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MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
MIssIssIPPI BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW:
A PROPOSAL FOR PROGRESS
Cecile C. Edwards*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mississippi's corporation law needs reform. Many of the provi-
sions in the corporation statute are peculiar, outdated or meaning-
less. The problems, however, are not limited to the statute: several
obsolete provisions of Mississippi corporation law may be traced
to the Mississippi Constitution.1 Unusual and outdated provisions
of Mississippi law create problems for lawyers attempting to plan
for corporate clients and impede economic development in Mis-
sissippi.
Nationally, corporation law has developed and changed rapid-
ly for some time, but Mississippi has not kept pace. Many provi-
sions in the Mississippi Act and Constitution are peculiar to
Mississippi or have been updated in other jurisdictions.' When
the Mississippi Legislature adopted the Mississippi Business Cor-
poration Law' in 1962,' it used as a guide the Model Business
Corporation Act' as it existed at the time of the Mississippi Law."
Since its enactment, the Model Act has undergone changes, but
unfortunately the Mississippi Legislature has ignored most of the
revisions made since 1962. Some of the deviations from the Model
Act were caused by provisions in the Mississippi Constitution;
others developed from legislative preferences which apparently
existed at the time. Unfortunately, many perceive Mississippi to
* B.B.A. and J.D., University of Mississippi. L.L.M., New York University. Associate Professor of Law,
Mississippi College School of Law.
1. MIss. CONST. art. VII, §§ 178 to 198-A.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 13-50.
3. 1962 Miss. Laws ch. 235, § 1; MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-1 to -293 (1972 & Supp. 1986). When the
statute was enacted in 1962, § 1 of the law provided: "This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the
Mississippi Business Corporation Act." When a new code was adopted by the Mississippi Legislature in 1972,
the name of the act was apparently changed editorially to the "Mississippi Business Corporation Law." In this
article, the Mississippi Business Corporation La-w may be referred to as the "Mississippi Statute" or the "Mis-
sissippi Act." The text of the sections cited herein is reprinted in Appendix A.
4. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-1 to -293 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
5. The Model Business Corporation Act is referred to herein as the "MBCA" or the "Model Act."
6. Proceedings of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Mississippi State Bar, 32 Miss. L. J. 339, App.
A at 405-06 (1961); Pr6ceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Mississippi State Bar, 33 Miss.
L.J. 407, App. A at 457-58 (1962).
7. See infra text following note 55.
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be "backward" or "out-of-step"8 with the rest of the nation.9 This
perception is increased by legal peculiarities that cause lawyers
from other jurisdictions to respond unfavorably to Mississippi be-
cause of the unusual nature of Mississippi's corporation law."0
When this occurs, Mississippi appears unattractive as a place to
conduct business, and lawyers representing out-of-state investors
or corporations considering business activities in Mississippi may
advise their clients to merely qualify to do business in Mississip-
pi while forming corporations in other jurisdictions." Worse yet,
lawyers may persuade clients simply to do business in other juris-
dictions. The purpose of this Article is to explain the need for
reform, highlight the obsolete portions of the Mississippi Act and
the Mississippi Constitution, and propose a plan for revision based
on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. 2
II. THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION
AND MISSISSIPPI CORPORATE LAW
There is a growing sentiment for constitutional reform in Mis-
sissippi today.' Many obsolete and embarrassing provisions have
been targeted by those wishing to modernize Mississippi's con-
stitution. Those in favor of a constitutional revision argue that
our present constitution is anti-business and retards economic de-
velopment. They also argue that it is too long and contains non-
fundamental provisions which would be better defined by statute.'
8. "Mississippi has a backwoods image outside of this state. We cause some of it ourselves." Jerry McDonald,
Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Economic Development, quoted in The State We're In:
Marketing Mississippi, Problems, Image Make State Hard to Sell, The Clarion-Ledger, tabloid reprint of ser-
ies, December 8-15, 1985, at 28. An interesting example of Mississippi's image in the business community
outside the state is cited in Business Week, Jan. 27, 1986. "L. F. Rothschild Chairman Thomas I. Unterberg
recalls that he choked on the soft drink he was sipping when Tranum told him he was mo ing to Mississippi.
'I wouldn't go near that place,' Unterberg says." Recio & Green, A Wall Street Banker with a Fast Track of
His Own, Bus. WK., Jan. 27, 1986, at 70, 72.
9. In addition, Mississippi has a very small body of corporate common law. As of February 24, 1986,
Mississippi had only 106 cases classified in West Publishing Company's digest under its key numbers related
to corporations. Most of these concerned jurisdictional problems. This small body of law contributes to the
uncertainty about Mississippi as a state in which to incorporate because there is no case law concerning a large
number of important topics. One reason Mississippi has a small body of case law is that there are relatively
few corporations incorporated in Mississippi. In order to correct this problem, Mississippi's law must become
more concrete.
10. See, e.g., Soderquist, Observations on a New Hawaii Corporation Statute, 3 U. HAWAII L. REv. 194,
195 (1981).
11. Id.
12. This Article will not address every provision of the Mississippi Business Corporation Law or the Mis-
sissippi Constitution, but only those provisions that need amendment because they are unmanageable or obso-
lete. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act will be referred to herein as the "RMBCA" or the "Revised
Model Act." See infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
13. Southwick, State Constitution Revision: Mississippi and the South, 32 Miss. LAW. 21, 22 (1985).
14. Id. For a discussion of the history of the corporate provisions of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890,
see Clark, Regulation of Corporations in the Mississippi Constitutional Convention of 1890, 48 J. Miss. HisT.
31 (1986).
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Article VH of the Mississippi Constitution governing corporate
law is ripe for amendment.
Three provisions are particularly unusual and outdated by na-
tional standards. The first is the portion of article VII, section
178 which provides that a corporation may not be granted exis-
tence for a period of more than 99 years."5 Second is the provi-
sion in article VII, section 194 of the Mississippi Constitution
which mandates cumulative voting in the election of directors,16
and third is the same provision and its effective prohibition on
non-voting common stock.'
A. Limited Corporate Life.
Mississippi is the only state in the nation which does not allow
perpetual incorporation.1" Section 178 was apparently designed
to allow a corporation to wind up without expense if at the end
of the charter period the state deemed it unwise to allow it to con-
tinue.'9 However, this provision has little meaning today and serves
no purpose other than to trap the unwary. Corporations are dis-
solved either voluntarily or involuntarily when necessary. The
corporation law of this state does not need a "sunset" provision,
particularly when it is so out of step with the corporation law in
the rest of the nation.2 ° The danger inherent in the provision out-
weighs any possible benefits. Although there is very little danger
in corporations outstaying their welcome, there is some potential
danger for corporations which, unaware of this strange provision
or unaware that the charter period has expired, continue their oper-
ation without a charter.2 This potential problem will become a
reality when corporate charters granted in the 1890's expire in
the 1990's.22 The Secretary of State's office does not know whether
any corporations face charter expiration in the next 10 or so years,
15. MISS. CONST. art VII, § 178; see also infra text accompanying notes 18-26.
16. Miss. CONST. art. VII, § 194; see also infra text accompanying notes 27-34.
17. MIss. CONST. art. VII, § 194; see also infra text accompanying notes 35-42.
18. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 42-43 (3rd ed. 1983).
19. G. ETHRIDGE, MIssIssIPPI CONSTITUTIONS 330 (1928).
20. See supra text accompanying note 8.
21. Those who purport to act as a corporation without statutory authority assume the supposed corporate
liability for thimnestes. Miss. CODE AN. S 79-3-295 (1972 & Supp. 1996).
22. Charters granted prior to 1950 were granted for only fifty years. In 1950, the statute was amended
to permit incorporation for a period of 99 years as the constitution provided. At the same time, the legislature
enacted a section which provides for an automatic charter extension when the 50 year period of incorporation
expires for those corporations chartered prior to 1950. The section provides that if the corporation continues
to do business for a period of 90 days after the expiration of its 50 year charter, the corporation's lifetime
shall be automatically extended to a term of 99 years from the date of its original charter. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 79-1-1 (1972). See 1950 Miss. Laws ch. 308, § 3 (amended in 1956, ch. 174, § 1).
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and has developed no plan to identify or notify those corpora-
tions when their charters are soon to expire."3
Perpetual incorporation is universally accepted among the cor-
porate bar and is one of the most often cited advantages of the
corporate form."' Very little history exists to explain why this pro-
vision prohibiting perpetual incorporation was inserted,"5 but prior
to 1890, perpetual life for corporations existed under Mississippi
law .26 This limiting provision should be deleted from the consti-
tution and the statute.
B. Mandatory Cumulative Voting.
Another provision which makes Mississippi seem unfriendly
to corporate interests is the provision in article VII, section 194
of the Mississippi Constitution which mandates cumulative vot-
ing in the election of directors7 Mississippi is one of the handful
of states with this requirement. " Although adopted to provide
minority shareholders with access to board representation, the cu-
mulative voting requirement has often failed to provide the
promised benefits and now provides limited protection only in
some closely held corporations.9
The cumulative voting provision is of little use in public com-
panies because there is usually no group which owns a signifi-
cant percentage of the stock, and if there is such a group, they
have enough shares to elect at least one director regardless of cu-
mulative voting3 ° In a closely held corporation, on the other hand,
cumulative voting may play a significant role because there are
few shareholders and a minority shareholder may obtain board
representation in no other way. Even in Mississippi, where most
of the corporations are closely held, there is no need for constitu-
23. Telephone interview with Ray Bailey, Assistant Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, Division
of Corporation Law (February 14, 1986).
24. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 132; 1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 467 (1765); W. CARY
& M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 21-22 (5th ed. abr. 1980).
25. Judge Ethridge stated in his treatise on Mississippi Constitutions that this provision "is for the purpose
of having the corporation wound up without expense if it should at the end of the charter period be thought
unwise to continue it." G. ETHRIDGE, MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTIONS 330 (1928).
26. Miss. REV. CODE §§ 2398, 2406 (1871).
27. MISS. CONST. art. VII, § 194. The purpose of cumulative voting is to provide minority shareholders
the opportunity to elect directors in roughly the same proportion to the shares that they own. ETHRIDGE, supra
note 19, at 361. Under cumulative voting, each shareholder is entitled to vote the number of shares owned
by him multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. The votes may be allocated among the candidates
for director in any mamver chosen by the shareholder. For a general discussion of cumnulative voting, see text
and articles cited infra notes 132-175.
28. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 42, 495; ARIz. CONST. art. IV, § 10; IDAHO CONST.
art. XI, § 4; Kv. Co NsT. art. 207; Miss. CONST. art. VII, § 194; Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 6; N. D. CoNST.
art. XH, § 6; S. D. CONST. art. XVII, § 5; W. VA. CoNsT. art. XI, § 4.
29. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 495. See also infta text at notes 160-204.
30. That group would probably be able to control the entire board. Soderquist, supra note 10, at 195 n.5.
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tionally mandated cumulative voting, as cumulative voting may
be provided for in either a "mandatory", "presumptive" or "per-
missive" statute," A number of states provide for presumptive
cumulative voting in the election of directors; that is, cumulative
voting exists if there is no statement in the articles concerning
voting, but the articles may provide otherwise. 2 Other states, the
majority, provide for "permissive" cumulative voting, permitting
the articles to govern the issue of shareholder voting, with cu-
mulative voting rights existing only if specifically granted by the
articles of incorporation."3 Cumulative voting is not a device which
insures minority representation on the board of directors, but only
a device which provides the opportunity of board representation
to those with a significant holding. The constitution is the docu-
ment which guarantees individual rights and freedoms, and the
subject of cumulative voting has no place in such a document."4
C. Inflexible Capital Structure.
Another provision which is often unnoticed and consequently
violated is the provision in article VII, section 194 of the Missis-
sippi Constitution, which apparently prevents Mississippi corpo-
rations from issuing any class of non-voting common stock.3
Section 194, which mandates cumulative voting, provides that all
shareholders must have the right to vote in the election of direc-
tors but provides an exemption for preferred stock where the ar-
ticles provide that there are no voting rights with respect to such
stock.36 This exception was inserted in the Mississippi Constitu-
tion in 1954 to allow for non-voting preferred stock.3 7
Mississippi is one of the few states which prohibit the use of
non-voting common stock. 8 Although unusual, this kind of pro-
vision causes little hardship for very large corporations because
31. For a discussion of the "mandatory" and "permissive" statutes governing cumulative voting, see infra
notes 160-63.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 160-204.
33. See infra note 163. Twenty-five jurisdictions now have permissive cumulative voting.
34. Cf Comment, Cumulative Voting -Advisability of Retaining the Cumulative Voting Provision in the
Pennsylvania Constitution, 8 VILL. L. REv. 391 (1963).
35. MIss. CONST. art. VII, § 194 (1890, amended 1954). Unfortunately, this type of provision was inter-
preted in People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 il. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922) and State ex rel.
Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 142 W. Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d 171 (1956) to prohibit the issuance of
any class of non-voting shares. But see State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561. 89 S.W. 872 (1905);
Shapiro v. Tropicana Lanes, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1963). The Mississippi section was amended in 1954
to permit the issuance of nion-voting preferred stock. 1954 Miss. Laws ch. 424.
36. Miss. CONST. art. VII, § 194 (1890, amended 1954).
37. HUEY B. HOWERTON, CHARLES N. FORTENBERRY, WILLIAM F. WINTER, DONALD S. VAUGHN, WIL-
LiAM J. BLASS, GEORGE W. ROGERS, RUSSELL H. BARRETT, EDWARD H. HOBBS, FREDRICK H. GAREAU, YESTER-
DAY'S CONSTITUTION TODAY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTiTtITION OF 1890 88 (1960).
38. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 499. See ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 32, § 7.40 (Smith-Hurd
1985); IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 4.
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the New York Stock Exchange will not list non-voting common
stock and prohibits any listed company from having any class of
non-voting common stock outstanding.3" Further, the Securities
and Exchange Commission regards non-voting common stock with
disfavor. ' The same is not true, however, for the majority of cor-
porations which are not governed by New York Stock Exchange
rules or by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In these
other corporations, which are usually owned and controlled by
a relatively small number of shareholders, non-voting common
stock may provide a convenient vehicle for the division of rela-
tive rights and preferences among shareholders. Some of the best
known methods for allocating control in a closely held corpora-
tion involve the issuance of either non-voting common stock or
common stock with limited voting rights. 1 Article VII, section
194 effectively prevents a corporation from dividing its capital
into more than one kind of common stock and therefore denies
the corporate bar the flexibility it needs to fashion creative struc-
tures for Mississippi corporations. "2 Section 194 of the Missis-
sippi Constitution should be deleted to allow for more flexibility
in corporate structure.
D. Miscellaneous Constitutional Provisions.
Other constitutional provisions which are anti-business in na-
ture should also be abandoned. These include provisions which
allow the legislature to restrict the power of corporations to ac-
quire and hold land, 3 which grant the legislature the power to
alter, amend or repeal any corporate charter without compliance
with the general laws," which prohibit the purchase of corporate
stock by municipalities," which limit the type of consideration
which may be accepted for stock by "transportation corporations," '
and which prohibit non-Mississippi corporations from owning or
operating a railroad in this state." Absurd as well as archaic, these
sections of the Mississippi Constitution were apparently ground-
ed in the fear of capital concentration, general distrust of corpo-
39. N.Y.S.E. COMPANY MANUAL § AI5, cited in H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 501.
40. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 322 (1976).
41. Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d
441 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 72d 800 (Sup. Ct, 1966 .
42. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46.
43. Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 84.
44. Id. at § 178.
45. Id. at § 183.
46. Id. at § 196.
47. Id. at§ 197.
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rations, and a need to protect the agricultural interests of the state."
These provisions, which were intended to address fears and cor-
rect problems in the 1890's, have no place in the 1980's and should
be abandoned, as the economic and political forces which led to
the anti-business sections of the constitution have largely abated.
The Governor's Constitutional Study Commission unanimous-
ly adopted recommendations on April 9, 1986, to amend or de-
lete these provisions from the constitution in the revision process. '
Such recommendations are well founded. Mississippi's constitu-
tion should be amended to contain only broad enduring princi-
ples rather than detailed materials that are better suited to a
statute." ° The section of the Mississippi Constitution concerning
corporation matters should do no more than recognize the right
of corporations and other forms of business organizations to ex-
ist, direct the legislature to provide general laws under which cor-
porate charters may be granted, amended, revoked and forfeited,
and guarantee corporations and other business organizations the
same basic rights accorded to individuals.
III. THE REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
AND THE MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act"' is a model stat-
ute designed to help states modernize their business corporation
laws.52 As such, the RMBCA is organized into chapters which
address the economic and social rights and duties of the corpora-
tion, its shareholders, its officers and its directors as well as the
responsibilities of the state in dealing with both domestic and for-
eign corporations." The RMBCA was developed by the Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law of the American Bar Association during five
years of extensive work and study."4 Because the Committee re-
48. Because of certain aggressive business practices in the 1880's, some of the state farmers became discon-
tented. The domination of the Constitutional Convention of 1890 by the "white farmers of the hilly counties
of east Mississippi" led to many of the anti-business provisions of the Mississippi Constitution. Clark, supra
note 14, at 31.
49. These recommendations were accepted by the Governor's Constitutional Study Commission on Febru-
ary 28, 1986. Telephone conversation with Brad Chism, Clerk of the Governor's Constitutional Study Com-
mission (May 20, 1986).
50. This is in accord with the statement of purpose adopted by the Governor's Constitutional Study Com-
mission considering amendment of Mississippi's constitution. It states: "We believe an effective state constitu-
tion should incorporate broad, lasting principles, as opposed to details of a statutory nature." Telephone
conversation with Brad Chism, Clerk of the Governor's Constitutional Study Commission (May 20, 1986).
51. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act will be referred to in this Article as the RMBCA. The
RMBCA is printed in full with the reporter's comments and annotations in MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
3d (1986). Selected provisions of the RMBCA are reprinted herein at Appendix B.
52. MODEL Bus. CoR'. ACT ANN. 3d xxiii (1986).
53. Id.
54. Id. at xxiv.
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lied on the knowledge of its members and the experience of several
important corporate states which have adopted innovative cor-
porate laws, the RMBCA represents the current trend in state bus-
iness corporation laws, and the reporter's comments provide
research tools for those who wish to consider new provisions.
In addition, the Model Business Corporation Act served as the
basis for the corporation law of 35 states 5 which are likely to
look to the RMBCA as a model for their respective revisions.
Its use as a revision tool by numerous states will cause the RMBCA
to have a significant impact on corporation law in general.
Mississippi is one of the 35 states which adopted the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA) as a foundation for its present
corporation laws. But when it adopted the 1959 version of the
MBCA, the Mississippi Legislature also adopted some interest-
ing deviations and has ignored virtually all subsequent revisions
to the MBCA. Thus, the Mississippi version of the MBCA is sub-
stantially out of date. The RMBCA provides Mississippi with the
opportunity to draw upon the experiences of other states and the
resources of the American Bar Association in order to modern-
ize its business corporation law. The RMBCA should be the foun-
dation for a complete revision of Mississippi corporation law.
The balance of this Article will explore important provisions
of the Mississippi Act, discuss problems associated with those
provisions and illustrate how the RMBCA will help solve those
problems.
A. Issues of Corporation Finance
Mississippi's corporation law has numerous corporate finance
restrictions which affect a corporation's ability to begin business,
as well as the legality of dividends, redemptions and other distri-
butions by a corporation to its shareholders. Restrictions of this
kind are usually categorized under the broad heading of "legal
capital." 6 Legal capital restrictions are founded upon the belief
that a corporation's capital accounts are important to the protec-
tion of its shareholders and creditors," and include concepts of
par value, stated capital, earned surplus and capital surplus." Legal
capital restrictions theoretically protect creditors two ways: first,
by requiring that a certain stated amount has been paid for the
shares, and second, by limiting distributions to shareholders either
55. Id.
56. For an explanation of legal capital problems in general, see B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON
LEGAL CAPITAL (2d ed. 1981).
57. See B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 18-20.
58. For definitions of these terms see infra text accompanying notes 101-07.
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by dividends or by repurchase of shares. 9 Legal capital provi-
sions were designed to protect creditors in their dealings with the
corporation by insuring that there was adequate capital to sup-
port the claims.6 As indicated below,61 the legal capital method
has failed as a creditor protection mechanism.
1. Prerequisites to Incorporation: Section 79-3-111.
Section 79-3-111 provides that a corporation must have accepted
subscriptions for and received at least one thousand dollars for
shares before it may transact business or incur any indebtedness. 2
Today, this section provides little or no meaningful protection to
persons who deal with the corporation."' In the last century, cap-
ital accounts were viewed as a "trust fund" for creditors."' The
"trust fund" theory has, however, been completely abandoned in
United States jurisdictions because capital accounts do not con-
tain any money at all."' Whether a corporation can pay an obliga-
tion usually depends upon its earnings, not upon its capital
accounts. 6 A security interest in property is a means for protec-
tion or insurance against disaster, not a mechanism to determine
whether a corporation can meet an obligation." In addition to fail-
ing to provide creditor protection, section 79-3-111 may work
to impose liability on unwitting directors who allow a corpora-
tion to begin business without the required one thousand dollars
of paid-in capital. " Section 79-3-91(e) provides that the direc-
tors who assent to the action of the corporation prior to such pay-
ment become jointly and severally liable for any part of the one
thousand dollars which was not paid in before the corporation be-
59. B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 35; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 429-33.
60. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 45(a) 2, at 890 (1971).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 62-134.
62. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-111 (1972).
63. Soderquist, supra note 10, at 194 n.3. Professor Soderquist explains that a one thousand dollar require-
ment is of little consequence by modem standards because of its very small amount and because it does nothing
to protect creditors. Id. at 194 n.3
64. Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, No. 17,944 (C.C.D. Me. 1824); See also Scovill v. Thayer, 105
U.S. 143 (1881); Livingston v. Adams, 225 Mo. App. 824, 43 S.W.2d 836 (1931).
65. Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 192-93, 50 N.W. 1117, 1119 (1892). The
court said:
The phrase that 'the capital of a corporation constitutes a trust fund for the benefit of creditors" is
misleading. Corporate property is not held in trust, in any proper sense of the term .... The capital
of a corporation is its property. It has the whole beneficial interest in it, as well as the legal title. It
may use the income and profits of it, and sell and dispose of it, the same as a natural person. It is
a trustee for its creditors in the same sense and to the same extent as a natural person, but no further.
Id; cf. Cargill, Inc. v. American Pork Producers, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 499 (D.S.D. 1977); Hunt, The Trust
Fund Theory and Some Substitutes for It, 12 Yale L.J. 63 (1902).
66. B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 14.
67. Id.
68. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-111 and 79-3-91(e) (1972 & Supp. 1986). See infra text accompanying note 69.
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gan to transact business.69 In light of the minimal protection provid-
ed to creditors, directors should not be expected to carry this
burden. Most states have abandoned this statute;7 ° Mississippi
should do the same.
2. Issuance of Shares: Par Value
Mississippi corporate law also requires that certain considera-
tion be paid for shares issued by a corporation. The considera-
tion requirements are based primarily on the concept of "par
value." Sections 79-3-27,-33 and -35 regulate the issuance of shares
and the consideration to be paid for shares when issued by Mis-
sissippi corporations. Section 79-3-27 provides that corporations
may issue shares with or without par value and in variations as
set forth in the articles of incorporation. However, section 79-3-33
adds an unusual requirement: shares with a par value may be is-
sued for consideration of not less than par value, and such stock
must have a par value of at least one dollar. This section also pro-
vides that no-par stock may be issued for such consideration as
the board in its discretion determines but that no-par shares must
not be issued for consideration of less than one dollar per share.
This one dollar minimum requirement is unique to Mississippi
and, in effect, precludes no-par stock.71
Section 79-3-33 prohibits any Mississippi corporation from is-
suing stock for less than one dollar in any circumstance.72 The
stock, if issued for less than one dollar, is assessable or watered.7"
As a result, a shareholder who pays less than par value (or less
than one dollar in the case of no-par stock) will be liable for the
difference between what he paid and the full amount of the par
value or for one dollar per share for no-par stock.7' Par value
has no discernible usefulness and may prove to be an unneces-
sary burden on a struggling corporation that wishes to sell addi-
tional shares of common stock at a time when the market price
69. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-91(e) (1972 & Supp. 1986).
70. B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 40.
71. Hodge and Perry, The Model Business Corporation Act: Does the Mississippi Version Dime the Bush-
es?, 46 Miss. L. J. 371, 380 (1975).
72. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-33 (1972).
73. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-47 (1972 & Supp. 1986). The term watered stock developed from the practice
of "aqsatizing of l veslock before w'6ging them in for sal." B. MsNING, supra TaV 56, at 20; I. HENN
J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, § 171, at 430.
74. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-47 (1972 & Supp. 1986). A number of theories have been advanced regarding
the liability of a shareholder who pays less than the required consideration for the shares. Most of these the-
ories have been replaced by statute today. This is true in Mississippi as well. Mississippi's provision on share-
holders' liability for watered stock is identical to the old Model Act formulation. The basis for the obligation
is now statutory. id. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, § 171, at 431-33.
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of its stock is less than one dollar per share.7
The apparent reason for the inclusion of this one dollar mini-
mum provision was to prevent the issuance of "penny stock"76 that
could be misleading to the public.77 If penny stock is deemed to
be a problem in Mississippi, the matter should be addressed un-
der state securities laws, not in the general corporation laws."'
There is no reason to subject all Mississippi corporations to this
unusual requirement when all corporations seeking to sell highly
speculative investments to the public could be and are regulated
by state and federal securities laws.79
Not only should the one dollar par and no-par requirement be
dropped from Mississippi's law, the entire concept of par value
should be abandoned in favor of a fiduciary standard based on
valuation and reason. Par value is a dollar amount assigned to
corporate shares in the corporate charter and has nothing to do
with the market value of shares which are traded or the underly-
ing value of the assets of the business represented by shares. As
one author stated, "p]ar value is a term so generally misunder-
stood and so completely without significance that many compa-
nies today either do not set any [par] value on their stock, in which
case it is known as no-par stock,"0 or they fix a value . . . so low
that it could not possibly be misinterpreted as an index of its real
value.""
Historically, par value served valid purposes. Par value was
designed to provide the capital needed by a firm to begin or ex-
pand and to provide value as a basis upon which credit could be
75. A corporation whose stock is trading at less than one dollar per share may be unable to issue additional
shares because it is practically impossible to sell shares at above market. This section would force a corpora-
tion which desires or needs to sell more stock to modify its capital structure in order to raise additional capital.
Such a corporation could amend its articles and effect a recapitalization, a reverse stock split or a merger.
Unfortunately, this type of procedure would require a shareholder vote which might necessitate an expensive
proxy solicitation. Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 381.
76. The term "penny stocks" refers to low priced stocks (priced at under five dollars per share) which are
sold by new or questionable companies and "peddled" by high-pressure sale techniques. One author suggests
that "anyone who takes a flyer on this kind of deal is much more apt to lose everything he puts into it than
he is to make a whopping profit." L. ENGLE & B. BOYD, HOW TO Buy STOCKS 149 (7th ed. 1982).
77. Hldge ansd Perf, sUpro nate 71, at 3W0. This provislon is not a arrywer of pFi MiSsissippi 1aN
on the issue of par or no-par stock. This one dollar minimum requirement came into being with the Mississippi
Business Corporation Law in 1962. See Miss. CoD ANN. § 5309-59 (1942).
78. See Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 380.
79. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-71-101 to -735 (Supp. 1986).
80. This is not possible in Mississippi. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
81. L. ENGEL & B. BOYD, supra note 76, at 10; accord W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 728;
B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 36.
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obtained. 2 Par value also served to protect shareholders by as-
suring that every purchaser paid the same price for the shares pur-
chased in the offering.8 The established practice was to set the
par value of shares and to sell the shares at that price.8" The basic
rule developed that shares could be issued by a corporation for
no less than par value." If a corporation issued stock for less than
par value, the shareholder was liable to the corporation and to
its creditors for the difference between the par value and the price
actually paid."6 In most states now, liability for "watered stock"
is statutory.8 7 Watered stock liability serves not only to penalize
those guilty of fraud, but the uninformed innocent as well. General
concepts of fiduciary duty would serve the same purpose without
imposing liability on those who are merely uninformed.
The legal capital rules and restrictions no longer serve their in-
82. W. CARY * M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 727; B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 19. This function
is satirized in W.S. Gilbert's verse:
Some Seven men form an Association
(If possible, all Peers and Baronets)
They start off with a public declaration
To what extent they mean to pay their debts
That's called their Capital...
Sir William Schwenck Gilbert, Utopia, Limited or The Flowers of Progress, first performed at the Savoy Theater,
London, October 7, 1893, conducted by Sir Arthur Sullivan. L. Ayre, The Gilbert and Sullivan Companion
436 (New York: Dodd, Mead 1972).
83. W. CARY A M. EISENBEERO, supra note 24, at 729; B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 19.
84. W. CARY A M. EISENBERO, supra note 24, at 729; B. MANNING, supra note 56, at 19.
85. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, § 123, at 283.
86. For a discussion of the four theories for finding liability when the full par value is not paid, see H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, § 171, at 431-35.
87. ALA. CONST. art. XII, 8 236; IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 17; MO. CONST. art XI, 8 8; OHIO CONST.
art. XIII, § 3; OR. CONST. art. XI, § 3; ALA. CODE § 10-2A-43 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.126 (1962);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 10-025 (1956 & Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-210 (1980); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 410 (West 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. 8 7-4-120 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8 33-350 (West
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 162 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-322 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.074
(West 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-110 (1982); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 416-92 (1985); IDAHO CODE 8 30-1-25
(1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 6.40 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-26-3 (Burns Supp. 1986);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.24 (West 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. 8 17-6412 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271A.125 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 8 12:93 (West 1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 509 (1981.); MD. CORPS a ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-215 (1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, 8 23 (West
1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 8 450.1317 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. 6§ 302A.405, 302A.425 (West
1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-47 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 351.275 (Vernon 1966); MONT. CODE ANN.
8 35-1-510 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. 8 21-2024 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. 88 78.225, 78.230 (1979); N.H.
Rav. STAT. ANN. 8 293-A:25 (Supp. 1985); N. J. STAT. ANN. 8 14A:5-30 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.
88 53-2-8, 53-11-25 (1978 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 628, 629, 630 (McKinney 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § §55-53, 55-54 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-69 (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 8 1701.18
(Baldwin 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 88 1.83, 1.84 (West 1986); OR. REv. STAT. § 57,131 (1985);
15 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. 8 1609 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS 8 7-1.1-23 (1985); S. C. CODE ANN. §
33-11-230 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. 8 47-3-22 to 47-3-25 (1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-1-719 (1984); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.21 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10-23 (1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. XI, 8 1871 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.205
(Supp. 1987); W.VA. CODE 8 31-1-89 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. 8 180.20 (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-122
(1977).
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tended purposes. Par value in no way indicates what a corpora-
tion's shares are worth, nor does it guarantee that the capital of
the corporation is adequate for it to do business or obtain credit.
Par value is a number which is an historical representation of an
event which occurred in the past. As with historical cost finan-
cial statements, more current information is needed to make rele-
vant decisions regarding a company's financial position. The par
value rules also fail to insure that all shareholders pay the same
price for their shares. No law requires that all shareholders pay
the same price for their shares; and, as long as there is full dis-
closure among the shareholders and no fraud, an arrangement for
shareholders to pay differing prices for their shares is valid.8
Therefore, any "parity" concept of par value is outdated and no
longer valid. Furthermore, in most states, corporations may set
par at any number and may also create stock with no par value.
Therefore, par in no way represents "capital" in the business con-
text.8" The flexibility accorded by no-par and low par stock is,
of course, subject to the fiduciary duties of the directors in their
dealings with subscribers.
In some state statutes, and in the RMBCA, the concept of par
value has been abandoned completely, allowing a corporate board
to issue stock in exchange for any consideration which it, in the
exercise of its good faith business judgment, decides is reason-
able and fair." Section 6.21 of the RMBCA provides that the board
of directors must determine if the consideration paid or to be paid
for the shares is adequate and further provides that the determi-
nation of the board of directors regarding the adequacy of con-
sideration is conclusive." This approach solves the problems of
"watered stock" liability for issuing shares at a price below par
value and relies on the principle of fiduciary duty to protect share-
holders and creditors against fraud.9"
88. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 731 (1926);
Milberg v. Baum, 25 N.Y.S.2d 451 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., 15 Del. Ch.
119, 132 A. 442 (Ch. 1926), affd, 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1927); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 18, at 424.
89. Capital is defined as "[aiccumulated goods, possessions and assets, used for the production of profits
and wealth ... ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 189 (5th ed. 1979). Manning says that the term "legal capital"
has "little or no relationship" to the word "capital" as the economist or business person knows it. B. MANNING,
supra note 56, at 34.
90. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 205, 409,418 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.401,
302A.405 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-605, 35-1-606, 35-1-610 (1985); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
3d § 6.21 official comment (1986).
91. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 6.21 (1986).
92. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 6.21 official comment (1986). The price of the shares and the
problem of equality of treatment of shareholders is a matter of fairness and judgment by the board of directors
which cannot be effectively addressed by a concept like par value. Id.
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3. Issuance of Shares: Consideration
Section 79-3-35 applies also to the original issuance of shares
by a Mississippi corporation.9" This section sets forth the types
of consideration which may be paid for shares of a corporation
upon issuance,94 stating that shares may be issued in exchange
for money, property or labor actually performed for the corpora-
tion." Neither promissory notes nor future services may consti-
tute legal consideration for shares."' The primary purpose of this
section was to protect against fraud those creditors who do not
have the opportunity to look behind the balance sheet. 9' Another
stated purpose of the provision was to protect shareholders who
had paid for their shares with money or tangible property against
dilution of their investment.98 While this section was taken without
substantial amendment from the 1959 version of the Model Act,
it is now outdated and should be amended. The section ignores
the fact that many different types of consideration, including
promissory notes and contracts for future services, may have value
to the corporation. This is a matter for the discretion of the board.
Also, because its provisions are so easily circumvented, the sec-
tion as it now exists fails to prevent fraud.99 The RMBCA takes
a new approach and recognizes that there are many types of
benefits for which a corporation should be empowered to issue
stock." ° Section 6.21 of the RMBCA provides that shares may
be issued in exchange for "consideration consisting of any tangi-
ble or intangible property or benefit to the corporation, including
cash, promissory notes, services performed, contracts for ser-
vices to be performed, or other securities of the corporation." This
leaves the determination of the value of offered consideration to
the discretion of the board of directors. In most instances, the
board of directors is in the best position to make this decision.
Of course, if there is fraud or deceit, the action would be subject
to challenge as a breach of fiduciary duty. This RMBCA formu-
la is functionally sound.
93. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-35 (1972).
94. Id.
95. Id. The Mississippi Constitution also provides that .transportation corporations" may issue stock only
in exchange for money, labor done or property. Miss. CONST. art. VII, § 196.
96. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-35 (1972).
97. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 19 official comment (1971).
98. Id.
99. Corporations will often issue a bonus or an advance of saary to an employee and allow him to use
the funds to purchase shares. Similarly, a corporation may lend money (subject to the prohibitions of Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-3-89 (1972)) to a prospective shareholder and allow that person to purchase shares with the
proceeds of the loan.
100 . MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 6.21 official comment (1986).
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4. Dividends, Repurchases and Other Distributions
Another major function of the legal capital structure is to pro-
tect creditors and senior shareholders against excessive distribu-
tions of company assets to shareholders of the corporation, either
in the form of dividends or repurchases. Whether a corporation
may pay a dividend or make any distribution usually depends upon
the law of the state of incorporation. Most states which adopt tradi-
tional concepts of legal capital adhere to the same language.
In order to understand fully the legal capital restrictions on dis-
tributions to shareholders, one must understand the meaning of
terms such as par value, stated capital, surplus, capital surplus
and earned surplus. Par value, as discussed above, is an arbitrary
dollar figure assigned to a class of stock. Shares with par value
may not be sold for less than that price."' Stated capital is an
amount derived from the multiplication of par value by the num-
ber of shares outstanding, plus the sale price of all no-par shares
(less any amount transferred to surplus), plus any amount trans-
ferred to stated capital by the board of directors. 2 Surplus is usual-
ly defined as the excess of net assets over stated capital."0 Surplus
consists of earned surplus and capital surplus." ' Earned surplus
is that portion of surplus which represents the profits or earnings
of the corporation which have not been distributed to share-
holders.' 05 Capital surplus, the unearned surplus of the compa-
ny,'0 usually consists of amounts paid for stock in excess of par.'
Other surplus may result from contributions or revaluation of as-
sets. 8 These concepts are important to the dividend and repur-
chase restrictions in the Mississippi provisions as well as most
other states' current law. Most states follow the general rule that
101. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-27 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
102. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-3(k) (1972 & Supp. 1986); W. CARY & M. EISENBERo, supra note 24, at
809. For example, if there are 1000 shares of $5.00 par value shares outstanding, stated capital is $5000.00.
103. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-3(1) (1972 & Supp. 1986); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 809.
104. W. CARY & M. EISENBEERG, supra note 24, at 809.
105. MiSs. Cons ANN. % 79-3-31{) (1972 & Supp. 196); W. Csa, & M. EIENBERG, supra note 24, t 809.
106. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-3(n) (1972 & Supp. 1986); W. CARY & M. EISENBERO, supra note 24, at 809.
107. W. CARY & M. EISENBERO, supra note 24, at 809.
108. Generally accepted accounting principles adhere to the representation of assets at historical cost. However,
when a corporation's real estate increases in value, the corporation may want to "write up" the asset on the
left-hand side of the balance sheet, thus creating a surplus on the right-hand side. In Randall v. Bailey, 23
N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), affd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942) the court upheld a dividend distribu-
tion based on this "revaluation surplus."
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dividends may be paid only to the extent of earned surplus,' 9 or
perhaps to the extent of surplus."' The policy surrounding divi-
dend limitations is that once money or property is contributed to
the corporation, it should remain in the corporation as a protec-
tion for creditors and senior shareholders."' These restrictions,
while obsolete, are still very much alive in the Mississippi Busi-
ness Corporation Law.
a. Dividend Restrictions
When the Mississippi Legislature adopted the dividend provi-
sions for the Mississippi Act, it deviated substantially from the
1959 version of the Model Act. The Mississippi Legislature adopt-
ed the Model Act formulations in sections 79-3-83 and -85,"' but
also adopted another section, 79-3-87,"' which complicates and
confuses the Mississippi version.
Section 79-3-83 provides that dividends of cash, property or
its own shares may be paid by the corporation at the discretion
of the board of directors unless the corporation is insolvent or
the payment of the dividend would render the corporation
insolvent". or unless there is a provision to the contrary in the
articles of incorporation."' This section limits the amount of divi-
dends of cash and property to the extent of unreserved and
109. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-67 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.204 (1962); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-045
(1956); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-110 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-356 (b) (West 1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.137 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-90 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-45
(1980); IND. CODE ANN. 23-1-2-15 (Burns 1984); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.225 (Baldwin 1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 515 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2043 (1983); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
293-A:45 (Supp. 1985); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-44 (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-92 (1985);
OR. REV. STAT. § 57.216 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-40 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-9-150 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1985); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 47-3-71 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-511 (1984); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.38 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-41 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
XI § 1889 (1984); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.420 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-99 (1982);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.38 (West 1957 & Supp. 1986); WYO. STAT. § 17-1-139 (1977).
110. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-402 (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-340
(1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-91 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 9.10 (Smith-Hurd 1985);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.41 (West 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6420 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:63 (West 1969); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-309 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1351
(West 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.220 (Vernon 1966); NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.290 (1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:7-14 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-50 (1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.33 (Baldwin 1979 & Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1.133 (West 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1702 (Purdon 1967).
111. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 805.
112. MIss. CODE ANN, §§ 79-3-83, 79-3-85 (1972 & Stpp. 19963, MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 24§
45-46 (1971).
113. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-87 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
114. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-83 (1972 & Supp. 1986). The term insolvent is defined in the Act to mean
the "inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business." Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-3-3(o) (1972 & Supp. 1986).
115. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-83 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
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unrestricted" 6 earned surplus,"" provides for the payment of divi-
dends from depletion reserves of "wasting asset" corporations if
the articles so provide, and provides for the payment of stock divi-
dends from any surplus."' With respect to "stock dividends," the
section states that share dividends may be paid with either treas-
ury or unissued shares." 9 Unissued shares may be issued as a divi-
dend to the extent of any unreserved and unrestricted surplus. 2
If unissued shares are used, an amount equal to par value must
be transferred to stated capital, or an amount adopted by the board
of directors if the shares have no par value."'
Section 79-3-85 provides that a corporation may make distri-
butions in cash or property to its shareholders from its capital sur-
plus if (1) the corporation is not insolvent and the distribution
would not render the corporation insolvent, (2) the articles of in-
corporation so provide or the shareholders approve by a two-thirds
vote, (3) all cumulative dividends are paid, (4) the distribution
will not reduce the net assets of the corporation below the total
preferential amount payable to holders of preference shares upon
voluntary liquidation and (5) the distribution is identified as a dis-
tribution from capital surplus at the time of the payment."' So
end the provisions parallel to the Model Act."
3
To the Model Act dividend provision, the Mississippi Legisla-
ture added section 79-3-87, which provides that notwithstanding
anything else, the board of directors may pay "cash dividends"
only from unrestricted and unreserved earned surplus." 4 This sec-
tion immediately follows the section which provides for distribu-
tions from capital surplus if the articles or shareholders allow it.
The reason for this provision and its effect are still unclear. Other
authors speculate that it may have resulted from "a perceived weak-
ness" in the Model Act provisions limiting distributions to share-
holders. "2 The section could be construed to mean that a
corporation may not rely on section 79-3-85 to make a cash dis-
116. The term "unreserved and unrestricted" is not defined in the Mississippi statute. Miss. CODE ANN.§
79-3-83 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
117. Id.
118. Id. A wasting asset corporation is one which is involved in the exploitation of natural resources which
are subject to depletion allowances. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 897 n.62; MODEL Bus.
ColR. ACT ANN. 2d § 45(b) (1971).
119. MIss. CODE ANN. % 79-3-43 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
120. Id.
121. Id. Remember that even no-par shares may not be issued for consideration of less than one dollar. Miss.
CoDE ANN. § 79-3-33 (1972).
122. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-85 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
123. See infra text accompanying notes 124-28.
124. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-87 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
125. Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 376-77.
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tribution to shareholders from capital surplus."2 6 If this is true,
any such payment would be illegal, and the directors and share-
holders might incur personal liability for the illegal distribution."'
Further, the section may be read to prevent distributions of
property as well as cash, and if interpreted in this manner, the
section would prohibit certain types of divisive reorganizations
permitted under section 79-3-85.1"8
b. Repurchase Restrictions
Mississippi's repurchase provision, section 79-3-9, states that
a Mississippi corporation has the right to repurchase its own
shares. Such purchases may be made, however, only to the ex-
tent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus. Like section
79-3-85, section 79-3-9 provides that repurchases may be made
to the extent of capital surplus if the articles so provide or if such
repurchase is approved by a two-thirds vote of its shareholders."'
Because of this section, the rigid restrictions of section 79-3-87
may be avoided. Using 79-3-9, a corporation may accomplish a
distribution from capital surplus by repurchasing a certain num-
ber of shares from its shareholders pro rata.
One major problem caused by the restriction of share repur-
chases occurs in the area of repurchase agreements used to pro-
tect ownership interests in close corporations. The problems center
around the corporation's legal ability to comply with its contrac-
tual obligations to its shareholders. Often corporations enter into
agreements to repurchase shares upon the occurrence of a cer-
tain event, such as the death or disability of the shareholder. If
so, the corporation must have enough legal capital (earned sur-
plus or capital surplus if allowed) to repurchase the shares. If the
problem is not anticipated, the corporation may have an obliga-
tion and a need to repurchase shares but find that such action is
illegal at the time of the repurchase.
If a dividend is paid or a repurchase is effected without the
proper "legal capital," the directors who assent to such action may
be liable to the corporation for the illegal portion of the distribu-
126. Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 377.
127. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
128. Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 378.
129. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-9 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
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tion."' Further, any shareholder who receives the distribution will
be liable for contribution to the corporation for the amount received
if the shareholder knew of the illegality of the distribution or repur-
chase. 1
In keeping with its rejection of the concept of par value, the
RMBCA rejects the legal capital approach entirely."' It places
the decision regarding distributions to shareholders in the hands
of the board of directors."' Distributions are allowable (legal) un-
less, immediately after the distribution or repurchase, the corpo-
ration would be unable to pay its debts as they become due or
unless the corporation's assets fail to exceed its liabilities plus an
amount necessary to meet the liquidation preferences of any class
of stock senior to that receiving the distribution. " The RMBCA
also provides that a corporation is not bound by general-
ly accepted accounting principles in its determination, but may
rely on the fair market value of its assets at the time of the distri-
bution or repurchase.' 5 Because it relies on current values and
solvency to determine whether and to what extent a corporation
may make distributions to its shareholders,' the RMBCA is an
improvement on traditional dividend restriction statutes, like the
Mississippi Act, which rely on historical events and arbitrary for-
mulae to determine whether a corporation may legally distribute
money or property to its shareholders. The RMBCA approach
is an effective, realistic method of dividend and repurchase re-
striction and should be adopted in Mississippi.
B. Flexible Capital Structure
The Mississippi Constitution and the Mississippi Statute pro-
hibit Mississippi corporations from issuing non-voting common
stock." 7 Section 194 of the Mississippi Constitution entitles all
shares to vote cumulatively in the election of directors, but pro-
vides an exemption for preferred stock.'38 Therefore, the section
130. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972 & Supp. 1986). That section also provides that any director present
at the meeting when the action is approved shall be deemed to have assented to the transaction unless his dissent
is entered in the minutes of the meeting or unless he files a written dissent with the secretary of the corporation
before or immediately after the adjournment of the meeting. Id. The section also provides a defense for direc-
tors who rely in good faith upon the regular books and records of the corporation which are represented to
be correct by the president, the officer of the corporation in charge of the books and records or a certified
public accountant. Id.
131. Id.




136. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 6.40 (1986).
137. Miss. CONST. art. VII, § 194; Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-27 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
138. MIss. CONST. art. VII, § 194.
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is interpreted to prevent the issuance of any common shares with
limited voting rights. 139 The statute, section 79-3-27, follows this
interpretation and apparently provides that voting rights can be
limited only with respect to preferred shares."' 0 This prohibition
is particularly unfortunate because issuance of non-voting com-
mon stock is one of the best methods to allocate rights and prefer-
ences among shareholders in closely held corporations."' In many
closely held corporations, control can be effectively allocated
among the shareholders by issuing different classes of common
shares and providing that each class of stock is entitled to elect
a certain number of directors.' In many cases, corporations are
formed under the laws of other jurisdictions in order to take ad-
vantage of more flexible capital structure options. Mississippi
should amend the constitution and the statute in favor of a com-
pletely flexible capital structure.
The RMBCA provides the type of flexibility Mississippi needs
in the statute. Section 6.01 authorizes a corporation to issue shares
in any classes and provides almost unlimited flexibility in struc-
turing a corporation to meet the needs and desires of the share-
holders."4 3 Further, the RMBCA completely abandons the terms
"common" and "preferred" with respect to shares."' Under the
RMBCA, a corporation may issue as many classes of shares as
it deems appropriate and may call them anything it likes.' The
traditional terms may be used, but are unnecessary. The drafters
indicate that the terms "common" and "preferred" may be mis-
leading because common stock may be created with significant
preferences and preferred may be subordinate to common in cer-
tain circumstances.' 6 The RMBCA provides significant advan-
tages to corporate counsel in planning and creating the capital
139. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
140. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-27 (1972 & Supp. 1986) provides that "[t]he articles of incorporation may
limit or deny the voting rights of or provide special voting rights for the shares of any class or preferred stocks
to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter." (emphasis added). Apparently, the statute
was designed to allow only non-voting preferred shares and not non-voting common shares. The "or" is appar-
ently a typographical error and should be "of."
141. O'NEAL, CLOSE COPORATIONS, LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 2.15, 3.17-20 (1971) (provides advice and
examples of how non-voting common shares can be used to allocate control in close operations); PAINTER,
CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 3.8 (1981).
142. Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d
441 (1947); Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1966); PAINTER, supra note 141,
at § 3.8.
143. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 6.01 (1986).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 5 6.01 official comment.
[VOL. 6:1
MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
structure for closely held corporations and should be adopted in
Mississippi following constitutional amendment.
C. Shareholders
1. Voting
Mississippi's provisions relating to shareholder voting rights
need amendment 1"7 This section of the Article will address share-
holder voting problems relating to the election of directors and
the approval of changes fundamental to corporate existence un-
der Mississippi law.
a. Quorum and Voting Requirements
Quorum requirements are designed to allow for adequate
representation of shareholders before any action is taken at a cor-
poration's shareholders meeting."" In Mississippi, a majority of
the shares entitled to vote on a matter constitutes a quorum un-
less the articles of incorporation provide otherwise. 9 The Mis-
sissippi version also contains a provision which prohibits the
articles from reducing the number of shares necessary to consti-
tute a quorum below one-third.' ° Section 79-3-61 also sets out
the voting requirements for shareholder action: unless the arti-
cles of incorporation or bylaws provide for a higher number and
if a quorum is present, the affirmative vote of a majority of those
shares represented at the meeting constitutes approval of the ac-
tion voted upon.'
This section is not at all unusual, but a more modern statute
has developed. " From a modem perspective, the Mississippi stat-
ute has a major flaw. The section does not provide any automatic
protection for superquorum or supermajority voting provisions
in the articles of incorporation. A well drafted three-fourths su-
permajority voting or quorum requirement in case of a merger
or consolidation inserted in the articles of a Mississippi corpora-
tion may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the shareholders
unless the articles require a three-fourths vote to amend that pro-
vision of the articles. Although clearly authorized in the statute,
147. See also infra text accompanying notes 148-62.
148. Notice is also important to protect shareholders in the same situation. The notice and quorum require-
ments work together.
149. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-61 (1912).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.094 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-116 (1982);
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1415 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:5-9, 14A:5-11
(1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 608, 614 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-65 (1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-1.1-30 (1985); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 2.28 (Vernon 1980); see also MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. 3d § 7.27 (1986).
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an amendment to the articles to remove a supermajority voting
requirement is not in accord with the intent of the drafters of the
articles. Automatic protection of supermajority voting and quo-
rum requirements should be a priority in any statutory revision.
The RMBCA takes a new approach to the entire area of quo-
rum and voting problems by providing simply that unless the ar-
ticles provide otherwise, a quorum is a majority of the shares
entitled to vote on the matter."5 3 The section allows the articles
to increase the number required for a quorum to unanimity or
decrease the number to as few as the incorporators or shareholders
desire.'" The one-third minimum was deleted from the RMBCA
because it was "thought to be unreasonably confining in certain
situations."' The section also provides for a new method for de-
termining the result of a shareholder vote. Instead of treating ab-
staining shares as "no" votes as is done in the Mississippi Act,
the RMBCA provision provides that a matter is approved by the
shareholders if there are more votes cast in favor of the action
than votes cast against the action.5 6 Therefore, true abstention
is available instead of every abstention being treated as a "no"
vote. The RMBCA also provides automatic protection to any su-
permajority provisions contained in the articles of incorporation.""
Section 7.27 requires that any amendment of a provision provid-
ing supermajority voting or quorum requirements be approved
by the same supermajority margin."5 8 The RMBCA provides that
if there is a supermajority voting or quorum provision in the arti-
cles, the quorum to meet and vote required to change that provi-
sion must be at least as great as the supermajority vote or quorum
it sets.' The RMBCA approach solves several shareholder vot-
ing problems which exist under the Mississippi Act. First, cor-
porations with a large number of shareholders occasionally find
it difficult to procure enough proxies to hold the required share-
holders meetings. The RMBCA provision which allows the arti-
cles of incorporation to set a lower than one-third quorum provides
flexibility for these larger corporations. The RMBCA deals with
another shareholder apathy problem by treating shares which do
153. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 7.25 (1986).
154. Id; see MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 7.25 official comment (1986).
155. The example mentioned by the reporter in the comment to section 7.25 of the RMBCA is "where a
class of shares with preferential rights is given a limited right to vote that may be exercisable only rarely."
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d % 7.25 official comment 5 (1986).
156. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 7.25 (1986).
157. Id. at § 7.27.
158. Id.
159. Id. For example, if the articles provide that any merger must be approved by two-thirds of the outstand-
ing shares, regardless of class, any proposal to amend that section of the articles would have to be approved
by a two-thirds vote of the outstanding shares, regardless of class.
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not vote at a meeting, or in some cases which do not appear at
a meeting, as abstentions rather than "no" votes, as the current
law does. These two aspects of the RMBCA help prevent the
detrimental effects of shareholder apathy. Further, the RMBCA
shareholder voting provisions provide automatic protection for
superquorum and supermajority voting requirements. The
RMBCA shareholder voting sections should be adopted in Mis-
sissippi.
b. Election of Directors
One important item to be addressed in a revision of the Missis-
sippi Business Corporation Law is the issue of cumulative voting
in the election of directors. The purpose of cumulative voting is
to give minority shareholders the opportunity to participate in the
management of the corporation through the mechanism of board
representation."' Currently, the Mississippi Constitution mandates
that all classes of common stock have cumulative voting rights
in the election of directors. Without a change in the constitution,
cumulative voting will continue in every Mississippi corporation. 6"
If the constitution is amended to remove mandatory cumulative
voting, the statute may then be amended to allow for straight voting
in the election of directors if the corporation so desires. 62 Mis-
sissippi will then have to choose one of four basic possibilities
regarding the status of cumulative voting under Mississippi law:
(1) make cumulative voting mandatory by statute; (2) adopt
presumptive cumulative voting, that is, provide that all shares of
voting stock vote cumulatively in the election of directors unless
the articles of incorporation provide otherwise; (3) adopt permis-
sive cumulative voting, that is, provide that cumulative voting for
the election of directors exists only if expressly reserved to the
shareholders in the articles of incorporation; or (4) prohibit cu-
mulative voting in the election of directors.
There has in the past been a great deal of scholarly debate about
the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory cumulative vot-
ing, but the debate has largely died out because most state stat-
160. Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus. Law. 3, 15 (April 1955).
The theory is based on John Stuart Mill's REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. Mill, Representative Government,
in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 327 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952). The idea was that the minority
should be represented in any deliberative body. Id. at 3-4.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
162. The Mississippi statute provides that directors must be elected by cumulative voting. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 79-3-63 (1972).
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utes are now permissive.'6 The Mississippi Legislature may now
be compelled to deal with the issue in some detail; therefore, this
Article will briefly explore some of the arguments for and against
cumulative voting.
Arguments in favor of cumulative voting include the follow-
ing: first, owners of a corporation should have the same right to
representation on the board of directors, which controls the cor-
poration, as any other group in our society has a right to be
represented in governmental bodies.1" A second argument in favor
of cumulative voting is that it is the only device available to in-
sure minority representation.16 A related argument is that cumula-
tive voting allows minority shareholders to express their views
before the entire board of directors, whereas under straight vot-
ing the minority has no voice at the board level. 66 Proponents
of cumulative voting argue further that the presence of minority
directors will serve to make the directors more sensitive to the
163. Most state statutes allow the corporation either to choose cumulative voting in the charter or opt out
of cumulative voting in the charter. Only 16 states still have mandatory cumulative voting. CAL. CONST. art.
12, § 1, Note 33; Mo, CONST. art. 11, § 6; S.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 5; Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-033(D)
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-219 (1980); CAL. COlR'. CODE § 708 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 416-74 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-33(d) (Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6504 (1981);
Ky. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.165 (Baldwin 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-63 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-506 (1985); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 21-2033 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-39 (1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.55(c) (Baldwin 1979); S.D. CODMnmD LAWS ANN. § 47-5-6 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-93
(1982); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-130 (1977). Only 9 states have presumptive cumulative voting. ALASKA
STAT. § 10.05.162 (1985); COLO. RaV. STAT. § 7-4-116 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 7.40 (Smith-Hurd
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.215 (West 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1505 (Purdon Supp. 1986);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.29(D) (Vernon 1980); S. C. CODE § 33-11-200 (Supp. 1985); WASH. Rav.
CODE ANN. § 23A.08.300 (Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-67 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
Twenty-five jurisdictions now have permissive cumulative voting. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-53(d) (1975); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-325 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 214 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-327(d)
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.097(4) (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-117(d) (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-2-9(k) (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.32 (West Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:75 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 622 (1964); MD. CORPS. &
ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-104(b)(7) (1985); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1451 (West 1973); NEV. RaV.
STAT. § 78.360 (1983); N.H. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:33 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14a:5-24 (West
1969 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-33 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 618 (McKinney
1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1.68(c) (West 1951); OR. REv. STAT. 57.170(4) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-1.1-31 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-712 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10.31 (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. § 1879 (1984); VA. CODE § 13.1-669 (Supp. 1985).
164. Steadman and Gibson, Should Cumulative Voting for Directors be Mandatory? - A Debate, 11 Bus.
LAW. 9, 16 (Nov. 1955); see also Campbell, supra note 160, at 15., This idea comes directly from John Stuart
Mill's theory of representative government. Mill, Representative Government, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 327 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952). One authority has said, "Cumulative voting is so obviously
in accord with our basic political philosophy of group representation and the party system that it is difficult
to understand the legislature's repeated rejection of it ... " Young, The Case for Cumulative Voting, 1950
Wis. L. Rav. 49.
165. Steadman and Gibson, supra note 136, at 16-17; see also Campbell, supra note 160, at 15.
166. Young, supra note 164, at 55; Campbell, supra note 160, at 15; Steadman and Gibson, supra note
164, at 17.
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wishes of all of the shareholders'67 and will operate to make board
meetings a forum for all shareholders, not just the majority. 68
A fifth argument is that the presence of minority interests on
the board "keeps the game more honest."'69 The argument is that
the mere existence of the right to vote cumulatively and elect
minority representatives may be enough to curb management ex-
cesses and abuses. 7' The argument continues that cumulative vot-
ing not only curbs mismanagement, but also serves as an incentive
for better performance by the board."' At least one authority has
argued that since directors elected by cumulative voting are in-
dependent in fact, and not dependent on management, they can
handle certain board responsibilities better than non-cumulatively
elected directors.7 2
A final argument in favor of cumulative voting is that it stimu-
lates the individual shareholder's interest in the corporation be-
cause his vote is more effective. Increased shareholder interest
in turn strengthens management and the corporation because it
encourages other shareholders to buy the stock.'73
Opponents of cumulative voting also have a number of argu-
ments in their favor, the first being that the proponents of cu-
mulative voting fail to recognize the difference between legislative
and executive functions when they apply Mill's representative
government theory'74 to corporations. The opponents contend that
the function of the board is executive in nature and is analogous
to the President and his cabinet, which is made up of the majori-
ty party. At this level, where policy is made, it is essential that
the board of directors function as a team and all have basically
the same theory of corporate management.' A minority voice
in this setting would disrupt the smooth workings of the corpora-
tion. Therefore, the opponents argue, the minority shareholder
167. Steadman and Gibson, supra note 164, at 17. Steadman argues that minority directors will have a "ther-
apeutic effect" on management. Id.
168. Young, supra note 164, at 56.
169. Sobieski, In Support of Cwnulative Voting, 15 Bus. LAW. 316, 325 (1960) (quoting an investment adviser).
170. Young, supra note 164, at 50; Campbell, supra note 160, at 15.
171. Young, supra note 164, at 54.
172. Sobieski, supra note 169, at 327.
173. Id. at 328-29. Sobieski also argues that the strengthening of the corporate structure also strengthens
the economy as a whole. Id. Steadman and Gibson, supra note 164, at 17; Young, supra note 164, at 55-56.
174. Mill, Representative Government, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 327 (R. Hutchins ed.
1952).
175. Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anarchronism, 16 Bus. LAW. 550, 552-54 (1961); Axley,
The Case Against Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. Rv. 278 (1950); Steadman and Gibson, supra note 164,
at 26. Gibson argues that Mill's essay applies only to government and not to corporations and further that minority
shareholders should not be represented because they are minority shareholders. Id. at 22.
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should be heard only at the shareholders meeting. 76 In response
to the argument that cumulative voting is the only way a minori-
ty shareholder can gain board representation, one author suggests
that the majority may invite such a shareholder onto the board
in an effort-to achieve harmony among the directors and share-
holders.177
In response to the argument that cumulative voting makes share-
holders more interested in the affairs of the corporation, oppo-
nents argue that there are better ways to accomplish this goal,
such as organizing a shareholders committee charged with the duty
to keep shareholders informed about corporate matters 78 and to
make more information available to shareholders on a regular ba-
sis."" One author, however, wonders if there is really any way
to stimulate the "average" shareholder's interest in corporate af-
fairs. Usually, the average shareholder is interested only in the
annual or quarterly dividend. 80
Those who oppose mandatory cumulative voting argue that
minority representation may also lead to factionalism on the board
because the minority shareholder may be representing only a spe-
cial interest group rather than the shareholders as a group.8 A
majority of the board may tend to unite behind management in
the face of criticism of management by a belligerent board mem-
ber. The free flow of information might then stop because the
majority would not wish to criticize management in front of the
minority member for fear he might use it against the management
in public.82
Further, minority representation, or special interest group
representation, is not necessary because each director has a
fiduciary duty to represent all the shareholders and act in the best
interest of the corporation at all times.18' If a director breaches
his duty to the corporation, a shareholder has the right to bring
176. Comment, Cumulative Voting - Advisability of Retaining the Cumulative Voting Provision in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, 8 VILL. L. Rav. 391, 398 (1963).
177. Sturdy, supra note 175, at 568. This author suggests that it is more likely that cumulative voting is
the only way a minority shareholder can get on the board in a closely held corporation. Id.
178. Axley, supra note 175, at 281.
179. Sturdy, supra note 175, at 569.
180. Comment, supra note 176, at 398.
181. Steadman and Gibson, supra note 164, at 26.
182. Sturdy, supra note 175, at 553-54. Sturdy quotes Guy Witter of Dean Witter and Co.:
Our past experience has been, and present attitude is, that benefits derived from cumulative voting
are the exception and seldom work to the advantage of either the corporation or its stockholders. More
frequently corporations that permit cumulative voting are the targets for professional troublemakers
who are not interested in the welfare of the corporation or its stockholders but whose sole interest
is in deriving some personal benefit.
Id. at 556.
183. Steadman and Gibson, supra note 164. at 26.
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a derivative suit against the directors. Therefore, cumulative voting
is not necessary for the protection of the minority. "" One author
suggests that directors elected cumulatively represent the alter ego
of the minority, but that directors who are elected non-cumulatively
by the majority are under a higher standard of care in favor of
minority shareholders because while the minority did not direct-
ly elect them, the board has charge of the minority's interests. 85
Civil liability may, of course, be imposed on a director who fails
to act in the best interest of the corporation. 86
Another reason that cumulative voting is disfavored by some
is the fear that it may be used by a competitor to gain a seat on
the board and thereby learn corporate secrets."7 Another fear is
that cumulative voting may lead to corporate blackmail, or at the
least, the purchase of votes. Because shareholders are not com-
pelled to disclose their reasons for voting a certain way, the pur-
chase of votes may never be revealed."'
A final argument against cumulative voting is that it turns the
election of directors into a numbers racket. In an early Pennsyl-
vania case, a minority of shareholders elected the majority of direc-
tors because the majority failed to spread its votes correctly to
elect a majority of directors. The court upheld the election."' The
problem is that there is no way to know before the meeting how
many shares will vote"90
Opponents of cumulative voting offer several remedies to un-
happy minority shareholders. The simplest of these is for the
minority shareholders to sell their shares. A shareholder who is
displeased with management may be better served to sell his shares
and invest in a corporation which fits his ideals rather than to up-
set the corporation and hurt its profitability.9' Another remedy
184. Comment, supra note 176, at 398.
185. Mattes, The Burden of the Corporate Director Elected Noncumulatively, 63 CAL. L. REV. 463, 464-65
(1975).
186. Id.
187. Axley, supra note 175, at 283. Mississippi law prohibits "any person who is engaged or interested in
a competing business" from sitting on a corporation's board unless a majority of the shares approve. Miss.
CODE ANN § 79-3-67 (Supp. 1985).
188. Axley, supra note 175, at 283.
189. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. Rep. 150 (1883), cited in Sturdy, supra note 174, at 565; see
also Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., 103 Cal. 357, 35 P. 1045 (1894), reh'g denied, 103 Cal. 1193, 37
P. 207 (1894); Schwartz v. State ex rel. Schwartz, 61 Ohio St. 497, 56 N.E. 201 (1900); Chicago Macaroni
Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 202 111. 312, 67 N.E. 17 (1903); In re P.B. Mathiason Mfg. Co., 122 Mo. App. 437,
99 S.W. 502 (1907); State ex rel. Price v. DuBrul, 100 Ohio St. 272, 126 N.E. 87 (1919). But see Zachary
v. Milin, 294 Mich. 622, 293 N.W. 770 (1940); State ex rel. David v. Dailey, 23 Wash. 2d 25, 158 P.2d
330 (1945).
190. Sturdy, supra note 175, at 565-66. "This is not 'democracy' but merely roulette for very high stakes."
id. at 567.
191. Axley, supra note 175, at 279. Axley argues that most shareholders do not want a dissenter on the
board to damage their investment. Therefore, why should the law require what intelligence says is not good. Id.
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available to the minority is to attempt to gain control of the board
by means of a proxy contest or a tender offer.19 Also, a share-
holder can sue derivatively if a director or the board has breached
its fiduciary duties.193 Opponents also argue that the effects of cu-
mulative voting are so easily and often circumvented that cumula-
tive voting rights are a misleading placebo to the minority
shareholder.19'
Cumulative voting may serve a valuable purpose in closely held
corporations where the shareholders act more like partners, and
these corporations should have the opportunity to choose cumula-
tive voting.9 " Cumulative voting is not, however, healthy for all
corporations, particularly those which have a large number of
shareholders. 96 Therefore, Mississippi should abandon manda-
tory cumulative voting. As stated in the section of this Article
dealing with constitutional amendment, mandatory cumulative vot-
ing is outdated and unnecessary.
If cumulative voting should not be mandatory, but should be
available, the question is, then, whether the statute should be
presumptive"' or permissive.'98 The RMBCA takes the position
that cumulative voting should be permissive, 99 and its approach
is reasonable in view of the limited protection provided by cu-
mulative voting today. Further, the plurality of jurisdictions have
adopted a permissive approach, and there is some benefit to be
gained in uniform laws.° Modem cases now recognize and en-
force a fiduciary duty among shareholders in closely held corpo-
rations.'O° This duty is one of "utmost good faith and loyalty." 2
192. Steadman and Gibson, supra note 164, at 30.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Some authorities argue that cumulative voting is not even needed in closely held corporations because
the same or a more effective result can be reached by the use of shareholders agreements setting forth the
rights of each shareholder. Sturdy, supra note 175, at 576. This is particularly true in light of the ways availa-
ble to frustrate cumulative voting. These might include classification of the board of directors and staggering
their terms, reducing the number of directors, appointing committees to carry out the functions of the board
of directors and issuing more stock to other shareholders. Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Busi-
ness, 13 Bus. LAW. 741 (1958); Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corporation Law - Part 1, 28 Sw.
L.J. 641, 645 (1974); see also Comment, Cumulative Voting - Removal, Reduction and Classtfication of Cor-
porate Boards, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (1955).
196. Sturdy, supra note 175, at 563-65. Sturdy quotes several case histories of problems caused by cumula-
tive voting in public corporations. Id. Cf. Soderquist, supra note 10, at 195.
197. See supra text following note 162.
198. Id.
199. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d % 7.28Mb) (1986).
200. See supra note 163.
201. In re Estate of Mihm, 345 Pa. Super. 1,497 A.2d 612 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Estate of Schroer v.
Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 482 N.E.2d 975 (1984); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335
(Del. Ch. 1984); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981); Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
202. Wilkes, supra note 201, at 661 (quoting Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843 (1952)).
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Coupled with the availability of cumulative voting, flexible capi-
tal structure and shareholders agreements, this duty should be suffi-
cient to protect minority shareholders.
The RMBCA, however, has an undesirable feature. A portion
of the voting statute provides that shares otherwise entitled to vote
cumulatively may not do so unless the meeting notice or proxy
statement so provides, or unless the shareholder who wishes to
vote cumulatively gives 48 hours notice of his intent to vote cu-
mulatively. °" The stated purpose of this provision is to make sure
that all the shareholders participating in the election of directors
know what the rules are and to avoid the distortion which could
result when cumulative voting is allowed. 2 ' The provision may
itself lead to confusion because, if cumulative voting exists only
where it is requested, the shareholders will not know whether cu-
mulative voting will be employed until they arrive at the meet-
ing. Further, lawyers must be prepared to handle an election in
two ways until shortly before the meeting. " ' If cumulative vot-
ing for the election of directors is provided for in the articles of
incorporation, then directors should always be elected by cumula-
tive voting. Therefore, the permissive aspects of the RMBCA pro-
vision, section 7.28, should be adopted, but the provision in
subpart (d) should be deleted. This would allow for cumulative
voting for the election of directors at all times if the articles call
for cumulative voting.
c. Shareholder Approval of Fundamental Changes
In all jurisdictions, the shareholders have the right to vote upon
special transactions which change the fundamental nature or direc-
tion of the corporate entity." These transactions, often called ex-
traordinary transactions, include the sale, lease, or exchange of
all or substantially all of the corporation's assets other than in the
regular course of business, amendment to the articles of incorpo-
ration, merger, consolidation and dissolution. °7 The reason for
allowing shareholder participation at this level is to allow the share-
holders to prevent fundamental changes in the nature of their in-
vestment." 8 In Mississippi, such transactions require approval by
the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote
203. MODEL Bus. CoaP. ACT ANN. 3d § 7.28(d) (1986).
204. Id. at § 7.28(d) official comment.
205. Cf. Soderquist, supra note 10, at 195 n.6.
206. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 955-56.
207. Id. at 956.
208. Id. at 952.
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on the proposal. °9 Half the states have now abandoned the statu-
tory two-thirds majority provision in favor of a simple majority
vote standard.210 The Model Act rejected the two-thirds require-
ment in its 1969 revision and replaced it with a majority standard
which could be altered by the articles of incorporation.21" ' This
change was due in part to the problem of shareholder apathy in
large corporations..2 and partly to a growing belief that fundamen-
tal decisions should be made by the majority, not an arbitrary
higher percentage.1"
The RMBCA integrates the need of management for flexibility
with the shareholders' need for protection by providing that when
shareholders have a right to vote on extraordinary transactions,
the transaction must be approved by a majority of the shares of
each class entitled to vote thereon. ' A corporation may include
209. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-157 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (sale of assets other than in the regular course
of business), 79-3-117 (1972) (amendment of articles of incorporation), 79-3-147 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (merg-
er or consolidation), 79-3-167 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (dissolution). Corporation attorneys considering a cor-
porate combination or fundamental change should consult the Mississippi Shareholder Protection Act, Miss.
CODE A"e. § § 79-25-1 to -9 (Supp. 1986). The Mississippi Shareholder Protection Act provides supermajori-
ty voting requirements in certain "business combinations" as defined therein. Id. at § 79-25-5 (1985).
210. Attz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-059, 10-073, 10-079, 10-084 (1977); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 152,902,
904, 1001, 1101, 1105, 1201, 1900 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251, 271,
275 (1983); FLA. STAT. §§ 607.181, 607.221, 607.241 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-191, 14-2-212,
14-2-231, 14-2-273 (1982 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-59, 30-1-73, 30-1-79, 30-1-84 (1980 & Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. H 23-1-38-3,23-1-38-4, 23-1-40-1,23-1-40-3,23-1-41-2 (Bums Supp. 1986); KAN.
STAT. ANN. 88 17-6602, 17-6701, 17-6801, 17-6804(1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§271A.295,271A.365,
271A.395 (Baldwin 1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, §§ 805, 902, 1003 (1981); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 450.1611, 450.1703, 450.1753, 450.1804 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.135,
302A.11l(2)(e), 302A.613, 302A.631, 302A.661, 302A.721 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); NEv. REv. STAT.
88 78.390, 78.470, 78.565, 78.320 (1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 88 293-A:59, 293-A:74, 293-A:80,
293-A:85 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. 8§ 14A:9-2, 14A:10-3, 14A:10-11, 14A:12-4 (West 1969 & Supp.
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-100, 55-108, 55-112, 55-118 (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.153,
1.166, 1.164, 1.182 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. 88 57.360, 57.465, 57.511, 57.536 (1985); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1805, 1902, 1311, 2102 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-1.1-54, 7-1.1-67,
7-1.1-72, 7-1.1-76, 7-1.1-77 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. 88 48-1-302, 48-1-907, 48-1-1002 (1984); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10-55, 16-10-68, 16-10-74, 16-10-79 (1972 & Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-107,
31-1-117, 31-1-121, 31-1-126 (1982); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25, 180.51, 180.64, 180.71, 180.753
(West 1957 & Supp. 1986).
211. MODitL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d §§ 59 (amendment of articles), 73 (merger), 79 (sale of assets other
than in the ordinary course of business), 83 (dissolution) (1971).
212. Exam9e- Corporation X has 150,000 shaves outstanding. If an affirrnative vote of two-thirds of the
outstanding shares is required to approve the transaction, 100,000 shares must vote in favor of the transaction.
If only 90,000 shares, which would constitute a quorum of over one-half, appear and vote at the meeting,
the corporate transaction cannot go forward, even if all 90,000 voting shares approve the transaction.
213. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 59 official comment (1971).
214. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d 8 12.02 (sale of assets other than in the regular course of business),
10.03 (amendment of articles of incorporation), 11.03 (merger or share exchange), 14.02 (dissolution) (1986).
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in its articles provisions requiring a greater margin for approval.21
Mississippi's law governing shareholder approval of extraordi-
nary transactions should be amended to provide a statutory stan-
dard of a majority of the shares to approve such transactions.
Provisions for supermajority voting and other protections for
minority shareholders may be placed in the articles of incorpora-
tion or in agreements among the shareholders as needed.
2. Shareholder Inspection Rights
Mississippi's statute concerning shareholder inspection rights,
section 79-3-99,216 provides that any person who has been a share-
holder of record for at least six months preceding his demand or
who holds at least one percent of all outstanding shares may, af-
ter written demand, inspect the books, records of account, minutes
and record of shareholders. The inspection right may be exer-
cised only at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose. Before
the Mississippi Legislature passed a statute concerning shareholder
inspection rights, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered the
rights of shareholders to inspect the records of a corporation in
Sanders v. Neely."1' In Sanders, the court held that in the absence
of a statute, Mississippi follows the common-law rule concern-
ing shareholder inspection rights. The shareholder in Sanders
desired to inspect the books of the corporation in order to ascer-
tain whether the business was being conducted prudently so as
to protect the interests of the corporation and his (the shareholder's)
interest therein. The court said that this purpose was sufficient
unless the officers of the corporation affirmatively proved that
the shareholder was acting in bad faith or out of idle curiosity. " '
Since the passage of the shareholder inspection statute in 1962,
the Mississippi Supreme Court has not decided any case concern-
ing shareholder inspection rights. Therefore, an issue exists regard-
ing whether the court would find legislative intent in the statute
to repeal the common-law right of inspection given to any share-
holder or whether the statute and common law would be deemed
to co-exist. There is some indication in Sanders that the common
law does survive the enactment of a statute governing inspection
215. It should be noted that the RMBCA provides that if there is a supermajority voting provision in the
articles, the margin to change that provision must be at least as great as the supermajority vote it sets. MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 7.27 (1986). For example, if the articles provide that any merger must be ap-
proved by two-thirds of the outstanding shares regardless of class, any proposal to amend that section of the
articles would have to be approved by two-thirds vote of the outstanding shares regardless of class. See supra
text accompanying notes 147-59.
216. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972).
217. 197 Miss. 66, 19 So. 2d 424 (1944).
218. Id. at 81, 19 So. 2d at 426.
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rights. In Sanders, the court considered whether or not a provi-
sion in the Insurance Code prescribing the duties of the Commis-
sioner of Insurance abrogated or repealed the common-law rights
of shareholders to inspect books and records. The court held that
it did not,2"' noting that there is a presumption that the legislature
does not intend to alter the common law and that the statutes and
the common-law rules are presumed to co-exist.22° The court found
no legislative intent to repeal the common-law right of shareholder
inspection of corporate books: "[T]he business, books and records
of a corporation are the property of its stockholders, and . . . their
officers, agents and employees are in possession of such books
and records as trustees for the stockholders, without the right to
deny any stockholder access thereto for a proper purpose at
reasonable times. "221
The Mississippi statute is similar to section 52 of the 1959 ver-
sion of the Model Business Corporation Act,2 which specifical-
ly granted the right of inspection to shareholders of record provided
the shares had been held for six months or that they constituted
five percent of all of the corporation's outstanding shares. 3 Taken
alone, this statute would seem to restrict the common-law rule
because of its limitation on who can assert the right: only share-
holders of record who have held their stock six months or more,
or those who own five percent or more of the outstanding shares. "2 '
Some courts, however, hold that the statute enlarges the common-
219. Id. at 82, 19 So. 2d at 426.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 92, 19 So. 2d at 431 (emphasis added).
222. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 52 (1960).
223. Id.
224. See Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1983), affg 560 F. Supp.
855 (D. Md. 1983). In Caspary, a federal court applying Maryland law viewed a shareholder inspection statute
as supplanting the common law, not expanding it; therefore, in order to inspect corporate books, a shareholder
must comply with the statutory requirements. In Caspary, the court said that the first Maryland statute in 1868
dealing with shareholder inspection rights abrogated the common-law right. This statute made inspection rights
absolute for shareholders, thereby eliminating 'proper purpose" restrictions. Id. at 786. It was then revised
in 1908 to restrict the right to shareholders owning five percent of the outstanding stock. The court also said
that to construe the common-law rule to still exist would make the statutory requirement of five percent owner-
ship illusory. Id. at 792. See generally Note, Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Erploration Co. - the Common
Law Right to Inspect Corporate Records for Proper Purpose, 43 Mo. L. REv. 572, 593 (1984) (stating that
Caspary has made Maryland the most restrictive shareholder inspection state in the nation. Even though corpo-
rations like pro-management jurisdictions, Maryland has, in this case, "out-Delawared" Delaware). Id. at 593.
The Maryland inspection rule is divided into two statutes. The first, § 2-512, deals with inspection of bylaws,
minutes of shareholders meetings, annual statements of affairs, and voting trust agreements. Any shareholder
or holder of a voting trust certificate or his agent is entitled to this right. MD. CORPS. a Ass'Ns. CODE ANN.
§ 2-512 (1975). The second statute, § 2-513, concerns inspection of the corporation's books of account and
its stock ledger. Here, the shareholder must be a shareholder of record, have held the stock for at least six
months, and own at least five percent of the outstanding shares (if more than one person is requesting, they
must own at least five percent together). MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns. CODE ANN. § 2-513 (1975). See generally
5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2215.1 (Supp. 1985).
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law right and that it is an addition to, rather than a substitution
for, common law.22 5 New York, on the other hand, codified only
a portion of its law on shareholder inspection rights and applies
the statute to some problems and common-law principles to
others. 6 If the statute and the common law do not co-exist, Mis-
sissippi's shareholder inspection rights are overly re-
strictive.
The Delaware statute and the RMBCA take a less re-
strictive and more reasonable approach. The Delaware statute
grants any record shareholder the right to inspect the corpora-
tion's stock ledger, list of shareholders, and other books and
records and to make copies or extracts during business hours and
for a proper purpose.27 The statute defines "proper purpose" as
"a purpose reasonably related to such person's interest as a stock-
holder." 228 Under the Delaware statute, the shareholder's right
of inspection is absolute unless the corporation can show bad faith,
225. Bank of Heflin v. Miles, 294 Ala. 462, 466, 318 So. 2d 697, 700 (1975). Bank of Heflin holds that
the Alabama statute, presently ALA. CODE ANN. § 10-2A-79 (1975 & Supp. 1986) (patterned after § 52 of
the Model Business Corporation Act) enlarges and extends the common-law right of inspection. Id. at 700.
226. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(b) (McKinney 1986). Under the New York statute a shareholder of record
who has held his stock for at least six months or who holds at least five percent of its outstanding shares of
stock may upon written demand examine the minutes and record of shareholders. He is also entitled to receive,
upon written demand, an annual balance sheet and profit and loss statement for the preceding year and any
interim balance sheet or profit and loss statement made available to the shareholders. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 624(e) (McKinney 1986). The New York court has interpreted this statute as an addition to the common-law
right of inspection, not a substitution of it. In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 265, 53 N.E. 1103, 1107 (1899);
Levine v. Pat-Plaza Amusements, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 485, 487-88, 324 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971). The New York statute takes one book, the stock book, and changes the common-law right to inspect
it from qualified to absolute if the statutory requirements of the holding period or percentage are met. The
rest of the common-law rule was left intact. Steinway, 159 N.Y. at 265, 53 N.E. at 1107. The court stated
the reason for the change was to enable shareholders to learn who was entitled to vote for directors. Id. The
court has also noted that the statute grants a new right as to financial statements. There was no such right
at common law. Therefore, in order to receive this right, the shareholder must meet the statutory requirements.
Levine, 67 Misc. 2d at 487-88, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 149. But the right to inspect the stock book is based both
on the statute and common law. Therefore, if one does not meet the statutory inspection requirements, he may
still have a qualified right to inspect under common law. Sivin v. Schwartz, 22 A.D.2d 821, 254 N.Y.S.2d
914 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); Johncamp Realty, Inc. v. Sanders, 98 Misc. 2d 949, 415 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979).
227. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1974).
228. Id. Delaware's common law has divided this statute into two different areas with different burdens.
When a shareholder seeks to inspect books and records, other than the stock ledger or list of shareholders,
the shareholder must establish that his purpose in seeking the information is proper. If, on the other hand,
the shareholder is seeking inspection of the shareholder list or stock ledger, the corparation has th uarde
of proving an improper purpose. If a proper purpose is established, other purposes, proper or improper, are
irrelevant. Even if the shareholder proves that his inspection request is proper and reasonably related to his
interest as a shareholder, inspection may be refused if it is adverse to the interests of the corporation. Skoglund
v. Ormand Industries, Inc., 372 A.2d 204, 207 (Del. Ch. 1976). See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
220(c) (1974). The purpose of the statute is "to provide speedy access to a stock list for a stockholder who
has demonstrated a purpose reasonably related to his interest as such." Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,
283 A.2d 852, 854 (Del. Ch. 1971).
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an improper motive, or a purpose with no relationship to the per-
son's status as a shareholder. 229 The Delaware statute, which differs
substantially from the Mississippi statute, prescribes no holding
period or percentage ownership restrictions as Mississippi does.
The Mississippi statute does not explicitly define "proper purpose."
The Delaware statute requires that the written demand stating the
purpose be under oath. Mississippi's statute does not. Both stat-
utes require the shareholder seeking inspection to be a shareholder
of record, and grant courts discretion to compel inspection. The
primary thrust of the Delaware statute is that any request by a
shareholder to inspect the books and records of a corporation must
be based on a purpose that is related to his status as a shareholder.2
Sections 16.02 and 16.03 of the RMBCA provide that a share-
holder, upon written demand and during regular business hours,
may inspect documents such as minutes of shareholders meetings
and directors meetings, accounting records, records of share-
holders, articles of incorporation, bylaws, resolutions by the board,
written communications to shareholders, names of board mem-
bers, and the most recent annual report.2" However, in order to
inspect excerpts from the minutes of the board, or records not
subject to inspection under § 16.02(a),"' the shareholder must
(1) make his demand in good faith and for a proper purpose; (2)
describe his purpose and the records he desires to inspect; and
(3) show that the records are directly connected with his purpose."
Furthermore, the shareholder's right of inspection cannot be
abolished or conditioned by the corporation's articles or bylaws.""
This statute is also substantially different from the Mississippi stat-
ute. Mississippi puts restrictions on the shareholder holding period
and percent ownership. Section 16.02(a) of the RMBCA provides
229. State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co. of Kansas, 41 Del. 172, 177, 18 A.2d 235, 237-38 (1941).
However, the shareholder's statement of purpose for inspecting the shareholders list must contain more than
just an intent to communicate with other shareholders. It must describe the substance for the intended commu-
nication, or inspection will be refused. Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 260 A.2d 428, 429
(Del. 1969). The Delaware court has said that
§ 220 is narrow in object and scope and is simply a 'look at the list' act. It contemplates summary
proceedings and the accelerated scheduling of cases under it emphasizes prompt processing and dispo-
sition. The narrow nature of the act must be kept in mind in applying the "proper purpose" requirement.
Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855, 857 (Del. 1969). Some cases have seemed to indicate that after
a proper purpose is found, the documents inspected should be limited to those concerning the event or condi-
tion for which the shareholder originally sought inspection. Skoglund, 372 A.2d at 210. However, this right
should not be limited by managements deciding that the shareholder may inspect some documents but not others
that relate to the shareholder purpose. Id. at 211.
230. Id. at 207.
231. MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 3d § 16.02(a) (1986).
232. Accounting records and the record of shareholders. MODEL Bus. CoRn'. ACT AiNNt. 3d § 16.02(b) (1986).
233. Id. at § 16.02(b)-(c) (1986).
234. Id. at § 16.02(d) (1986).
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an absolute right to inspect certain documents under § 16.02(b)-
(e), subject only to a showing of proper shareholder purpose. The
RMBCA section is similar to Delaware law. " ' It allows any share-
holder to inspect the books and records for a proper purpose and
avoids "fishing expeditions," because the shareholder is required
to state his purpose and the documents he wishes to inspect. The
RMBCA statute provides a method to allow sincere shareholders
to inspect the corporation's books to protect or further their owner-
ship interests, and to prevent abusive shareholders from engag-
ing in fishing expeditions which interrupt the day-to-day business
of the corporation. The RMBCA provisions are effective and
modem, and could be a benefit to shareholders of Mississippi cor-
porations.
3. Derivative Actions
Mississippi's statute governing the procedural requirements for
derivative litigation is one of the simplest in the nation." 6 It
provides:
No action shall be brought in this state by a shareholder in the right of a domestic or foreign corpora-
tion unless the plaintiff was a holder of shares or of voting trust certificates therefor at the time of
the transaction of which he complains, or his shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved
upon him by operation of law from a person who was a holder at such time."'
Under this provision, the shareholder seeking to bring an ac-
tion in the right of the corporation must have owned the shares
at the time the allegedly illegal transaction occurred, or have
received his shares by operation of law from someone who owned
his shares at the time. " 8 Mississippi's statute does not require de-
mand on directors, demand on shareholders, verification of the
complaint, security for costs, or other procedural requirements
provided for in most other jurisdictions. " 9
The RMBCA provides several procedural requirements for ac-
tions in the right of the corporation." 0 The procedural require-
ments of section 7.40 include contemporaneous ownership (the
section provides a definition of "shareholder" which includes
beneficial owners), verification of the complaint, demand on share-
holders, and court settlement approval." 1 Section 7.40 also pro-
vides that the court may require an unsuccessful plaintiff to pay
235. Skoglund, 372 A.2d at 207.




240. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 3d § 7.40 (1986).
241. Id.
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the defendant's reasonable attorney fees if the court finds that the
suit was commenced without cause,2" and that a court may stay
the shareholder's action while the corporation investigates the al-
leged wrongdoing." '
Whether or not certain procedural requirements are beneficial
depends on how the state views the whole concept of shareholder
litigation. The primary regulator of corporate management, " the
derivative suit is the only means of redress available to the share-
holder for self dealing and bad faith actions of an unfaithful board
of directors." ' Therefore, shareholder litigation serves a useful
societal function. On the other hand, abuses in derivative litiga-
tion are widespread." Shareholders and counsel often use deriva-
tive litigation as a method to gain large settlements which do not
benefit the corporation at all."7 Strike suit problems are the basis
for the strict procedural requirements in derivative litigation which
are imposed in most states and in the federal courts." 8 Further,
a great deal of controversy currently exists about the general utility
of shareholder litigation as a means to protect shareholders from
corporate mismanagement. "9 Some scholars argue that the costs
associated with derivative suits outweigh the benefits derived."'
Others disagree, arguing that while there are costs associated with
the derivative suit, the benefits justify the costs because of the
need to curb corporate managers in some way."' This debate is
likely to continue for some time to come, but the derivative ac-
tion seems to be here to stay.
Although the Mississippi statute is very simple and provides
relatively few procedural requirements, a few refinements from
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
245. H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at § 358; W. CARY AND M. EISENBERG, supra note 24,
at 632; Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel and Bradey,
71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 324-27 (1986); Goetz, A Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules and the Derivative
Suit: Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 346-49 (1986).
246. SOLOMON, STEVENSON AND SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS LAW & POLICIES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
638 (1982).
247. See H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at § 358; W, CARY AND M. EISENBERG, supra note
24, at 632.
248. W. CARY AND M. EISENBERG, supra note 24, at 632; Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff
as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, 5, 13.
249. See Fischel and Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1986); Coffee, The Unfaithfid Champion: The Plaintiff
as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, 5.
250. Fischel and Bradley, supra note 249, at 262-63; Coffee, supra note 249, at 13.
251. Schwartz, supra note 245, at 324-27; Goetz, supra note 245, at 346-49.
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the RMBCA may be beneficial. One particular provision which
should be added to the Mississippi section is the definition of
"shareholder" to include all beneficial owners of shares in the cor-
poration. The logic of this type of provision is apparent. The
beneficial owner of shares should have the right to bring the share-
holder's derivative action. The Mississippi section limits the suit
to holders of shares or voting trust certificates. 52 While a court
might interpret this to include all beneficial shareholders, the defi-
nition of "shareholder" should not be left to chance.
Two other provisions which should be included in the Missis-
sippi section are those which allow a court discretion to stay the
suit while the corporation investigates the charges and require the
court to approve settlements. These two provisions help eliminate
the two most common abuses of the derivative litigation process:
unfounded suits and collusive settlements. While there has been
no flood of litigation in Mississippi under this procedural statute,
Mississippi will benefit from these simple and sensible
refinements.
4. Dissenters' Rights
The right of shareholders to dissent from certain transactions
and receive the fair value of their shares is a statutory method
designed to balance the needs of management for flexibility in
the activities of the corporation against the needs of the investors
to withdraw their investment when the fundamental nature of the
corporation is changed." Unfortunately, many older statutes, like
the Mississippi statute, are very complex and place undue em-
phasis upon the use of judicial appraisal of shares. The conflict
between these two groups often leads to litigation.75 Modem dis-
senters' rights statutes simplify compliance procedures and attempt
to remove the litigation incentive and induce the parties to deter-
mine "fair value" of the shares without resort to the courts. 55 Other
problems with Mississippi's dissenters' rights sections should be
addressed. These problems include the limitations on the trans-
actions which trigger the right to dissent and the exclusion of
beneficial owners from those shareholders entitled to dissent. Mis-
sissippi's dissenters' rights sections, 79-3-159 and 79-3-161, are
252. miss. CODE AN. % 79-3-93 (1972 & Sup9. 1996).
253. H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at § 349; Report of the Committe on Corporate Laws,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenter's Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1856 (1977).
254. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d ch. 13, official comment at 1354-55 (1986).
255. Cf. MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d §§ 13.01-31; COLO. Rav. STAT. § 7-4-124 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1-81 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.473 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-812 (1985);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2080 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 293-A:82 (Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §
57.865-.890 (1985).
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based upon an early version of the MBCA. 2 ' Although the MBCA
was amended in 1978 to correct certain weaknesses in the dis-
senters' rights sections, those changes were not made in the Mis-
sissippi law.2"' Consequently, Mississippi's dissenters' rights
sections are out of date.
a. Compliance Procedures
One of the major problems with the Mississippi dissenters' rights
section is the fact that it is very poorly written and so complicat-
ed that compliance is usually difficult and costly. Therefore, share-
holders who wish to dissent are often unable to do so, either
because the process is too complex, or because they fail to com-
ply correctly with one of the several deadlines or procedural re-
quirements. Generally, in order to comply with the terms of
Section 79-3-161 and receive the fair value of his shares, a share-
holder must (1) file with the corporation a written objection to
the transaction from which he wishes to dissent prior to or at the
meeting at which the transaction is submitted to a vote; (2) not
vote in favor of the transaction; (3) make a written demand on
the corporation for payment of the fair value of his shares within
10 days after the transaction is approved by the shareholders; and
(4) submit his stock certificates to the corporation within 20 days
after demanding payment for his shares."' If a shareholder makes
demand upon the corporation, the corporation is required to make
a written offer to the dissenting shareholder to buy his shares at
a price deemed by the corporation to be the fair value of the shares
within 10 days of the time the corporate transaction is effective." 9
If the corporation and the shareholder agree on the fair value of
the shares within 30 days of the date of the transaction, the cor-
poration must make payment for the shares within 90 days of the
date of the transaction." 0 If the corporation and the shareholder
are unable to agree on a price of the shares within 30 days from
the date of the transaction, the corporation may, within 60 days
of the date of the transaction, file an action in the chancery court
in the county where the registered office of the corporation is lo-
cated, asking that the fair value of the shares be determined."'
256. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-159, 79-3-161 (1972 & Supp. 1985); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§
73, 74 (1960).
257. See Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Af-
fecting Dissenter's Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1856 (1977).
258. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-161 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
259. Id.
260. Id. The payment obligation is conditioned upon the surrender of the share certificates to the corporation.
261. Id.
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If the corporation fails to begin an appraisal proceeding as re-
quired by the statute, any dissenting shareholder may do so in
the name of the corporation.26" If suit is filed, the court will de-
termine the fair value of the shares as provided by the statute."3
The court may appoint appraisers to take evidence and make a
recommendation to the court with respect to the fair value of the
shares. " "6 The costs of appraisal proceedings are usually assessed
against the corporation, but the court may apportion costs against
a dissenting shareholder if the court finds that the shareholder acted
in bad faith in rejecting the written offer of the corporation."'
The complex nature of the section makes compliance difficult
and costly, and should be simplified. The RMBCA, in a section
derived from the 1976 MBCA revision, significantly simplifies
dissenters' rights compliance for both the corporation and the
shareholder. 66 For the sake of simplicity alone, the RMBCA sec-
tion is better than the current Mississippi statute.
b. Right to Dissent
Mississippi law fails to provide dissenters' rights for amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation even where substantial share-
holder rights are affected.67 Under current law, shareholders in
Mississippi corporations are entitled to dissent only from "[a]ny
plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is a
party . . . or [ajny sale or exchange of all or substantially all of
the property of the corporation" other than in the regular course
of business. 68 Section 79-3-159 provides exceptions which deny
the right to dissent where the merging corporation is owner of
all the shares of the corporations to be merged or where the share-
holders are not entitled to vote on the transaction. 69 The section
also provides that dissenters' rights are not available for transac-
tions involving the sale of all or substantially all of a corpora-
tion's assets other than in the regular course of business if approval
of the transaction is conditioned upon the distribution of the net
proceeds of the sale to the shareholders within one year of the
sale.2" A more liberal approach to dissenters' rights is needed.
262. Id.
263. Id. The fair value of the shares as fixed by the court shall include any allowance for interest that the
court finds fair and reasonable.
264. id.
265. Id.
266. MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 3d § § 13.01-31; Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes
in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenter's Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1856 (1977).
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A shareholder should have the right to dissent and receive the
fair value of his shares when the corporation amends its articles
of incorporation in such a way as to impair shareholder rights.
Providing the right to dissent to amendment of the articles of in-
corporation serves some very important purposes. Allowing share-
holders to dissent and "cash-out" when the fundamental nature
of their investment changes provides additional security to share-
holders.27 At the same time, providing dissenters' rights when
the articles are substantially amended provides greater flexibility
to the majority, 7" because the right to dissent provides an "es-
cape hatch" for a shareholder who would otherwise be forced to
accept a fundamental change in his rights without the option to
receive fair value for his shares.2 Dissenters' rights can provide
a fair choice to shareholders.
Another change which would benefit Mississippi law is a pro-
vision allowing the corporation, in its articles of incorporation
or bylaws, to provide dissenters' rights for certain types of trans-
actions which would not trigger dissenters' rights under the stat-
ute. " " Voluntary dissenters' rights may make some preferred shares
more attractive and can provide an additional tool for corporate
lawyers in creating an appropriate entity for the respective par-
ties."5 Voluntary dissenters' rights may also protect proposed cor-
porate action from collateral attack by shareholders because, if
dissenters' rights are granted, shareholders may not challenge such
action unless it is "unlawful or fraudulent." 26 The RMBCA pro-
vides all these changes in a very well organized series of sections
which should be adopted.
c. Beneficial Owners
Dissenters' rights under Mississippi law are limited to record
owners of shares.2" As a consequence, many shareholders are
denied the right to dissent because their shares are held by
nominees in street names. Mississippi law should provide benefi-
cial owners the right to dissent. The RMBCA specifically pro-
vides procedures to allow beneficial owners to exercise their right
to dissent.
271. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 13.02 official comment (1986).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 13.02 official comment (1986).
275. Id.
276. Id. at §§ 13.02(a)(5), 13.02(b).
277. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-159 and § 79-3-3(g) (1972 & Supp. 1986). Section 79-3-3(g) provides that
shareholder means the record holder of shares. Id. at § 79-3-3(g). Therefore, there is no provision in section
79-3-159 for dissenters' rights for beneficial owners. Id. at § 79-3-159.
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The RMBCA provides a workable balance in the area of dis-
senters' rights because it provides more clarity and simplicity in
this area. Mississippi should take advantage of this well drafted
and workable provision of corporation law.
d. Directors
1. Indemnification and Insurance
Uncertainty surrounding the liability of directors and the in-
terpretation of the business judgment rule has made indemnifica-
tion and insurance increasingly important in the last 20 years.""
A number of social issues are important in determining the ex-
tent to which corporate funds should or may be used to pay ex-
penses and judgments against officers and directors acting in their
official capacity. The large number of cases, their complexity,
and the expense of litigation against board members today dis-
courages intelligent and honest businessmen from sitting on boards
of directors unless there is some protection from personal liabili-
ty. ' Therefore, some form of protection is necessary to encourage
competent persons to sit on corporate boards. On the other hand,
indemnification must not allow management to use corporate funds
to protect an officer or director who has, in bad faith, committed
wrongful acts against the corporation. Allowing indemnification
in such a situation encourages objectionable conduct. In addition,
corporation law must determine whether indemnification for cer-
tain types of offenses (violations of state and federal securities
and antitrust laws) will frustrate public policy by preventing the
penalty from falling on the responsible officer or director. The
statute governing indemnification must strike a balance between
the needs of the officers and directors and the public policy set
forth in the statutes and common law.28
Mississippi makes little provision for indemnification of its
278. Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW
1993, 1993 (1978); Knepper, Officers and Directors: Indemnification and Liability Insurance -An Update,
30 Bus. LAW. 951, 951 (1975); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Officers and Directors, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1078 (1968).
279. Johnston, supra note 278, at 1994; Silas, Risk Business, Corporate Directors Bail Out, 72 A.B.A. J.,
June 1986, at 24. "Some members of corporate boards of directors are finding that these coveted posts are
more trouble than they are worth. The problems, which include stockholder lawsuits, cancellation of director
and officer liability insurance, and increased time demands needed to devote to companies, have caused some
directors to quit." Id. at 24.
280. Johnston, supra note 278, at 1994; Knepper, supra note 278, at 951-52; Bishop, supra note 278, at
1078. As Professor Bishop put it in 1968, "A vast pother has arisen in corporate circles over the dreadful plight
of officers and directors, beset on the one hand by predatory strike suitors anxious to convert them and their
little families into welfare clients if their efforts to maximize the corporation's profits come to grief, beset on
the other by ruthless minions of the Antitrust Division determined to throw them into the federal pen if those
efforts succeed." Bishop, supra note 278, at 1078.
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officers and directors and makes virtually no provision for in-
demnification of its employees or agents when they face litiga-
tion based on their position as a corporate director, officer or
employee. Mississippi's provision, section 79-3-7(o), is based on
the MBCA as it existed in 1963, and only three other states have
retained its language.281 The Mississippi indemnification statute
is extremely limited in light of current business risks and too vague
to permit careful planning. 82 Therefore, most states have enact-
ed more comprehensive statutes. Directors and officers who may
need indemnification and those who must decide whether indem-
nification is appropriate under the statute will find little guidance
in the Mississippi act. The Mississippi section should be expand-
ed to provide indemnification appropriate to protect those who
act for and serve the corporation. The following indemnification
and insurance issues are important in analyzing the Mississippi
statute:
When is there authority to indemnify?
Who is entitled to indemnification?
Does an officer, director or employee have a right to indemnifi-
cation?
For what claims will indemnification lie?
What costs and expenses are covered by the indemnification pro-
visions?
What conditions must a director meet to qualify for indemnifi-
cation?
May a corporation advance an officer, director, or employee for
expenses involved in the litigation and if so, under what circum-
stances?
Who decides whether indemnification is appropriate in a given
situation?
May a corporation purchase insurance to protect it against indem-
nification claims?
Unfortunately, the answers to most of these questions are unclear
under current Mississippi law. " '
When is there authority to indemnify? The Mississippi section
on indemnification provides authority to indemnify in limited cir-
281. INn. CODE ANN. § 23-1-2-2(9) (Burns 1984), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4.1 (Supp. 1986) and VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1852(15) (1984).
282. See generally Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 393-97.
283. See infra text accompanying notes 284-321.
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cumstances as defined in the statute and as provided in the arti-
cles of incorporation, the bylaws or any resolution adopted by
the shareholders. " '8
Who is entitled to indemnification? Mississippi's statute pro-
vides that a Mississippi corporation has the power to indemnify
its past and present officers and directors, and officers and direc-
tors of a subsidiary or debtor corporation if the subject corpora-
tion has asked them to serve."' 5 The section makes no provision
for indemnification of employees or agents who are not officers
or directors of the corporation.286 Although they may be entitled
to protection under general agency principles," 7 employees and
agents should not be excluded from those whom a corporation
has the power to indemnify. 8 Because the statute is silent with
respect to employees and agents, it is likely not to be interpreted
so as to include them. 9 Mississippi's indemnification sections
should be amended to allow indemnification for employees and
agents who are neither officers nor directors. Adoption of the
RMBCA would provide this correction in the Mississippi stat-
ute.
290
Does an officer, director or employee have a right to indem-
nification ? Officers and directors have no right to indemnifica-
tion under Mississippi law.295 Unless the articles of incorporation
or bylaws provide otherwise, the corporation is under no duty
to indemnify its officers or directors.2 Officers and directors who
because of their position with the corporation are named parties
to a suit in which they are subsequently judged not liable should
be entitled to indemnification from the corporation.
29 3
For what claims will indemnification lie? An officer or direc-
tor of a corporation may find himself a defendant in two types
284. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972 & Supp. 1986).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Generally, an agent who incurs liability based upon acts performed for the benefit of and under the
direction of his principal, is entitled to indemnification for liability for those acts. McLeod v. Dean, 270 F.
Supp. 855, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see also Differential Steel Car Co. v. Macdonald, 180 F.2d 260, 267 (6th
Cir. 1950); Lauderdale v. Peace Baptist Church of Birmingham, 246 Ala. 178, 182, 19 So. 2d 538, 542 (1944);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 439-440 (1958).
288. Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 393.
289. Provisions for indemnification of officers and directors should be strictly construed. Diamond v. Dia-
mond, 307 N.Y. 263, 266, 120 N.E.2d 919, 921 (1954); Hodge and Perry, supra nte 71, at 393.
290. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d §§ 8.50-.58 (1985).
291. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972 & Supp. 1986). This section creates only a limited power on the
part of the corporation to indemnify.
292. Id.
293. Cornell and Little, Indemnification of Fiduciary and Employee Litigation Costs Under ERISA, 25 B.C.L.
RED. 1, 14-19 (1983); Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of Its Directors and Officers from Per-
sonal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 513, 514 (1983).
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of suits. First is a derivative action by a shareholder against a
director or the board of directors claiming recovery on behalf of
the corporation for a wrong done to the corporation and not cor-
rected by the board of directors. 9 ' Derivative actions usually in-
volve allegations of breach of fiduciary duties by directors, at least
in the refusal to enforce the claim. Second is an action by a third
party against the corporation and its board for a wrong done to
the third party." These cases usually involve claims by share-
holders or third parties directly against the corporation and its
directors individually for violations of specific laws, such as the
federal antitrust or securities laws. Whether the Mississippi sec-
tion allows indemnification with respect to both types of suits is
unclear. Although the comments to the 1960 version of the MBCA
state that the section should be construed to include non-derivative
actions,"6 the comments often become separated from the statute
in the legislative process." 7 Other authors suggest that the Mis-
sissippi provision does not allow indemnification for judgments
paid in third party actions. 98 If this is so, the Mississippi statute
fails to provide indemnification for a very important type of claim.
Such an interpretation could also impair the corporation's authority
to purchase insurance against such claims. " " Mississippi should
adopt a statute which is clear respecting whether and to what ex-
tent a corporation may indemnify both derivative and third party
actions.
What costs and expenses are covered by the indemnification pro-
visions? The Mississippi statute says that a corporation may in-
demnify an officer or director for "expenses actually and
reasonably incurred . . . in connection with the defense of any
action .... " . The meaning of "expenses" is unclear. One major
issue concerning the meaning of "expenses" is whether attorney
fees are included."0 1 The Mississippi section makes no reference
to attorney fees,' and in the absence of express statutory authority,
Mississippi courts may refuse to allow payment of attorney fees.
294. A derivative action is a suit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation for some wrong
done to the corporation. It is usually allowed only when those in control of the corporation wrongfully refuse
to enforce the claim. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont
206 N.Y. 7, 19, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912); H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 1036-37.
295. A third party action is a suit brought by a party unrelated to the corporation and its directors for some
wrong.
296. MODEL Bus. CotP. A m ANN. % 4o) 9 4.04 (1960).
297. Branson, infra note 352, at 70.
298. Hedge and Perry, supra note 71, at 394.
299. See infra text accompanying notes 313-21.
300. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972 & Supp. 1986).
301. Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 394.
302. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972 & Supp. 1986).
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Unless there is an express provision including attorney fees in
the expenses to be paid by the corporation there can be no assur-
ance that they will be included. Because attorney fees are likely
to be one of the largest expenses incurred in the event that a cor-
porate director or officer is named as a party to corporate litiga-
tion, indemnification covering these fees is important. If the basic
rationale for indemnification is correct or, indeed, accepted, at-
torney fees should be expressly provided for in the statute. In-
demnification against such major expenses may encourage
competent individuals to serve as board members.
Two additional problems regarding the meaning of "expenses"
include whether (1) payment made in settlement of a claim and
(2) expenses incurred in connection with threatened litigation...
are considered "expenses actually and reasonably incurred." Is-
sues of settled and threatened claims should be addressed in the
statute.
What conditions must a director meet to qualify for indemnifi-
cation? A Mississippi corporation may indemnify its officers and
directors unless the party has "been . . .adjudged . . . liable for
negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty, or a viola-
tion of [the Mississippi antitrust and fair trade laws .. . .]"' The
Mississippi section does not address civil judgments or convic-
tions against officers and directors based on violations of other
laws such as the federal securities laws, the federal antitrust laws
or the Internal Revenue Code. Whether indemnification for such
directors and officers is authorized under this section or whether
such a violation constitutes "negligence or misconduct in the per-
formance of duty" is not clear in the Mississippi Act. Also unad-
dressed is whether "negligence in the performance of duty" refers
only to a breach of a fiduciary duty or extends to other forms
of misconduct. Directors, officers and their attorneys need guide-
lines concerning these issues.
Another unanswered question about the Mississippi indemnifi-
cation section is whether the provision allowing "any other in-
demnification" authorized in the articles of incorporation or
approved by the shareholders would validate a provision in the
articles or bylaws which authorizes indemnification even where
the director breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation or vio-
303. Johnston, supra note 278, at 2041. Official comments to the 1960 version of the Model Act state that
the provision "should be held to cover settlement payments if the corporation has been advised by counsel that
the suit was without substantial merit and that settlement payments did not exceed the probable expenses of
litigation." MODEL Bus. COP. ACT ANN. § 4(o) 4.03 (1960).
304. MISS. COoE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972 & Supp. 1986). No legislative history exists to explain why these
two statutory violations were singled out for the purpose of denying indemnification. See also Hodge and Per-
ry, supra note 71, at 395.
1985]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
lated the Mississippi antitrust or fair trade laws. Although courts
would probably be unwilling to allow indemnification in such a
circumstance, the issue is unclear in Mississippi."'5 The corpora-
tion law with respect to the indemnification of directors should
be clear concerning both when a director is entitled to indemnifi-
cation under the statute and, in more liberal circumstances, when
the corporation may authorize indemnity.
May a corporation advance to an officer, director, or employee
expenses involved in the litigation and, if so, under what circum-
stances? Another issue which arises in the context of corporate
litigation is whether the corporation may advance funds to an
officer or director to reimburse the officer or director for litiga-
tion expenses."° The Mississippi section does not specifically pro-
vide for the advance payment of expenses. 0 7 If the corporation
fails to provide funds to help meet litigation expenses where in-
demnification will be granted, the director or officer may suffer
unnecessary financial hardship. If the corporation will eventual-
ly indemnify the director or officer if he or she is successful in
defense of the action, there is no reason to deny the officer or
director advances for litigation expenses as long as the advances
are made on the condition that the officer or director agrees to
repay the corporation in the event that he is required to do so. 08
Mississippi should clarify this matter by statutory amendment.
Who decides whether indemnification is appropriate in a given
situation? Another problem with the Mississippi indemnification
provision is that it provides no guidance as to how the decision
to indemnify is made. The Mississippi section provides only that
no indemnification may be granted where the party seeking in-
demnification has been adjudged liable for negligence or miscon-
duct in the performance of duty or for violations of the Mississippi
antitrust3 °  or fair trade.1 laws. 1 ' The section does not address
305. See, e.g., Lawson v. Baltimore Paint and Chem. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 967, 981-83 (D. Md. 1972);
Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d. 949, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1963); Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 267-68, 120
N.E.2d 819, 820-21 (1954). Indemnification in such a situation could be considered unlawful as against public
policy because a party should not be indemnified against his own fraudulent or willful misconduct. Johnston,
supra note 278, at 2006-07.
306. Cornell and Little, Indemnification of Fiduciary and Employee Liigation Costs Under ERISA, 25 B.C.L.
REV. 1 (1983); Oesterle, Limits on a Corporations Protection of Its Directors and Officers from Personal Lia-
bility, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 513 (1983).
307. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(o) (1972 & Supp. 1986).
308. One disadvantage to the advance of litigation expenses is that the director may be unable to repay the
corporation if he loses the suit. This is not completely unfair however, because there is also a risk that if the
tables are turned, the corporation may be unable to repay an officer or director entitled to indemnification.
Hedge and Perry, supra note 71, at 397.
309. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-21-1 to -39 (1972).
310. Id. at § 75-23-1 to -27 (1972).
311. Id. at § 79-3-7(o) (1972).
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the issue of the conflicts of interest which arise in the context of
making an indemnification decision. Other statutes, including the
RMBCA, provide specific procedures for deciding whether or not
to indemnify a particular party in any of a number of situations1'
Mississippi needs a provision which will address the corporate
procedure necessary to approve or reject indemnification.
May a corporation purchase insurance to protect it against in-
demnification on claims? Most states allow a corporation to pur-
chase insurance for its officers and directors to protect them against
claims and to protect the corporation from indemnification obli-
gations in the event of litigation. Mississippi has no provision al-
lowing for the purchase of such insurance. While the purchase
of insurance to cover litigation expenses is probably valid, cor-
porate purchases of insurance may be disallowed to guard against
liability for which the corporation could not indemnify its officers
and directors. 1 Therefore, the purchase of insurance covering
violations of antitrust, securities or tax laws in connection with
the affairs of the corporation may be unauthorized. Corporate
authority to purchase insurance should be clear in all these situ-
ations.
The RMBCA provides a comprehensive plan for providing in-
demnification and insurance to its officers, directors, employees
and other agents. 1 ' It provides for mandatory indemnification
when a director is wholly successful on the merits or otherwise
in defending the action to which he was made a party because
of his corporate relationship."' Indemnification for both deriva-
tive and third party claims is included in the RMBCA plan, and
the statute sets the standards for both." 6 The RMBCA makes clear
that attorney fees and amounts paid in settlement of a claim may
312. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-21 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-005 (1956 & Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 64-309 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101 (1973 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145
(1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-153 (1982); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 416-35 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-5 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.65 (Smith-Hurd
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4A (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (1981); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:83 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 719 (1964); MICH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. 88 450.1561-450.1571 (West 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355 (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEa. REV.
STAT. § 21-2004(15) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.751 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:5 (1970
& Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.43a (West
1986); OvL. Rav. Sr,.. %% 57.255, 57.260 (1995; PA. Svxr. MAN. tit. 15, §8 410, 141 (ftrdan 1995 &
Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o) (1953); VA. CODE § 13.1-701 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-9
(1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.05 (West 1957 & Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(1977); see infra
notes 313-20.
313. Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 397.
314. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d §§ 8.51, 8.56 (1986).
315. Id. at 8 8.52.
316. id. at 8 8.51(d).
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be included in the authorized indemnification. 17 Another feature
of the RMBCA plan is its specific procedure for determining
whether or not the corporation may or must indemnify the party
as well as the amount to which the party is entitled.3 18 The RMBCA
also provides for the advance of expenses for parties to corporate
litigation 19 and authorizes the corporation to purchase insurance
to protect officers and directors regardless of the corporation's
power to indemnify against such actions."' Thus, by integrating
the indemnification provisions with those relating to the conduct
of directors, the RMBCA strikes a rational balance between con-
flicting policy considerations. "2
2. Standards of Conduct for Directors
Mississippi has no statutory provisions governing the standards
of conduct of corporate directors. Mississippi also has very few
cases concerning the duties of corporate directors. This is partic-
ularly unfortunate because the issue of directors' duties is one of
the most uncertain and controversial areas of corporate law at this
time." In Mississippi, directors must rely upon vague standards
of conduct set out in a limited number of cases .3" The origina-
tion of standards of conduct for directors developed from the com-
mon law rather than from a statute. Courts viewed corporate
directors as fiduciaries and held them to the normal fiduciary stan-
dards of honesty and good faith. Due to the number and varia-
tion of the decisions, states adopted statutes to define the
relationship between the corporation and its directors. A substantial
number of states have statutes providing that a director must dis-
charge his responsibilities in good faith and with the care that an
317. Id. at § 8.50(3).
318. Id. at § 8.55.
319. Id. at § 8.53.
320. Id. at § 8.57.
321. MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 3d 88 8.30-.33 official conment (1986).
322. Manning, Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 2 (1985) ("all courts-but particu-
larly Delaware's courts-are struggling to develop a jurisprudence that will answer a series of basic questions"
about directors' duties); Veasey, Further Reflections on Court Review of Judgments of Directors: Is the Judicial
Process Under Control? 40 Bus. LAW. 1373 (1985); Ruder, Duty ofLoyalty - A Law Professor's Status Report,
40 Bus. LAW. 1383 (1985); Lipton and Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities -
An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403 (1985); Warden, The Boardroom as a War Room: The Real World Applica-
tions of the Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty, 40 Bus. LAW. 1431 (1985); Fischel, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Trans-Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985).
323. See infra cases cited at note 326.
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ordinary prudent person would exercise in like circumstances."
Most of these states also require that the director act in a way
that he perceives to be in the best interest of the corporation."'
Mississippi's case law is very narrow with respect to the mean-
ing and requirements of fiduciary duty. The Mississippi cases hold
that a director is a fiduciary who owes his corporation a duty to
act in good faith, with loyalty, and in accordance with the best
interests of the corporation. 26 Most of these cases deal with is-
sues of conflict of interest or self dealing; but one case states that
a director owes a duty to exercise the same "diligence and cau-
tion" that a careful and prudent owner would exercise in connec-
324. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-74 (1980); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 309 (West 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-101
(Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111 (West
1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-152 (Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-91.5 (1985); IDA-
Ho CODE % 30-1-35 (199D); IND. CODE ANN. % 23-1-35-1 (Bums Supp. 19%6); IOWA CODE ANN. % 496A.34
(West Supp. 1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:91 (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (1981
& Supp. 1986); MD. CotPS. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B,
§ 65 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1541 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251
(West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-401 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293-A:35 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 717,
719 (McKinney 1986); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin Supp.
1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 18, § 1.34 (West 1986); OR. RaV. STAT. § 57.228 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15 § 1408 (Purdon 1961 & Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-33 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150
(Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-813 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8
23A.08.343 (Supp. 1986); WYO. STAT. H 17-1-133, 17-1-141 (1977 & Supp. 1986); see, e.g., Folk, State
Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Responsible Management Conduct, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1976).
325. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-74 (1975); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-101
(Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (West 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.111 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-91.5 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-35 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. §
23-1-35-1 (Bums Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
13A, § 716 (1981 & Supp. 1986); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-401 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:35 (Supp. 1985);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.228 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-1.1-33 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
23A.08.343 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-141 (1977 & Supp. 1986).
326. Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Miss. 1979); McNair v. Capital Elec. Power Ass'n.,
324 So. 2d 234, 240 (Miss. 1975); Amer. Empire Life Ins. Co. v. McAdory, 319 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss.
1975); Cooper v. Miss. Land Co., 220 So. 2d 302, 309 (Miss. 1969); Benstz v. Vardaman Manuf. Co., 210
So. 2d 35, 40 (Miss. 1968); Smith v. Miss. Livestock Prod. Ass'n., 188 So. 2d 758, 762 (Miss. 1966); Frier-
son Bldg. Supply Co. v. Pritchard, 253 Miss. 541, 553-54, 176 So. 2d 301, 306 (1965); Knox Glass Bottle
Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699, 743, 89 So. 2d 799, 814 (Miss. 1956), sugg. of error overruled, 228 Miss.
789, 789, 91 So. 2d 843-44 (1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 977 (1957); Millsaps v. Chapman, 76 Miss. 942,
953, 26 So. 369, 370 (1899); see also Home Tel. Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992, 999 (N.D. Miss. 1973),
affd, 489 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1974) (federal court interpreting Mississippi law). Several Mississippi cases
cite to Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) in their discussion of the fiduciary duties of directors. Knox
Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699, 742, 89 So. 2d 799, 814 (Miss. 1956), sugg. of error over-
ruled, 328 Miss. 789, 789, 91 So. 2d 843-44 (1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 977 (1957); ElIzey v. Fyr-Pruf,
Inc. 376 So. 2d 1328. 1335 (Miss. 1979).
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tion with his own property. 27 These duties are sui generis, and
there is no certainty about the standards as they currently exist." 8
The RMBCA has a comprehensive set of standards that govern
fiduciary conduct." 9 The RMBCA section, which sets out the
general rules of care and loyalty, requires that a director perform
his duties "in good faith. . . with the care that an ordinary pru-
dent person in a like position would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances; and. . . in a manner he reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation."' 0 The RMBCA also al-
lows a director to rely in good faith on reports and opinions pre-
pared by corporate officers or employees, experts, or committees
of the board of directors, unless he has reason to doubt their com-
petence or reliability, or unless he possesses some knowledge
which prevents good faith reliance. 3 ' If the required standard of
conduct is met, the director is completely exonerated, and there
is no need for any further analysis under the business judgment
rule. " This approach may help clarify the current common-law
problems with directors' fiduciary duty and the business judgment
rule.3" The RMBCA gives significant guidance to directors and
prospective directors regarding the standard of conduct to which
they will be held.
3. Conflicts of Interest
The Mississippi corporate statute fails to address the problem
of director conflicts of interest and the status of contracts between
327. Cf McNair v. Capital Elec. Power Ass'n., 324 So. 2d 234, 240 (Miss. 1975) (quoting Webb & Knapp,
Inc. v. Hanover Bank, 214 Md. 230, 243, 133 A.2d 450, 456 (1957). ) (trustees of electric power association
held to fiduciary duty); see also Guntharp v. Planters Oil Mill, 358 So. 2d 397, 400 (1978) (directors and
officers owe 'the duty of dealing fairly and with the utmost caution in regard to the business" of the corporation.).
328. Mississippi does, however, have a statute which permits a director to claim good faith reliance on the
books and records of the corporation in meeting any of his obligations as a director, whatever they may be.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
329. See MODEL BUs. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d §§ 8.30-.33 official comment (1986).
330. Id. at § 8.30.
331. Id.
332. The business judgment rule is a judicially created concept that provides that
[i]f in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within the corporation's powers...
and their authority, for which there is a reasonable basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of
their independent discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what they
honestly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court will not interfere with internal manage-
ment and substitute its judgment for that of the directors to enjoin or set aside the transaction or to
surcharge the directors for any resulting loss.
H. HENN AND J. ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at § 242. The comment to RMBCA § 8.30 states that the section
is not an attempt to codify the business judgment rule because of the continuing development of the area.
333. See supra note 322.
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the corporation and its directors." 4 In many situations, a corpo-
ration may enter into a contract or transaction with a member of
its board of directors, or with a corporation in which a director
has a financial or managerial interest."' The leading Mississippi
case is Knox Glass Bottle Company v. Underwood. " Knox Glass,
which involved the lease of trucks to the corporation by its cor-
porate officers and directors, held that where a director acts for
and represents both the corporation and himself in a contract, that
contract is voidable at the option of the corporation, unless there
was shareholder ratification or estoppel. The Knox Glass court
makes sweeping statements regarding the voidability of contracts
where a conflict exists. In that case, the court said:
[Where an officer or director represents both himself and the corporation, the contract is voidable
by the corporation without reference to the good faith of the defendant or whether the corporation
suffered an actual injury; fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and "the law will not permit the
agent to place himself in a situation in which he may be tempted by his own private interest to dis-
regard that of his principal" (citation omitted)."'
Fortunately, the court went on to say:
This rule does not proscribe all contracts between a director or officer in the corporation. It simply
requires that, if such a contract is made, the corporation's interest must be guarded, and it represented,
by disinterested agents free from the control or influence of the interested director or officer.'"
At the time of the Knox Glass decision, the majority rule was
that where a conflict existed between the corporation and its direc-
tors, the contract was voidable at the election of the corporation
unless the directors could show that (1) they had disclosed their
personal interests in the transaction, (2) a majority of the disin-
terested directors had approved the transaction, and (3) the trans-
action was fair to the corporation. 9 Therefore, most jurisdictions
would have validated the contract if approved by a majority of
334. The only provision in Mississippi corporation law concerning conflicts of interest of directors is section
79-3-67. It states in part: "No person who is engaged or interested in a competing business either individually
or as employee or stockholder shall serve on any board of directors of any corporation without the consent
of a majority of interest of the stockholders thereof." This provision prevents a competitor from gaining a seat
on the board unless a majority of the shareholders agree. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-67 (Supp. 1986).
335. Mississippi examples: Home Tele. Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992, 998 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (merger
with corporation in which directors held a financial interest); Bentz v. Vardaman Mfg. Co., 210 So. 2d 35,
40-41 (1968) (sale of materials to an affiliate of a director); Millsaps v. Chapman, 76 Miss. 942, 953-54, 26
So. 369, 370 (1899) (sale of land to a director). Other examples: Muller v. Leyendecker, 697 S.W.2d 668,
675-76 (Tex. App. 1985)(lease of property to a director); Neidert v. Neidert, 637S.W.2d 296, 299-300 (Me.
App. 1982) (sale of property to director); Western Inn Corp. v. Heyl, 452 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. Cir. App.
1970) (borrowing of funds from director); Poweroil Mfg. Co. v. Carstensen, 69 Wash. 2d 673, 675, 419 P.2d
793, 797 (1966) (borrowing of funds from director).
336. 228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d. 799 (1956).
337. 228 Miss. at 745, 89 So. 2d at 815-16 (citing 13 Am. JUR., Corporations, § 1002).
338. 228 Miss. at 745, 89 So. 2d. at 816.
339. Branson, supra note 352, at 59.
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the disinterested directors or if it was fair to the corporation." '
While it is not stated explicitly in the case, Knox Glass stands
for a similar rule. Subsequent Mississippi cases cite Knox Glass
in support of the rule that" 'self-dealing' . . . automatically raises
a presumptive conflict of interest, thus shifting the burden to the
fiduciary to justify his conduct." 3'
Under Knox Glass, a great deal of uncertainty exists about the
enforceability of any contract between the corporation and one
or more of its directors (or his affiliates). The uncertainty exists
because such contracts will be judged in hindsight by courts after
a disagreement arises. No means other than shareholder approval
exist to provide advance protection for a contract. In many cases,
the cost of the proxy statement to secure shareholder approval
of the contract or transaction would outweigh the benefits which
the corporation might gain from the transaction. Knox Glass pre-
vents a corporation from entering into some valid and beneficial
contracts which could be voidable without shareholder ratifica-
tion. Alternative methods to protect fair and equitable transac-
tions between a corporation and its directors should be available.
This does not mean that Mississippi should remove all restric-
tions on contracts where a conflict of interest exists. Instead, Mis-
sissippi should adopt a statute governing this problem as
thirty-seven other jurisdictions have done." ' The RMBCA pro-
vides such a statute.
340. By 1960, most courts had departed enough from traditional trust concepts to recognize that all contracts
between a corporation and its directors should not be automatically voidable at the option of the corporation,
but that a court could carefully scrutinize such a contract and find it void if it was unfair to the corporation.
Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 39-40 (1966);
Hodge and Perry, supra note 71, at 388-89. Contra Johnson v. Duensing, 340 S.W.2d 758, 769 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1960) ("[N]otwithstanding the views expressed by the courts in some jurisdictions on the subject, the
policy of the law in this state has long continued to be .. .[that] 'a director .. .may not ... profit by reason
of his position .. . .It is immaterial that the corporation was not damaged by the transaction in which the
profits were made or that he acted throughout in the highest good faith and without intent to injure the corpora-
tion.' "). Id. at 768-69.
341. Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Miss. 1979); see also American Empire Life Ins.
Co. v. McAdory, 319 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1975); Bentz v. Vardaman Manuf. Co., 210 So. 2d 35, 40
(Miss. 1968); Frierson Bldg. Supply Co. v. Pritchard, 176 So. 2d 301, 306 (Miss. 1965). The Mississippi
rule appears to be that the contract is voidable only where there is actual fraud. But the rule is not clear.
342. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-63 (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-041 (1956 & Supp. 1986); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-323 (West 1960 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.124
(West 1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-155 (1982 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-41 (Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-10-6 (Bums 1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.205 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:84 (West 1969 & Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 717(l)(1964); MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS.
COoE ANN. § 2-419 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1545, 450.1546 (West 1973); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.255 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-413 (1985); NEE. RaV. STAT. § 21-2040.01 (1983);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.140 (1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
§ 14A:6-8(1), 14A:6-8(2) (West Supp. 1985-86); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C.
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The RMBCA abandons the rule of automatic voidability and
provides that a transaction" 3 is not voidable solely because a direc-
tor has a conflict of interest. " The RMBCA section provides that
a conflict of interest transaction is not voidable if (1) all material
facts about the transaction and the director's conflict were dis-
closed to the board and a majority of the disinterested directors" '4
"authorized, approved or ratified the transaction";""' or (2) all
material facts about the transaction and the director's conflict of
interest were disclosed to the shareholders, and a majority of the
disinterested shareholders "authorized, approved or ratified the
transaction";"4 7 or (3) the transaction was fair to the corporation.'
The abandonment of the automatic voidability rule does not mean
that a conflict of interest transaction is automatically valid if one
of these conditions is met;34 9 the section provides only that the
transaction is not voidable on the basis of conflict of interest. The
transaction may still be attacked on other grounds, such as failure
to follow procedure set forth in other sections of the corporate
law, waste, or breach of a duty of care." Conflict of interest rules
are necessary to allow the corporation to function efficiently and
effectively. The RMBCA section on conflict of interest provides
effective conflict of interest rules.
GEN. STAT. § 55-30(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.60 (Baldwin 1979); OR. REV.
STAT. tit. 7, § 57.265 (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R. I. GEN. LAWS §
7-1.1-37.1 (1985); S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-816
(1984); VA. CODE § 13.1-691 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-25 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.355 (West
Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-136.1 (Supp. 1986).
343. "A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the corporation in which a director of the corpo-
ration has a direct or indirect interest." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 8.31 (1986).
344. MODEL Bus. Coap. ACT ANN. 3d § 8.31 official comment (1986).
345. The RMBCA does not define "interested director." The official comment to section 8.31 says that a
director is interested if "he or the immediate members of his family have a financial interest in the transaction
or a relationship with the other parties to the transaction such that the relationship might reasonably be expect-
ed to affect his judgment in the particular matter in a manner adverse to the corporation." Id. at § 8.31 official
comment.
346. The affirmative vote of a majority of the board of directors who have no interest in the transaction
is necessary to approve a conflict of interest transaction; but a single director may disapprove a transaction.
For the purpose of considering a conflict of interest transaction, a majority of the directors who have no in-
terest in the transaction constitutes a quorum. The RMBCA also states that the fact that an interested director
is present at the meeting or votes on the transaction does not affect the procedural validity of the action if
all other conditions of the section are met. Id. at § 8.31(c).
347. If shareholders are asked to approve a conflict of interest transaction, the affirmative votes of a majority
of shares not held by an interested party, or an affiliate of an interested party, is sufficient to pass the transac-
tion. Id. at § 8.3 1(d). The effect of this subsection may in some cases (where the majority shareholder(s) have
an interest in the transaction) require the approval of a majority of the minority. Id. at § 8.31 official comment.
348. Id. at § 8.31(a).
349. This section does not affect the required procedure to approve corporate actions under the RMBCA.
Id. at § 8.31 official corment.
350. Id.
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4. Management Structure
The Mississippi Act provides that the board of directors shall
manage the business and affairs of the corporation." 1 The new
trend in corporate governance is for corporate power to be exer-
cised "by or under the authority" of the board of directors with
the business and affairs of a corporation managed under the direc-
tion of the board of directors."' This authority is subject to any
limitation contained in the articles of incorporation."' The new
trend developed because the traditional model requiring all cor-
porations to be managed by a board of directors is not appropri-
ate for every type of enterprise." ' A corporate statute should be
flexible enough to provide some realistic governance alternatives
to meet the needs of different types of corporations. In many small,
closely held corporations, the board members will also be share-
holders, officers, or employees. In those corporations, the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation will appropriately be managed
by the board of directors. In other situations, as in large, public-
ly held corporations, the directors rarely have any contact with
the day-to-day operation of the corporation. In these larger cor-
porations, the more appropriate and accurate theory of corporate
governance is that the management of the corporation be per-
formed by the senior executives of the corporation under the direc-
tion of the board of directors."' Mississippi corporations suffer
no real harm from this provision, but the new trend in corporate
governance should not be ignored in statutory revision. This realis-
tic option should be available.
The Mississippi Act also provides that the number of directors
351. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-67 (Supp. 1986).
352. Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Com-
pany Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 89-92 (1983);
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 8.01 official comment (1986). The following jurisdictions now provide
that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed "by or under the authority of" the board of
directors: ALA. CODE § 10-2A-57 (1975 & Supp. 1986), CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE' ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.111 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416 91.5 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §
30-1-35 (1948); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-2-11 (Bums 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1985);
MD. CoRPs. & Ass'r4s. CODE ANN. § 2-401 (1985); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. H 450.1501, 450.1463 (West
1973 & Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.201, 302A.457 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
35-1-401, 35-1-515 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:35 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701
(McKinney Supp. 1986); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.59, 1701.591 (Baldwin 1985); OKL. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1.34 (West 1953); S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-11-220, 33-13-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); and WAsH.
Rav. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.340 (Supp. 1985).
353. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d 8 8.01 (1986).
354. Branson, supra note 352, at 91. Branson says that "[i]n large corporations especially, that formulation
[that directors manage the corporation] does not accord with reality." Id. See also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. 3d § 8.01 official comment (1986).
355. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 8.01 official comment (1986).
[VOL. 6:1
1985] MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
may be fixed in the bylaws and that the minimum number of direc-
tors is three."5 6 The requirement that a board of directors be com-
posed of at least three people is also an antiquated statutory
concept." 7 Modem corporate statutes drop the statutory minimum
to one and allow the corporation to determine how many direc-
tors it needs." 8 Although most state statutes still provide for a
board of directors, some allow a sole shareholder to act as the
board." 9 In corporations which have only one or two shareholders,
allowing the corporation to act with a one- or two-person board
avoids the need to bring in outsiders and may increase the effi-
ciency of the corporation. The RMBCA goes even further. In cor-
porations which have 50 or fewer shareholders, the shareholders
may elect, in the articles of incorporation, to dispense with the
board altogether 6" and manage the corporation directly. 61 While
356. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-69 (1972).
357. Only five states other than Mississippi still require three or more directors in all cases. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.315 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-25 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-37 (1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.35 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-34 (1953).
358. Seventeen states require the number of directors to be three unless there are less than three shareholders.
In these 17 states, the statutes allow fewer than three directors as long as the number of directors is not fewer
than the number of shareholders. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.177 (1976); AEx. STAT. ANN. § 64-302 (1980);
COLA. REV. STAT. § 7-5-102 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-314 (1983); GA. CODE ANN.§
14-2-141 (Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-4 (1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:81 (West 1969 &
Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 703 (1964); MD. CoiRs. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-402
(Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156, § 21 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.115 (1981);
N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 702 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 81701.56 (Baldwin
1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1402 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. 8 48-1-802 (1984);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. II, § 1882 (1984); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-134 (1977). Twenty-five states require one or
more directors and allow the corporation to decide how many directors are needed in all circumstances. ALA.
CODE § 10-2A-58 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-036 (1956); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 212, 301, 303
(West 1977 & Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.114 (West 1977);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-36 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-2-1 1(3)(b) (West 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.35
(West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6301(b) (1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.180 (Baldwin
1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 450-1505 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.203 (West 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-402 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:36 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-2
(West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-36 (1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 57.185 (1985); R. I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-1.1-34 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. 8 33-13-30 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. §
47-5-4 (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2.32 (Vernon 1980); VA. CODE § 13.1-673 (Supp. 1985);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.350 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-21 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.32 (West Supp. 1986).
359. See infra note 361.
360. The corporation may choose to limit the board's authority rather than dispense with the board entirely.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 8.01 (1986).
361. The articles must state who will exercise the functions of the board. Id. at § 8.01. A number ofjurisdic-
tions now allow close corporations to dispense with the board of directors or delegate managerial duties to
shareholders, other persons, or other corporations. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 701 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1501, 450.1463 (West Supp. 1985);
MONT. CODE ANN. 88 35-1-401, 35-1-515 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin 1985); S.C.
CoDE ANN. §§ 33-11-220, 33-13-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985). Many other jurisdictions allow close corpora-
tions to dispense with a board of directors in separate close corporation statutes. See Model Close Corporation
Supplement and annotations thereto. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d 1803-79 (1986).
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all corporations need a model of corporate governance, the same
model is not appropriate for all corporations. Because corpora-
tions are formed for a variety of purposes and in many different
sizes, the corporation statute should allow each corporation to
shape its management form to meet its specific needs62 The state
corporate statute should meet the needs of corporations of all types.
Mississippi should take advantage of the RMBCA's common-sense
flexibility regarding management structure.
E. Miscellaneous Provisions
This portion of the Article will discuss some little known pro-
visions of Mississippi's corporation law which should be amended.
1. Survival of Claims Against a Dissolved Corporation:
Section 79-3-209
Section 79-3-209, which was based primarily on the 1960 ver-
sion of the MBCA, deals with survival of remedies after the dis-
solution, suspension or forfeiture of the corporation." It provides
that dissolution, suspension or forfeiture does not impair any reme-
dy available to or against the corporation for any right or claim
existing or any liability incurred prior to the dissolution, suspen-
sion or forfeiture." 4 The section also provides for the survival
of a claim against a dissolved corporation if an action or proceeding
to enforce the claim is commenced within the period of limita-
tion set forth in the applicable statute of limitations. Although the
Mississippi section may be adequate to govern pre-dissolution
claims, it fails to address the problems of claims that arise after
362. See supra text accompanying notes 351-61.
363. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-209 (1972). MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 98 (1960). That section was
renumbered § 105 in the 1969 revision of the Model Business Corporation Act. That section provided:
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the Secre-
tary of State, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business
of the corporation as provided in this Act, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, shall not take
away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers, or share-
holders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action
or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of such dissolution. Any
such action or proceeding by or against the corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corpora-
tion in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors and officers shall have power to take such cor-
porate or other action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such corporation
was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such corporation may amend its articles of
incorporation at any time during such period of two years so as to extend its period of duration.
For an historical perspective of the problem, see Miller, The Status of Choses in Action of Dissolved but Unad-
ministered Corporations after Erpiration of the Statutory Period for Winding Up, 9 Miss. L.J. 455 (1937).
364. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-209 (1972). Prior to the adoption of the Mississippi Business Corporation
Act, Mississippi provided for the survival of claims against a dissolved corporation for a period of three years.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 5353 (1942 & Supp. 1957).
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dissolution." Post-dissolution claims often involve claims for per-
sonal injuries which occur after dissolution, but which are allegedly
caused by products manufactured or sold prior to dissolution. 66
Whether a products liability claim arises before or after dissolu-
tion may depend upon the liability theory the court applies to the
claim.367 If a court adopts a warranty theory, the claim will arise
at the date of the sale and the statute of limitations will begin to
run from the same date.3" If the claim is in tort, for negligence,
the cause of action will accrue at the time of the injury and the
statute of limitations will run from that date. 69 The action may
also sound in strict liability, a hybrid of the two.7 In strict liabil-
ity cases, the courts are split on whether warranty or tort princi-
ples apply. 71 A substantial number of jurisdictions hold that the
tort standard applies and that the claim accrues and the statute
of limitations begins to run at the time of the injury." If the sale
occurs before dissolution and the injury thereafter, the theory ap-
plied will affect the classification of a claim as pre-dissolution
or post-dissolution.3 If the warranty theory is adopted in this sit-
uation, the claim is pre-dissolution; if a tort standard is adopted,
the claim is post-dissolution. In Mississippi the application of this
section is clouded and may have disastrous results.
In Naugher v. Fox River Tractor Company,"" the application
of Mississippi's survival statute, Section 79-3-209, created an un-
limited statute of limitations for personal injury cases." In Naugh-
er, the court held that a plaintiff who was injured after the
dissolution of the defendant corporation by a product manufac-
tured and sold before the corporation was dissolved could main-
tain a claim against the defendant because the claim accrued at
365. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-209 (1972). See generally Henn and Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolu-
tion on Products liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 899 (1971).
366. Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 867-73, 888-89; Friedlander and Lannie, Post-Dissolution
Liabilities of Shareholders and Directors for Claims Against Dissolved Corporations, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1363,
1366-69 (1978); Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant - The Effect of a Sale of
Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REv. 321, 321 (1976).
367. Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 888; Wallach, supra note 365, at 326.
368. Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 877; Note, Statutes of Limitations: Their Selection and Appli-
cation in Products Liability Cases, 23 VAND. L. REv. 775, 782-85 (1970).
369. Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 877-78; Note, supra note 368, at 775, 781-82.
370. Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 873-78.
371. Note, supra note 368, at 782-95.
372. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The restatement takes the position that
strict liability sounds in tort even though some courts rely on warranty theories. Note, Statutes of Limitations:
Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases, 23 VAND. L. Rsv. 775, 787-88 (1970). But cf.
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) (decided on a warranty principle).
373. Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 888-89.
374. 446 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss 1977).
375. See infra text accompanying note 382.
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the time the machine was manufactured and placed on the mar-
ket. '76 The court then applied the general six-year statute of limi-
tations beginning from the date of the injury rather than the date
of the sale."' In Naugher, the court mixed its theories and adopt-
ed a warranty theory for accrual of the claim and a negligence
theory for the purpose of determining the applicable statute of
limitations.'78 Therefore, the court found that the claim accrued
at the date of sale but held that the statute of limitations ran from
the date of the injury. 7' If the court had applied either theory con-
sistently, the claim would have been barred. Under a warranty
claim, the suit would have been barred by the statute of limita-
tions. If a negligence theory were applied, the claim would have
been barred because the survival provision of section 79-3-209
would not apply. 8 ° Commentators, as well as a majority of cases
from other jurisdictions, conclude that a dissolved corporation
may be sued only for pre-dissolution claims in those states whose
statutes are patterned after the 1960 version of the MBCA. 8' The
effect of Naugher is to create an unlimited time for which the
shareholders and directors of a dissolved corporation may be held
responsible for tort claims for products manufactured and sold
prior to dissolution. 8
The decision in Naugher makes it practically impossible for a
corporation to complete the winding up process in a reasonable
time. Further, the Naugher decision is unfair to the shareholders
and directors of the corporation who may be saddled with claims
for an unlimited time after dissolution.' On the other hand, deny-
ing all claims which arise after dissolution may be unfair to an
injured plaintiff.'" In response to post-dissolution claim problems
with the MBCA provision, the RMBCA provides for continuing
liability for post-dissolution claims for a specified period after
376. 446 F. Supp. at 1283. In Naugher, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for damages
sustained while using a "crop chopper" manufactured by the defendant. The "crop chopper" was sold to the
plaintiff in 1966 and the defendant corporation dissolved in 1968. The plaintiff was injured while using the
machine in 1969 and brought suit in 1975. Id. at 1282.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 1283.
379. Id.
380. Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 899.
381. Stone v. Gibson Refrig. Sales Corp., 366 F. Supp. 733, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Bishop v. Schield Ban-
tam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 95 (N.D. Iowa 1968); Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 251
(N.D. Ohio 1965); Henn and Alexander, supra note 365, at 899; Wallach, supra note 366, at 326.
382. Under the Naugher formulation, a corporation which manufactured a product in 1965 and dissolved
in 1975 would be subject to suit by a plaintiff injured by the product in 1985 as long as the suit was brought
within six years from the 1985 injury. This is quite clearly not the intent of the statute.
383. Freidlander and Lannie, supra note 366, at 1401.
384. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 14.07 official comment (1986); Henn and Alexander, supra note
365, at 905. Freidlander and Lannie, supra note 366, at 1400.
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dissolution. 8 The RMBCA continues liability for a period of five
years from the publication of notice of dissolution. 86 The official
commentary to the RMBCA states that while the five-year peri-
od is arbitrary, the drafters believed that the "great bulk" of post-
dissolution claims will arise within five years.""
Mississippi should amend its statute to correct the problems
created by a federal judge interpreting Mississippi law. The de-
cision in Naugher leaves the shareholders and directors of a dis-
solved corporation subject to liability for an unlimited period.88
The RMBCA provides a sound, reasonable solution by balanc-
ing the right of plaintiffs to seek redress for injuries against the
need for certainty in the dissolution of corporations. This is a pro-
vision which should not be ignored in the revision of Mississip-
pi's corporation statutes.
2. Administrative Dissolution
Mississippi is one of only three jurisdictions which does not
allow involuntary administrative dissolution." 9 Mississippi allows
involuntary dissolution only by judicial order."" Mississippi's in-
voluntary dissolution statute provides that a corporation may be
dissolved by a decree of a chancery court upon an action filed
by the attorney general if the corporation (1) failed to file an an-
nual report within the time specified by law, (2) procured its ar-
ticles by fraud, (3) abused its authority, (4) failed to appoint and
maintain an agent for service of process in the state, or (5) failed
to file a change of registered agent within 30 days after the
change.' As a practical matter, this section causes hardship on
the secretary of state who has no legal authority to dissolve a delin-
quent or abandoned corporation, but must refer the problem to
the attorney general to bring an action to dissolve the corpora-
tion. Unfortunately, the attorney general's office is busy and has
limited legal resources available. Often dissolution actions are
abandoned, and the secretary of state is left with continued ad-
ministrative paperwork and no dissolution. In many instances the
385. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 14.07 (1986).
386. Id.
387. Id. at § 14.07 official comment.
388. Naugher, 446 F. Supp. at 1283.
389. Alabama and Wisconsin still have no administrative dissolution statute. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-192 (1980);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.769 (Supp. 1986).
390. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-187 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
391. Id. This section was drawn from an earlier version of the Model Act. The reason given for mandatory
judicial dissolution was that restricting this type of action to the courts might protect rights which could be
lost otherwise. (MBCA comments). This position was not accepted widely, however, and Mississippi is one
of only three jurisdictions which do not allow administrative dissolution.
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secretary of state wishes to seek dissolution because the corpora-
tion has been abandoned by its shareholders. 92 The corporate
records of the state should be purged of those corporations that
are no longer active or will not comply with state law require-
ments. Resort to judicial action takes unnecessary time and ener-
gy whereas administrative dissolution is a much simpler method
to achieve the same objective.
The RMBCA provides for administrative dissolution, as do a
large majority of the states. 3 Administrative dissolution under
the RMBCA occurs if (1) the corporation fails to pay its fran-
chise taxes and any penalties within 60 days after they are due;
(2) the corporation fails to deliver its annual report to the secre-
tary of state within 60 days of its due date; (3) the corporation
is without a registered agent or registered office in this state for
a period of 60 days or more; (4) the corporation fails to notify
the secretary of state within 60 days after its registered agent or
registered office has been changed; or (5) the corporation's peri-
od of duration stated in its articles of incorporation expires." Un-
der the RMBCA provisions, the corporation receives notice of
its pending dissolution and the opportunity to correct the failing
within 60 days.3 ' If the corporation is dissolved by administra-
392. Telephone interview with Ray Bailey, Assistant Secretary of State, Division of Corporation Law (Feb.
14, 1986).
393. MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. 3d §§ 14.20-.23 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.519 (1985); AMz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-095, 10-128 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-1842, 84-1843 (1980 & Supp.
1985); CAL. CORP. Coop 2205 (West Supp. 1986); COLD. REV. STAT. § 7-10-109 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-378, 33-387, 33-388 (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 8§ 510-514 (1983); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.271 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-283 (1982 & Supp. 1986); HAWAIt REV.
STAY. %% 416-122 to 416-127 (19%5); IDmAi CoDv %% 30-1-134 to 30-1-13% (9ig(); Ws. PrNs. STT. ch.
32, § 12.35 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-46-1 to 23-1-46-4 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CoDE
ANN. § 496A.91 (West 1962 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2719, 17-7510 (1981), 50-103 (1983);
Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 271A.615 (Baldwin 1983 & Supp. 1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:163 (West
Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 1302 (1981); MD. CoaPS. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. §§ 3-503
to 3-512 (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, §§ 101, 108 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1922, 450.1925 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.821 (West 1985); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 351.525-351.540 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 35-12-1201 (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. 8§ 21-313 to 21-323, 21-20135 to 21-20144 (1983); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.170-.185 (1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:95(I) (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:11-1 to 54:11-5 (West 1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-5-7 (1983); N.Y. TAX LAW § 203a (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-230,
105-232 (1985); OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 5733.20-.22 (Baldwin 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.198a
(1986); OR. Ray. STAT. §§ 57.585, 57.755(5) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 1704 (Purdon 1949); R.I.
GEN. LAWS 88 7-1.1-87 to 7-1.1-89 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-21-110, 33-21-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-7-52.1 to 47-7-59 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. % 67-4-917' (Supp.
1986); TEX. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7.01 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-88
to 16-10-88.2 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. II, § 2063 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §9 13.1-752 to 13.1-755
(Supp. 1986); WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. § 23A.28.125-.127 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-156(b) (1982);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.793 (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. 88 17-1-613, 17-2-102, 17-2-103 (1977).
394. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 14.20 (1986).
395. Id. at § 14.21.
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tive order, there is also a reinstatement procedure available if the
corporation seeks reinstatement within two years. '
Mississippi should adopt administrative dissolution because it
reduces the number of records to be maintained by the secretary
of state, eliminates wasteful attempts to compel abandoned cor-
porations to comply with state laws and returns unused names
to the pool of names available in the state. Most importantly, ad-
ministrative dissolution and the threat thereof will serve as an ef-
fective enforcement mechanism against corporations which fail
to pay franchise taxes or file annual reports." 7
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has touched only on those sections of the Missis-
sippi Business Corporation Law which are the most outdated and
awkward. Attention must be given, however, to the entire stat-
ute. Mississippi's business corporation statute needs a major over-
haul. The current statute, which is over 20 years old, has received
little attention since its passage. Because the statute is outdated
and unusual, it enhances Mississippi's backward image. The cur-
rent statute should be abandonded in favor of a new statute pat-
terned closely after the Revised Model Business Corporation Act.
The RMBCA should be adopted with as few changes as possible
so that Mississippi's corporation law will be comfortable and flex-
ible for use by both Mississippi lawyers and those from other
states. In addition, the proposed statutory amendments cannot be
completed unless the Mississippi Constitution is amended to de-
lete the unusual anti-business sections. Therefore, the legislature
should consider amendments to both the statute and the constitu-
tion at the same time and take advantage of the expertise and
knowledge of the drafters of the RMBCA by adopting the statute
substantially as written. In connection with any statutory revision,
the state must also consider the need to keep the business corpo-
ration law updated as the RMBCA is amended. This could be ac-
complished by nominating a body of interested individuals to keep
track of the corporate law nationwide and to propose changes in
the Mississippi corporation statutes as needed. Some type of cor-
porate law advisory committee is essential to the continued health
of Mississippi corporate law.
396. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 14.22 (1986).
397. Telephone interview with Ray Bailey, Assistant Secretary of State, Division of Corporation Law (Feb.
14, 1986); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 14.20 official comment (1986).
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Appendix A
Mississippi BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
Selected Provisions
§ 79-3-3. Def'mitions.
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the term:
(a) "Corporation" or "domestic corporation" means a corporation for profit subject to the provisions of this
chapter, except a foreign corporation.
(b) "Fontigi corpovation" means a corporation for profit orgazd under laws other than te laws of1 this
state for a purpose or purposes for which a corporation may be organized under this chapter.
(c) "Articles of incorporation" means the original or restated articles of incorporation and all amendments
thereto and includes articles of merger.
(d) The principal office in Mississippi of a domestic corporation or of a foreign corporation shall be its registered
office, which may be, but need not be, the same as its place of business in this state.
(e) "Shares" means the units into which the proprietary interests in a corporation are divided.
(f) "Subscriber" means one who subscribes for shares in a corporation, whether before or after incorporation.
(g) "Shareholder" means one who is a holder of record of shares in a corporation.
(h) "Authorized shares" means the shares of all classes which the corporation is authorized to issue.
(i) "Treasury shares" means shares of a corporation which have been issued, have been subsequently ac-
quired by and belong to the corporation, and have not, either by reason of the acquisition or thereafter, been
canceled or restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares. Treasury shares shall be deemed to be
"issued" shares, but not "outstanding" shares.
(j) "Net assets means the amount by which the total assets of a corporation, excluding treasury shares, ex-
ceed the total debts of the corporation.
(k) "Stated capital" means, at any particular time, the sum of (1) the par value of all shares of the corporation
having a par value that have been issued, (2) the amount of the consideration reeceived by the corporation
for all shares of the corporaton without par value that have been issued, except such part of the consideration
therefor as may have been allocated to capital surplus in a manner permitted by law, and (3) such amounts
not included in clauses (1) and (2) of this paragraph as have been transferred to stated capital of the corpora-
tion, whether upon the issue of shares as a share dividend or otherwise, minus all reductions from such sum
as have been effected in a manner permitted by law. Irrespective of the manner of designation thereof by the
laws under which a foreign corporation is organized, the stated capital of a foreign corporation shall be deter-
mined on the same basis and in the same manner as the stated capital of a domestic corporation, for the purpose
of computing fees and other changes imposed by this chapter.
(1) "Surplus" means the excess of the net assets of a corporation over its stated capital.
(in) "Earned surplus" means the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the balance of its net profits,
income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation, or from the latest date when a deficit was eliminated
by an application of its capital surplus or stated capital or otherwise, after deducting subsequent distributions
to shareholders and transfers to stated capital and capital surplus to the extent such distributions and transfers
are made out of earned surplus.
(n) "Capital surplus" means the entire surplus of a corporation other than its earned surplus.
(o) "Insolvent" means inability of a corporation to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of
its business.
§ 79-3-7. General powers.
Each corporation shall have power:
(a) To have succession for a period not to exceed ninety-nine (99) years by its corporate name unless a lesser
period of duration is stated in its articles of incorporation.
(b) To se and be sted, complain and defend, in its orporate namt.
(c) To have a corporate seal which may be altered at pleasure, and to use the same by causing it, or a facsim-
ile thereof, to be impressed or affixed or in any other manner reproduced.
(d) To purchase, take, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal
in and with real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated.
(e) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and otherwise dispose of all or any part
of its property and assets.
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(t) To lend money to its employees other than its officers and directors, and otherwise assist its employees,
officers and directors.
(g) To purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mort-
gage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, and otherwise use and deal in and with shares or other interests
in, or obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, associations, partnerships or individuals, or direct
or indirect obligations of the United States or of any other government, state, territory, governmental district
or municipality or of any instrumentality thereof, provided, however, that this section shall not be construed
to grant to any corporation the power to create unlawful monopolies, trusts or combinations in restraint of
trade in violation of the laws of this state.
(h) To make contracts and guarantees and incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates of interest as the
corporation may determine, issue its notes, bonds, and other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by
mortgage or pledge of all or any of its property, franchises and income.
(i) To lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its funds, and take and hold real and per-
sonal property as security for the payment of funds so loaned or invested.
j) To conduct its business, carry on its operations, and have offices and exercise the powers granted by
this chapter in any state, territory, district, or possession of the United States, or in any foreign country.
(k) To elect or appoint officers and agents of the corporation, and define their duties and fix their compensation.
(1) To make and alter bylaws, not inconsistent with its articles of incorporation or with the laws of this state,
for the administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation.
(in) In addition to authority now provided by law, to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable,
scientific or educational purposes; and in time of war to make donations in aid of war activities.
(n) In time of war to transact any lawful business in aid of the United States in the prosecution of the war.
(o) To indemnify any director or officer or former dictyeo or officer of the corporalim, or any ptrson who
may have served at its request as a director or officer of another corporation in which it owns shares of capital
stock or of which it is a creditor, against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with
the defense of any action, suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, in which he is made a party by reason of being
or having been such director or officer, except in relation to matters as to which he shall be adjudged in such
action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty, or a violation
of the provisions of sections 75-21-1 to 75-21-39, and 75-23-1 to 75-23-27, Mississippi Code of 1972; and
to make any other indemnification that shall be authorized by the articles of incorporation or by any bylaw
or resolution adopted by the stockholders after notice.
(p) To pay pensions and establish pension plans, pension trusts, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans, and
other incentive plans for any or all of its directors, officers and employees.
(q) To cease its corporate activities and surrender its corporate franchise.
(r) To have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to affect any or all of the purposes for which
the corporation is organized.
(a) To apply to the governor for a renewal of its succession under the corporate name, in which event it
shall be sufficient for the governor to give a certificate under the great seal of the state that the original articles
of incorporation and certificate of incorporation and all amendments thereto then in effect are renewed for
a period not to exceed ninety-nine (99) years. Every certificate of renewal shall be recorded at length in the
office of the secretary of state in a well-bound book to be kept by him for that purpose, to be furnished by the state.
§ 79-3-9. Right of corporation to acquire and dispose of its own shares.
A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, hold, own, pledge, trans-
fer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, but purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall
be made only to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor, and if the articles
of incorporation so permit or with the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of all shares entitled
to vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor.
To the extent that earned surplus or capital surplus is used as the measure of the corporation's right to pur-
chase its own shares, such surplus shall be restricted so long as such shares are held as treasury shares, and
upon the disposition or cancellation of any such shares the restriction shall be removed pro tanto.
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, a corporation may purchase or otherwise acquire its own shares
for the purpose of:
(a) Eliminating fractional shares.
(b) Collecting or compromising indebtedness to the corporation.
(c) Paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their shares under the provision of this chapter.
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(d) Effecting, subject to the other provisions of this chapter, the retirement of its redeemable shares by redemp-
tion or by purchase at not to exceed the redemption price.
No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent
or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent, or when such purchase would reduce its outstand-
ing capital below the minimum provided in its articles of incorporation to begin business.
§ 79-3-27. Authorized shares.
Each corporation shall have power to create and issue the number of shares stated in its articles of incorpora-
tion. Such shares may be divided into one or more classes, any or all of which classes may consist of shares
with par value or shares without par value, with such designations, preferences, limitations, and relative rights
as shall be suited in the articles of incorporation. The articles of incorporation may limit or deny the voting
rights of or provide special voting rights for the shares of any class or preferred stocks to the extent not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this chapter.
Without limiting the authority herein contained, a corporation, when so provided in its articles of incorpora-
tion, may issue shares of preferred or special classes:
(a) Subject to the right of the corporation to redeem any of such shares at the price fixed by the articles
of incorporation for the redemption thereof.
(b) Entitling the holders thereof to cumulative, non cumulative or partially cumulative dividends.
(c) Having preference over any other class or classes of shares as to the payment of dividends.
(d) Having preference in the assets of the corporation over any other class or classes of shares upon the
voluntary or involuntary liquidation of the corporation.
(e) Convertible into shares of any other class or into shares of any series of the same or any other class,
except a class having prior or superior rights and preferences as to dividends or distribution of assets upon
liquidation, but shares without par value shall not be converted into shares with par value unless that part of
the stated capital of the corporation represented by such shares without par value is, at the time of conversion,
at lease equal to the aggregate par value of the shares into which the shares without par value are to be converted.
§ 79-3-33. Consideration for shares.
Shares having a par value shall not have a par value less than one dollar ($1.00). Such shares may be issued
for such consideration expressed in dollars, not less than the par value thereof, as shall be fixed from time
to time by the board of directors.
Shares without par value may be issued for such consideration expressed in dollars and not less than one
dollar ($1.00) per share as may be fixed from time to time by the board of directors unless the articles of
incorporation reserve to the shareholders the right to fix the consideration. In the event that such right be reserved
as to any shares, the shareholders shall, prior to the issuance of such shares, fix the consideration to be received
for such shares, not less than one dollar ($1.00) per share, by a vote of the holders of a majority of all shares
entitled to vote thereon.
Treasury shares seay be disposed of by the corporation for such cosssiers expressed in dollars as may
be fixed from time to time by the board of directors.
That part of the surplus of a corporation which is transferred to stated capital upon the issuance of shares
as a share dividend shall be deemed to be the consideration for the issuance of such shares.
In the event of a conversion of shares, or in the event of an exchange of shares with or without par value
for the same or a different number of shares with or without par value, whether of the same or a different
class or classes, the consideration for the shares so issued in exchange or conversion shall be deemed to be
(1) the stated capital then represented by the shares so exchanged or converted, and (2) that part of surplus,
if any, transferred to stated capital upon the issuance of shares for the shares so exchanged or converted, and
(3) any additional consideration paid to the corporation upon the issuance of shares for the shares so exchanged
or converted.
§ 79-3-35. Payment for shares.
The consideration for the issuance of shares may be paid, in whole or in part, in money, in other property,
tangible or intangible, or in labor or services actially performed for the corporation. When payment of the
consideration for which shares are to be issued shall have been received by the corporation, such shares shall
be deemed to be fully paid and non-assessable.
Neither promissory notes nor future services shall constitute payment or part payment for shares of a corpo-
ration.
In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the board of directors or the shareholders, as
the case may be, as to the value of the consideration received for shares shall be conclusive.
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§ 79-3-47. Liability of subscribers and shareholders.
A holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation shall be under no obligation to the corporation or its
creditors with respect to such shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full consideration
for which such shares were issued or to be issued.
Any person becoming asn assignee or transferee of shares or of a subscription for shares in good faith and
without knowledge or notice that the full consideration therefor has not been paid shall not be personally liable
to the corporation or its creditors for any unpaid portion of such consideration.
An executor, administrator, conservator, guardian, trustee, assignee for the benefit of creditors, or receiver
shall not be personally liable to the corporation as a holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation, but
the estate and funds in his hands shall be so liable.
No pledgee or other holder of shares as collateral security shall be personally liable as a shareholder.
§ 79-3-61. Quorum of shareholders.
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a majority of the shares entitled to vote, represented
in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of shareholders, but in no event shall a quorum
consist of less that one-third (1/3) of the shares entitled to vote at the meeting. If a quorum is present, the
affirmative vote of the majority of the shares represented at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject
matter shall be the act of the shareholders, unless the vote of a greater number or voting by classes is required
by this chapter or the articles of incorporation or bylaws.
§ 79-3-63. Voting of shares.
Each outstanding share, regardless of class, shall be entitled to one vote on each matter submitted to a vote
at a meetinig of shareholders, except to the extenit that the voting rights of the shares of preferred stock are
limited or denied by the articles of incorporation as permitted by this chapter.
Neither treasury shares, nor shares held by another corporation of a majority of the shares entitled to vote
for the election of directors of such other corporation is held by the corporation, shall be voted at any meeting
or counted in determining the total number of outstanding shares at any given time.
A shareholder may vote either in person or by proxy executed in writing by the shareholder or by his duly
authorized attorney-in-fact. No proxy shall be valid after eleven (11) months from the date of its execution,
unless otherwise provided in the proxy.
At each election for directors every shareholder entitled to vote at such election shall have the right to vote,
in person or by proxy, the number of shares owned by him for as many persons as there are directors to be
elected and for whose election he has a right to vote, or to cumulate his votes by giving one candidate as many
votes as the number of such directors multiplied by the number of his shares shall equal, or by distributing
such votes on the same principle among any number of such candidates.
Shares standing in the name of another corporation, domestic or foreign, may be voted by such officer, agent
or proxy as the bylaws of such corporation may prescribe, or, in the absence of such provision, as the board
of directors of such corporation may determine.
Shares held by an administrator, executor, guardian or conservator may be voted by him, either in person
or by proxy without a transfer of such shares into his name. Shares standing in the name of a trustee may
be voted by him, either in person or by proxy, but no trustee shall be entitled to vote shares held by him without
a transfer of such shares into his name.
Shares standing in the name of a receiver may be voted by such receiver, and shares held by or under the
control of a receiver may be voted by such receiver without the transfer thereof into his name if authority
so to do be contained in an appropriate order of the court by which such receiver was appointed.
A shareholder whose shares are pledged shall be entitled to vote such shares until the shares have been trans-
ferred into the name of the pledgee, and thereafter the pledgee shall be entitled to vote the shares so transferred.
On and after the date on which written notice of redemption of redeemable shares has been mailed to the
holders thereof and a sum sufficient to redeem such shares has been deposited with a bank or trust company
with irrevocable instruction and authority to pay the redemption price to the holders thereof upon surrender
of certificates therefor, such shares shall not be entitled to vote on any matter and shall not be deemed to be
outstanding shares.
§ 79-3-67. Board of directors.
The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors. Each director shall be
eighteen (18) years of age or older, and need not be a resident of this state or shareholder of the corporation
unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws so require. The articles of incorporation or bylaws may prescribe
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other qualifications for directors. The board of directors shall have authority to fix the compensation of direc-
tors unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation. No person who is engaged or interested in a
competing business either individually or as employee or stockholder shall serve on any board of directors
of any corporation without the consent of a majority of interest of the stockholders thereof.
§ 79-3-69. Number and election of directors.
The number of directors of a corporation shall be not less than three (3). Subject to such limitation, the num-
ber of directors shall be fixed by the bylaws, except as to the number constituting the initial board of directors,
which number shall be fixed by the articles of incorporation. The number of directors may be increased or
decreased from time to time by amendment to the bylaws, but no decrease shall have the effect of shortening
the term of any incen hs" director. In the absence of a bylaw fixing ft minber of directors, the numbr shall
be the same as that stated in the articles of incorporation. The names and addresses of the members of the
first board of directors shall be stated in the articles of incorporation. Such person shall hold office until the
first annual meeting of shareholders, and until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. At the
first annual meeting of shareholders and at each annual meeting thereafter the shareholders shall elect directors
to hold office until the next succeeding annual meeting, except in case of the classification of directors as per-
mitted by this chapter. Each director shall hold office for the term for which he is elected and until his succes-
sor shall have been elected and qualified.
§ 79-3-83. Dividends.
The board of directors of a corporation may, from time to time, declare and the corporation may pay divi-
dends on its outstanding shares in cash, property, or its own shares, except when the corporation is insolvent
or when the payment thereof would render the corporation insolvent or when the declaration or payment there-
of would be contrary to any restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation, subject to the following
provisions:
(a) Dividends may be declared and paid in cash or property only out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned
surplus of the corporation, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(b) If the articles of incorporation of a corporation engaged in the business of exploiting natural resources
so provide, dividends may be declared and paid in cash out of the depletion reserves, but each such dividend
shall be identified as a distribution of such reserves and the amount per share paid from such reserves shall
be disclosed to the shareholders receiving the same concurrently with the distribution thereof.
(c) Dividends may be declared and paid in its own shares out of any treasury shares that have been reacquired
out of surplus of the corporation.
(d) Dividends may be declared and paid in its own authorized but unissued shares out of any unreserved
and unrestricted surplus of the corporation upon the following conditions:
(1) If a dividend is payable in its own shares having a par value, such shares shall be issued at not less than
the par value thereof and there shall be transferred to stated capital at the time such dividend is paid an amount
of surplus at least equal to the aggregate par value of the shares to be issued as a dividend.
(2) If a dividend is payable in its own shares without par value, such shares shall be issued at such stated
value as shall be fixed by the board of directors by resolution adopted at the time such dividend is declared,
and there shall be transferred to stated capital at the time such dividend is paid an amount of surplus equal
to the aggregate stated value so fixed in respect of such shares; and the amount per share so transferred to
stated capital shall be disclosed to the shareholders receiving such dividend concurrently with the payment thereof.
(e) No dividend payable in shares of any class shall be paid to the holders of shares of any other class unless
the articles of incorporation so provide or such payment is authorized by the affirmative vote or the written
consent of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of the class in which the payment is
to be made. A split-up or division of the issued shares of any class into a greater number of shares of the
same class without increasing the stated capital of the corporation shall not be construed to be a share dividend
within the meaning of this section.
§ 79-3-85. Distribution from capital surplus.
The board of directors of a corporation may, from time to time, distribute to its shareholders out of capital
surplus of the corporation a portion of its assets, in cash or property, subject to the following provisions:
(a) No such distribution shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such distribution
would render the corporation insolvent.
(b) No such distribution shall be made unless the articles of incorporation so provide or such distribution
is authorized by the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each
class whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of the articles of incorporation of the corporation.
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(c) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares unless all cumulative dividends
accrued on all preferred or special classes of shares entitled to preferential dividends shall have been fully paid.
(d) No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares which would reduce the remaining
net assets of the corporation below the aggregate preferential amount payable in event of voluntary liquidation
to the holders of shares having preferential rights to the assets of the corporation in the event of liquidation.
(e) Each such distribution, when made, shall be identified as a distribution from capital surplus and the amount
per share disclosed to the shareholders receiving the same concurrently with the distribution thereof.
The board of directors of a corporation may also, from time to time, distribute to the holders of its outstand-
ing shares having a cumulative preferential right to receive dividends, in discharge of their cumulative divi-
dend rights, dividends payable in cash out of the capital surplus of the corporation, if at the time the corporation
has no earned surplus and is not insolvent and would not thereby be rendered insolvent. Each such distribution,
when made, shall be identified as a payment of cumulative dividends out of capital surplus.
§ 79-3-87. Specific restrictions on dividends.
Anything to the contrary in this chapter notwithstanding, the board of directors of a corporation shall never
declare, nor shall a corporation pay, a cash dividend unless such dividend is out of the unreserved and unre-
stricted earned surplus only of such corporation and has been legally appropriated for the specific purpose
of paying dividends; provided further, that no such dividend shall be declared or paid when the corporation
is insolvent or when the payment thereof would render the corporation insolvent or when such payment would
be contrary to any provisions in the articles of incorporation. Nothing in this chapter shall impair or prevent
a legal distribution to shareholders upon liquidation or dissolution as provided in this chapter.
§79-3-89. Loans.
No loans shall be made by a corporation to its officers or directors, and no loans shall be made by a corpora-
tion secured by its shares.
§ 79-3-91. Liability of directors in certain eases.
In addition to any other liabilities imposed by -law upon directors of a corporation:
(a) Directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the declaration of any dividend or other distribution
of the assets of a corporation to its shareholders contrary to the provisions of this chapter or contrary to any
restrictions contained in the articles of incorporation, shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation
for the amount of such dividend which is paid or the value of such assets which are distributed in excess of
the amount of such dividend or distribution which could have been paid or distributed without a violation of
the provisions of this chapter or the restrictions in the articles of incorporation.
(b) Directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the purchase of its own shares contrary to the provi-
sions of this chapter shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount of consideration
paid for such shames which is u txcess of th maximum amount which could have been paid therfore without
a violation of the provisions of this chapter.
(c) The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to any distribution of assets of a corporation to
its shareholders during the liquidation of the corporation without the payment and discharge of, or making
adequate provision for, all known debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation shall be jointly and severally
liable to the corporation for the value of such assets which are distributed, to the extent that such debts, obliga-
tions and liabilities of the corporation are not thereafter paid and discharged.
(d) The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to the making of a loan to an officer or director
of the corporation, or the making of any loan secured by shares of the corporation, shall be jointly and several-
ly liable to the corporation for the amount of such loan until the repayment thereof.
(e) If a corporation shall commence business before it has received at least one thousand dollars ($ 1,000.00)
as consideration for the issuance of shares, the directors who assent thereto shall be jointly and severally liable
to the corporation for such part of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) as shall not have been received before
commencing business, but such liability shall be terminated when the corporation has actually received one
thousand dollars ($1,00.00) as consideration for the issuance of shares.
A director of a corporation who is present at a meeting of its board of directors at which action on any cor-
porate matter is taken shall be presumed to have assented to the action taken unless his dissent shall be entered
in the minutes of the meeting or unless he shall file his written dissent to such action with the person acting
as the secretary of the meeting before the adjournment thereof or shall forward such dissent by registered mail
to the secretary of the corporation immediately after the adjournment of the meeting. Such right to dissent
shall not apply to a director who voted in favor of such action.
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A director shall not be liable under subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) of this section if he relied and acted in
good faith upon financial statements of the corporation represented to him to be correct by the president or
the officer of such corporation having charge of its books of account, or stated in a written report by an in-
dependent public or certified public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial condi-
tion of such corporation, nor shall he be so liable if in good faith in determining the amount available for any
such dividend or distribution he considered the assets to be of their book value.
Any director against whom a claim shall be asserted under or pursuant to this section for the payment of
a dividend or other distribution of assets of a corporation and who shall be held liable thereon, shall be entitled
to contribution from the shareholders who accepted or received any such dividend or assets, knowing such
dividend or distribution to have been made in violation of this chapter, in proportion to the amounts received
by them respectively.
Any director against whom a claim shall be asserted under or pursuant to this section shall be entitled to
contribution from the other directors who voted for or assented to the action upon which the claim is asserted.
§ 79-3-93. Provisions relating to actions by shareholders.
No action shall be brought in this state by a shareholder in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation
unless the plaintiff was a holder of shares or of voting trust certificates therefor at the time of the transaction
of which he complains, or his shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon him by operation
of law from a person who was a holder at such time.
§ 79-3-99. Books and records.
Each corporation shall keep correct and complete books and records of account and shall keep minutes of
the proceedings of its shareholders and board of directors; and shall keep at its registered office or principal
place of business, or at the office of its transfer agent or register, a record of its shareholders, givsing the names
and addresses of all shareholders and the number and class of the shares held by each.
Any person who shall have been a shareholder of record for at least six (6) months immediately preceding
his demand or who shall be the holder of record of at least one per cent (1%) of all the outstanding shares
of a corporation, upon written demand stating the purpose thereof, shall have the right to examine, in person,
or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any proper purpose, its books and records of
account, minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts therefrom.
Any officer or agent who, or a corporation which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or his agent
or attorney, so) to examine and make extracts from its books and records of account, minutes, and records
of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall be liable to such shareholder in a penalty often per cent (10%)
of the value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in addition to any other damages or remedy afforded
him by law. It shall be a defense to any action for penalties under this section that the person suing therefor
has within two (2) years sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders of such corporation or any other corpo-
ration or has aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of shareholders for any such purpose, or has
improperly used any information secured through any prior examination of the books and records of account,
or minutes, or record of shareholders of such corporation or any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand.
Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of competent jurisdiction, upon proof by a
shareholder of proper purpose, irrespective of the period of time during which such shareholder shall have
been a shareholder of record, and irrespective of the number of shares held by him, to compel the production
for examination by such shareholder of the books and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders
of a corporation.
Upon written request of any shareholder of a corporation, the corporation shall mail to such shareholder
its most recent financial statements showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the results of its
operations.
§ 79-3-111. Requirement before commencing business.
A corporation shall not transact any business or incur any indebtedness, except such as shall be incidental
to its organization or to obtaining subscriptions to or payment for its shares, until there has been paid in for
the issuance of shares consideration of the value of at least one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
§ 79-3-117. Procedure to amend articles of incorporation.
Amendments to the articles of incorporation shall be made in the following manner:
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution setting forth the proposed amendment and directing that
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it be submitted to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may be either an annual or a special meeting.
(b) Written or printed notice setting forth the proposed amendment or a summary of the changes to be effect-
ed thereby shall be given to each shareholder of record entitled to vote thereon within the time and in the man-
ner provided in this chapter for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders. If the meeting be an annual
meeting, the proposed amendment or such summary may be included in the notice of such annual meeting.
(c) At such meeting a vote of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon shall be taken on the proposed amend-
ment. The proposed amendment shall be adopted upon receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of at least
two thirds (2/3) of the shares entitled to vote thereon, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote thereon
as a class, in which event the proposed amendment shalt be adopted upon receiving the affirmative vote of
the holders of at least two thirds (2/3) of the shares of each class of shares entitled to vote thereon as a class
and of the total shares entitled to vote thereon.
Any number of amendments may be submitted to the shareholders, and voted upon by them, at one meeting.
§ 79-3-147. Articles of merger or consolidation.
Upon such approval, articles of merger or articles of consolidation shall be executed in duplicate by each
corporation by its president or a vice president and by its secretary or an assistant secretary, and verified by
one (1) of the officers of each corporation signing such articles, and shall set forth:
(a) The plan of merger or the plan of consolidation.
(b) As to each corporation, the number of shares outstanding, and, if the shares of any class are entitled
to vote as a class, the designation and number of outstanding shares of each such class.
(c) As to each corporation, the number of shares voted for and against such plan, respectively, and, if the
shares of any class are entitled to vote as a class, the number of shares of each such class voted for and against
such plan, respectively.
Duplicate originals of the articles of merger or articles of consolidation shall be delivered to the secretary
of state. If the secretary of state finds that such articles conform to law, he shall, when all fees have been
paid as in this chapter prescribed:
(1) Endorse on each of such duplicate originals the word "Filed," and the month, day and year of the filing
thereof.
(2) File one (1) of such duplicate originals in his office.
(3) Issue a certificate of merger or a certificate of consolidation to which he shall affix the other duplicate
original.
The certificate of merger or certificate of consolidation, together with the duplicate original of the articles
of merger or articles of consolidation affixed thereto by the secretary of state, shall be returned to the surviving
or new corporation, as the case may be, or its representative.
§ 79-3-157. Sale or mortgage of assets other than in regular course of business.
A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of all, or substantially all, the property and
assets, with or without the good will, of a corporation, if not made in the usual and regular course of its busi-
ness, may be made upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration, which may consist in whole
or in part of money or property, real or personal, including shares of any other corporation, domestic or for-
eign, as may be authorized in the following manner:
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending such sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge,
or other disposition and directing the submission thereof to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may
be either an annual or a special meeting.
(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to each shareholder of record entitled to vote at such meeting
within the time and in the manner provided in this chapter for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders,
and, whether the meeting be an annual or a special meeting, shall state that the purpose, or one of the purposes,
of such meeting is to consider the proposed sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition.
(c) At such meeting the shareholders may authorize such sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other
disposition and may fix, or may authorize the board of directors to fix, any or all of the terms and conditions
thereof and the consideration to be received by the corporation therefor. Each outstanding share of the corpora-
tion shall be entitled to vote thereon, whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of the articles
of incorporation. Such authorization shall require the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two thirds (2/3)
of the outstanding shares of the corporation, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote as a class thereon,
in which event such authorization shall require the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two thirds (2/3)
of the outstanding shares of each class of shares entitled to vote as a class thereon and of the total outstanding
shares.
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(d) After such authorization by a vote of shareholders, the board of directors nevertheless, in its discretion,
may abandon such sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of assets, subject to the rights
of third parties under any contracts relating thereto, without further action or approval by shareholders.
§ 79-3-159. Right of shareholders to dissent.
Any shareholder of a corporation shall have the right to dissent from any of the following corporate actions:
(a) Any plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation is party;
(b) Any business combination, as defined in Section 79-25-3(e), of the Mississippi Shareholder Protection
Act, to which the corporation is party; provided, however, that this Section 79-3-159 shall in no way be inter-
preted to allow a security holder of a corporation subject to the Mississippi Shareholder Protection Act to receive
dual compensation for his securities urder this section in addition to compensmion eceived dirctly from such
business combination; or
(c) Any sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation, otherwise
than in the usual and regular course of its business and other than a sale for cash where the shareholders, ap-
proval thereof is conditional upon the distribution of all or substantially all of the net proceeds of the sale to
the shareholders in accordance with their respective interests within one (1) year after the date of sale.
A shareholder may dissent as to less than all of the shares registered in his name. In that event, his rights
shall be determined as if the shares as to which he has dissented and his other shares were registered in the
names of different shareholders.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to the shareholders of the surviving corporation in a merger
if such corporation is on the date of the filing of the articles of merger the owner of all the outstanding shares
of the other corporations, domestic or foreign, which are parties to the merger, or if a vote of the shareholders
of such corporation is not necessary to authorize such merger.
§ 79-3-161. Rights of dissenting shareholders.
Any shareholder electing to exercise such right of dissent shall file with the corporation, prior to or at the
meeting of shareholders at which such proposed corporate action is submitted to a vote, a written objection
to such proposed corporate action. If such proposed corporate action be approved by the required vote and
such shareholder shall not have voted in favor thereof, such shareholder may, within ten (10) days after the
date on whih the vote was taken, or if a corporation is to be merged without a vote of its shareholders into
another corporation, any of its shareholders may, within fifteen (15) days after the plan of such merger shall
have been mailed to such shareholders, make written demand on the corporation, or, in the case of a merger
or consolidation, on the surviving or new corporation, domestic or foreign, for payment of the fair value of
such shareholder's shares, and, if such proposed corporate action is effected, such corporation shall pay to
such shareholder, upon surrender of the certificate or certificates representing such shares, the fair value there-
of as of the day prior to the date on which the vote was taken approving the proposed corporate action, exclud-
ing any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of such corporate action. Any shareholder falling to make
demand within the ten (10) day period shall be bound by the terms of the proposed corporate action. Any share-
holder making such demand shall thereafter be entitled only to payment as in this section provided and shall
not be entitled to vote or to exercise any other rights of a shareholder.
No such demand may be withdrawn unless the corporation shall consent thereto. If, however, such demand
shall be withdrawn upon consent, or if the proposed corporate action shall be abandoned or rescinded or the
shareholders shall revoke the authority to effect such action, or if, in the case of a merger, on the date of
the filing of the articles of merger the surviving corporation is the owner of all the outstanding shares of the
other corporations, domestic and foreign, that are parties to the merger, or if no demand or petition for the
determination of fair value by a court shall have been made or filed within the time provided in this section,
or if a court of competent jurisdiction shall determine that such shareholder is not entitled to the relief provided
by this section, then the right of such shareholder to be paid the fair value of his shares shall cease and his
status as a shareholder shall be restored, without prejudice to any corporate proceedings which may have been
taken during the interim.
Within ten (10) days after such corporate action is effected, the corporation, or, in the case of a merger
or consolidation, the surviving or new corporation, domestic or foreign, shall give written notice thereof to
each dissenting shareholder who has made demand as herein provided, and shall make a written offer to each
such shareholder to pay for such shares at a specified price deemed by such corporation to be fair value there-
of. Such notice and offer shall be accompanied by a balance sheet of the corporation the shares of which the
dissenting shareholder holds, as of the latest available date and not more than twelve (12) months prior to the
making of such offer, and a profit and loss statement of such corporation for the twelve months' period ended
on the date of such balance sheet.
1985] MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 71
If within thirty (30) days after the date on which such corporate action was effected the fair value of such
shares is agreed upon between any such dissenting shareholder and the corporation, payment therefor shall
be made within ninety (90) days after the date on which such corporate action was effected, upon surrender
of the certificate or certificates representing such shares. Upon payment of the agreed value the dissenting
shareholder shall cease to have any interest in such shares.
If within such period of thirty (30) days a dissenting shareholder and the corporation do not so agree, then
the corporation, within thirty (30) days after receipt of written demand from any dissenting shareholder given
within sixty (60) days after the date on which such corporate action was effected, shall, or at its election at
any time within such period of sixty (60) days may, file a petition in the chancery court of the county in this
state where the registered office of the corporation is located praying that the fair value of such shares be found
and determined. If, in the case of a merger or consolidation, the surviving or new corporation is a foreign
corporation without a registered office in this state, such petition shall be filed in the county where the registered
office of the domestic corporation was last located. If the corporation shall fail to institute the proceeding as
herein provided, any dissenting shareholder may do so in the name of the corporation. All dissenting share-
holders, wherever residing, shall be made parties to the proceeding as an action against their shares quasi in
rem. A copy of the petition shall be served on each dissenting shareholder who is a resident of this state and
shall be served by registered or certified mail on each dissenting shareholder who is a nonresident. Service
on nonresidents shall also be made by publication as provided by law. The jurisdiction of the court shall be
plenary and exclusive. All shareholders who are parties to the proceeding shall be entitled to judgment against
the corporation for the amount of the fair value of their shares. The court may, if it so elects, appoint one
or more persons as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a decision on the question of fair value.
The appraisers shall have such power and authority as shall be specified in the order of their appointment or
an amentdmen. thereof. The judgment shall be payable only upon and concurently with the surrender to the
corporation of the certificate or certificates representing such shares. Upon payment of the judgment, the dis-
senting shareholder shall cease to have any interest in such shares.
The judgment shall include an allowance for interest at such rate as the court may find to be fair and equitable
in all the circumstances, from the date on which the vote was taken on the proposed corporate action to the
date of payment. The costs and expenses of any such proceeding shall be determined by the court and shall
be assessed against the corporation, but all or any part of such costs and expenses may be apportioned and
assessed as the court may deem equitable against any or all of the dissenting shareholders who are parties to
the proceeding to whom the corporation shall have made an offer to pay for the shares if the court shall find
that the action of such shareholders in failing to accept such offer was arbitrary or vexatious or not in good
faith. Such expenses shall include reasonable compensation for reasonable expenses of the appraisers, but shall
exclude the fees and expenses of counsel for and experts employed by any party; but if the fair value of the
shares as determined materially exceeds the amount which the corporation offered to pay therefor, or if no
offer was made, the court in its discretion may award to any shareholder who is a party to the proceeding
such sum as the court may determine to be a reasonable compensation to any expert or experts employed by
the shareholder in the proceeding.
Within twenty (20) days after demanding payment for his shares, each shareholder demanding payment shall
submit the certificate or certificates representing his shares to the corporation for notation thereon that such
demand has been made. His failure to do so shall, at the option of the corporation, terminate his rights under
this section unless a court of competent jurisdiction, for good and sufficient cause shown, shall otherwise direct.
If shares represented by a certificate on which notation has been so made shall be transferred, each new certifi-
cate issued therefor shall bear similar notation, together with the name of the original dissenting holder of
such shares, and a transferee of such shares shall acquire by such transfer no rights in the corporation other
than those which the original dissenting shareholder had after making demand for payment of the fair value
thereof.
Shares acquired by a corporation pursuant to payment of the agreed value therefor or to payment of the
judgment entered therefor, as in this section provided, may be held and disposed of by such corporation as
in the case of other treasury shares, except that, in the case of a merger or consolidation, they may be held
and disposed of as the plan of merger or consolidation may otherwise provide.
§ 79-3-167. Voluntary dissolution by act of corporation.
A corporation may be dissolved by the act of the corporation, when authorized in the following manner:
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending that the corporation be dissolved, and directing
that the question of such dissolution be submitted to a vote at a meeting of the shareholders, which may be
either an annual or a special meeting.
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(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to each shareholder of record entitled to vote at such meeting
within the time and in the manner provided in this chapter for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders,
and, whether the meeting be an annual or special meeting, shall state that the purpose, or one of the purposes,
of such meeting is to consider the advisability of dissolving the corporation.
(c) At such meeting a vote of shareholders entitled to vote thereat shall be taken on a resolution to dissolve
the corporation. Each outstanding share of the corporation shall be entitled to vote thereon, whether or not
entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of the articles of incorporation. Such resolution shall be adopted
upon receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote as a class thereon, in which event the resolution shall
require for its adoption the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding shares
of each class of shares entitled to vote as a class thereon, and of the total outstanding shares.
(d) Upon the adoption of such resolution, a statement of intent to dissolve shall be executed in duplicate
by the corporation by its president or a vice-president and by its secretary or an assistant secretary, and verified
by one of the officers signing such statement, which statement shall set forth:
(1) The name of the corporation.
(2) The names and respective addresses of its officers.
(3) The names and respective addresses of its directors.
(4) A copy of the resolution adopted by the shareholders authorizing the dissolution of the corporation.
(5) The number of shares outstanding, and, if the shares of any class are entitled to vote as a class, the desig-
nation and number of outstanding shares of each such class.
(6) The number of shares voted for and against the resolution, respectively, and, if the shares of any class
are entitled to vote as a class, the number of shares of each such class voted for and against the resolution,
respectively.
Within thirty (30) days after a statement of intent to dissolve has been executed, same shall be published
one time in one or more newspapers published in the county where such corporation has its principal office
or place of business, or if none be so published, then in one or more newspapers published in the state and
having a circulation in such county.
§ 79-3-187. Involuntary dissolution.
A corporation may be dissolved involuntarily by a decree of the chancery court of the county in which its
registered office is situated, or of the county in which its principal place of business is situated, in an action
filed by the attorney general when it is established that:
(a) The corporation has failed to file its annual report within the time required by this chapter; or
(b) The corporation procured its articles of incorporation through fraud; or
(c) The corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law; or
(d) The corporation has failed for thirty (30) days to appoint and maintain a registered agent in this state; or
(e) The corporation has failed for thirty (30) days after change of its registered office or registered agent
to file in the office of the secretary of state a statement of such change.
§ 79-3-209. Survival of remedy after dissolution, suspension or forfeiture.
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certficate of dissolution by the secretary of
state, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of the corporation
as provided in this chapter, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration; or the suspension of a domestic or
a foreign corporation from the right to exercise the powers theretofore granted it for failure to file its annual
report as required by law, or the forfeiture of its charter or articles of incorporation or its certificate of authori-
ty to do business in Mississippi, or the suspension of a corporation for failure to pay franchise tax, shall not
take away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders,
for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution, suspension or forfeiture
if action or other proceeding is commenced within the period of limitation for the commencement of such ac-
tion or other proceeding as prescribed in the applicable statutes of limitation. Any such action or proceeding
by or against the corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The
shareholders, directors and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other action as shall be ap-
propriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its
period of duration, such corporation shall make application to the secretary of state for a renewal of its articles
of incorporation within two (2) years after such dissolution. The secretary of state shall prescribe the form
of the application.
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§ 79-3-211. Admission of foreign corporation.
No foreign business corporation for profit shall have the right to transact business in this state until it shall
have procured a certificate of authority so to do from the secretary of state. No foreign corporation shall be
entitled to procure a certificate of authority under this chapter to transact in this state any business which a
corporation organized under this chapter is not permitted to transact. A foreign business corporation for profit
shall not be denied a certificate of authority by reason of the fact that the laws of the state or country under
which such corporation is organized governing its organization and internal affairs differ from the laws of this
state, and nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to authorize this state to regulate the organization
or the internal affairs of such corporation, No foreign non-profit non-share or non-profit or non-share corpora-
tion shall be entitled to procure a certificate of authority under this chapter.
Without excluding other activities which may not constitute transacting business in this state, a foreign cor-
poration shall not be considered to be transacting business in this state, for the purposes of this chapter, by
reason of carrying on in this state any one or more of the following activities:
(a) Maintaining or defending any action or suit or any administrative or arbitration proceeding, or effecting
the settlement thereof or the settlement of claims or disputes.
(b) Maintaining bank accounts.
(c) Maintaining offices or agencies for the transfer, exchange and registration of its securities, or appointing
and maintaining trustees or depositaries with relation to its securities.
(d) Soliciting or procuring orders, whether by mail or through employees or agents or otherwise, where
such orders require acceptance without this state before becoming binding contracts.
(e) Transacting any business in interstate commerce.
(f) Conducting an isolated transaction completed within a period of thirty days and not in the course of a
number of repeated transactions of like nature.
(g) Investing in or acquiring, in transactions, outside of Mississippi, royalties and other non-operating mineral
interests, and the execution of division orders, contracts of sale and other instruments incidental to the owner-
ship of such non-operating mineral interests.
§ 79-3-285. Unauthorized assumption of corporate powers.
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally liable
for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof.
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REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Selected Provisions
CHAPTER 6. SHARES AND DISTRIBUTIONS
SUBCHAPTER A. SHARES
§ 6.01 Authorized Shares
(a) The articles of incorporation must prescribe the classes of shares and the number of shares of each class
that the corporation is authorized to issue. If more than one class of shares is authorized, the articles of incor-
poration must prescribe a distinguishing designation for each class, and prior to the issuance of shares of a
class the preferences, limitations, and relative rights of that class must be described in the articles of incorpora-
tion. All shares of a class must have preferences, limitations, and relative rights identical with those of other
shares of the same class except to the extent otherwise permitted by section 6.02.
(b) The articles of incorporation must authorize (1) one or more classes of shares that together have unlimit-
ed voting rights, and (2) one or more classes of shares (which may be the same class or classes as those with
voting rights) that together are entitled to receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution.
(c) The articles of incorporation may authorize one or more classes of shares that:
(1) have special, conditional, or limited voting rights, or no right to vote, except to the extent prohibit-
ed by this Act;
(2) are redeemable or convertible as specified in the articles of incorporation (i) at the option of the
corporation, the shareholder, or another person or upon the occurrence of a designated event; (ii) for
cash, indebtedness, securities, or other property; (iii) in a designated amount or in an amount determined
in accordance with a designated formula or by reference to extrinsic data or events;
(3) entitle the holders to distributions calculated in any manner, including dividends that may be cu-
mulative, noncumulative, or partially cumulative;
(4) have preference over any other class of shares with respect to distributions, including dividends
and distributions upon the dissolution of the corporation.
(d) The description of the designations, preferences, limitations, and relative rights of share classes in sub-
section (c) is not exhaustive.
SUBCHAPTER B. ISSUANCE OF SHARES
§ 6.21 Issutce of Shares
(a) The powers granted in this section to the board of directors may be reserved to the shareholders by the
articles of incorporation.
(b) The board of directors may authorize shares to be issued for consideration consisting of any tangible
or intangible property or benefit to the corporation, including cash, promissory notes, services perfoamed,
contracts for services to be performed, or other securities of the corporation.
(c) Before the corporation issues shares, the board of directors must determine that the consideration received
or to be received for shares to be issued is adequate. That determination by the board of directors is conclusive
insofar as the adequacy of consideration for the issuance of shares relates to whether the shares are validly
issued, fully paid, and nonassessable.
(d) When the corporation receives the consideration for which the board of directors authorized the issuance
of shares, the shares issued therefor are fully paid and nonassessable.
(e) The corporation may place in escrow shares issued for a contract for future services or benefits or a
promissory note, or make other arrangements to restrict the transfer of the shares, and may credit distributions
in respect of the shares against their purchase price, until the services are performed, the note is paid, or the
benefits received. If the services are not performed, the note is not paid, or the benefits are not received, the
shares escrowed or restricted and the distributions credited may be cancelled in whole or part.
SUBCHAPTER D. DISTRIBUTIONS
§ 6.40 Distributions to Shareholders
(a) A board of directors may authorize and the corporation may make distributions to its shareholders subject
to restriction by the articles of incorporation and the limitation in subsection (c).
(b) If the board of directors does not fix the record date for determining shareholders entitled to a distribution
(other than one involving a repurchase or reacquisition of shares), it is the date the board of directors autho-
rizes the distribution.
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(c) No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect:
(1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of busi-
ness; or
(2) the corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the arti-
cles of incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be
dissolved at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders
whose preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution.
(d) The board of directors may base a determination that a distribution is not prohibited under subsection
(c) either ot financial statements prepared oan the basis of accounting practices and principles that are reasona-
ble in the circumstances or on a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.
(e) The effect of a distribution under subsection (c) is measured:
(1) in the case of distribution by purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of the corporation's shares,
as of the earlier of (i) the date money or other property is transferred or debt incurred by the corporation
or (ii) the date the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder with respect to the acquired shares;
(2) in the case of any other distribution of indebtedness, as of the date the indebtedness is distributed;
(3) in all other cases, as of (i) the date the distribution is authorized if the payment occurs within 120
days after the date of authorization or (ii) the date the payment is made if it occurs more than 120 days
after the date of authorization.
(f) A corporation's indebtedness to a shareholder incurred by reason of a distribution made in accordance
with this section is at parity with the corporation's indebtedness to its general, unsecured creditors except to
the extent subordinated by agreement.
CHAPTER 7. SHAREHOLDERS
SUBCHAPTER B. VOTING
§ 7.25 Quorum and Voting Requirements for Voting Groups
(a) Shares entitled to vote as a separate voting group may take action on a matter at a meeting only if a
quorum of those shares exists with respect to that matter. Unless the articles of incorporation or this Act pro-
vide otherwise, a majority of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter by the voting group constitutes a quo-
rum of-that voting group for action on that matter.
(b) Once a share is represented for any purpose at a meeting, it is deemed present for quorum purposes
for the remainder of the meeting and for any adjournment of that meeting unless a new record date is or must
be set for that adjourned meeting.
(c) If a quorum exists, action on a matter (other than the election of directors) by a voting group is approved
if the votes cast within the voting group favoring the action exceed the votes cast opposing the action, unless
the articles of incorporation or this Act require a greater number of affirmative votes.
(d) An amendment of articles of incorporation adding, changing, or dedeting a q-o,m or voting requir mtnt
for a voting group greater than specified in subsection (b) or (c) is governed by section 7.27.
(e) The election of directors is governed by section 7.28.
§ 7.27 Greater Quorum or Voting Requirements
(a) The articles of incorporation may provide for a greater quorum or voting requirement for shareholders
(or voting groups of shareholders) than is provided for by this Act.
(b) An amendment to the articles of incorporation that adds, changes, or deletes a greater quorum or voting
requirement must meet the same quorum requirement and be adopted by the same vote and voting groups re-
quired to take action under the quorum and voting requirements then in effect or proposed to be adopted,
whichever is greater.
§ 7.28 Voting for Directors; Cumulative Voting
(a) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes
cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election at a meeting at which a quorum is present.
(b) Shareholders do not have a right to cumulate their votes for directors unless the articles of incorporation
so provide.
(c) A statement included in the articles of incorporation that "[all] [a designated voting group of] shareholders
are entitled to cumulate their votes for directors" (or words of similar import) means that the shareholders
designated are entitled to multiply the number of votes they are entitled to cast by the number of directors
for whom they are entitled to vote and cast the product for a single candidate or distribute the product among
two or more candidates.
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(d) Shares otherwise entitled to vote cumulatively may not be voted cumulatively at a particular meeting unless:
(1) the meeting notice or proxy statement accompanying the notice states conspicuously that cumula-
tive voting is authorized; or
(2) a shareholder who has the right to cumulate his votes gives notice to the corporation not less than
48 hours before the time set for the meeting of his intent to cumulate his votes during the meeting, and
if one shareholder gives this notice all other shareholders in the same voting group participating in the
election are entitled to cumulate their votes without giving further notice.
SUBCHAPTER D. DERIVATIVE PROCEEDINGS
§ 7.40 Procedure in Derivative Proceediugs
(a) A person may not commence a proceeding in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation unless he
was a shareholder of the corporation when the transaction complained of occurred or unless he became a share-
holder through transfer by operation of law from one who was a shareholder at that time.
(b) A complaint in a proceeding brought in the right of a corporation must be verified and allege with par-
ticularity the demand made, if any, to obtain action by the board of directors and either that the demand was
refused or ignored or why he did not make the demand. Whether or not a demand for action was made, if
the corporation commences an investigation of the changes made in the demand or complaint, the court may
stay any proceeding until the investigation is completed.
(c) A proceeding commenced under this section may not be discontinued or settled without the court's ap-
proval. If the court determines that a proposed discontinuance or settiement will substantially affect the interest
of the corporation's shareholders or a class of shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be given the share-
holders affected.
(d) On termination of the proceeding the court may require the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable
expenses (including counsel fees) incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding was com-
menced without reasonable cause.
(e) For purposes of this section, "shareholder" includes a beneficial owner whose shares are held in a voting
trust or held by a nominee on his behalf.
CHAPTER 8. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
SUBCHAPTER A. BOARD OF DIRECTORS
§ 8.01 Requirement For And Duties Of Board Of Directors
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), each corporation must have a board of directors.
(b) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of
the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in
the articles of incorporation.
(c) A corporation having 50 or fewer shareholders may dispense with or limit the authority of a board of
directors by describing in ita articles of corpoat hn who 'il perform some or all of the duties of a board
of directors.
SUBCHAPTER C. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
§ 8.30 General Standards for Directors
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements,
including financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director reasonably believes to
be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director reasonably believes
are within the person's professional or expert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the director reasonably be-
lieves the committee merits confidence.
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question that makes
reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted.
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(d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed
the duties of his office in compliance with this section.
§ 8.31 Director Conflict of Interest
(a) A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the corporation in which a director of the corpora-
tion has a direct or indirect interest. A conflict of interest transaction is not voidable by the corporation solely
because of the director's interest in the transaction if any one of the following is true:
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or known to the board
of directors or a conittee of the board of directors and the board of directors or committee authorized,
approved, or ratified the transaction;
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or known to the share-
holders entitled to vote and they authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction; or
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation.
(b) For purposes of this section, a director of the corporation has an indirect interest in a transaction if (1)
another entity in which he has a material financial interest or in which he is a general partner is a party to
the transaction or (2) another entity of which he is a director, officer, or trustee is a party to the transaction
and the transaction is or should be considered by the board of directors of the corporation.
(c) For purposes of subsection (a)(I), a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified
if it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the directors on the board of directors (or on the committee)
who have no direct or indirect interest in the transaction, but a transaction may not be authorized, approved,
or ratified under this section by a single director. If a majority of the directors who have no direct or indirect
interest in the transaction Yote to authorize, approve, or ratify the transaction, a quorum is present for the
purpose of taking action under this section. The presence of, or a vote cast by, a director with a direct or
indirect interest in the transaction does not affect the validity of any action taken under subsection (a)(1) if
the transaction is otherwise authorized, approved, or ratified as provided in that subsection.
(d) For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified
if it receives the vote of a majority of the shares entitled to be counted under this subsection. Shares owned
by or voted under the control of a director who has a direct or indirect interest in the transaction, and shares
owned by or voted under the control of an entity described in subsection (b)(l), may not be counted in a vote
of shareholders to determine whether to authorize, approve, or ratify a conflict of interest transaction under
subsection (a)(2). The vote of those shares, however, shall be counted in determining whether the transaction
is approved under other sections of this Act. A majority of the shares, whether or not present, that are entitled
to be counted in a vote on the transaction under this subsection constitutes a quorum for the purpose of taking
action under this section.
§ 8.32 Loans to Directors
(a) Except as provided by subsection (c), a corporation may not lend money to or guarantee the obligation
of a director of the corporation unless:
(1) the particular loan or guarantee is approved by a majority of the votes represented by the outstand-
ing voting shares of all classes, voting as a single voting group, except the votes of shares owned by
or voted under the control of the benefited director; or
(2) the corporation's board of directors determines that the loan or guarantee benefits the corporation
and either approves the specific loan or guarantee or a general plan authorizing loans and guarantees.
(b) The fact that a loan or guarantee is made in violation of this section does not affect the borrower's liability
on the loan.
(c) This section does not apply to loans and guarantees authorized by statute regulating any special class
of corporations.
§ 8.33 Liability for Unlawful Distributions
(a) Unless he complies with the applicable standards of conduct described in section 8.30, a director who
votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation of this Act or the articles of incorporation is personally
liable to the corporation for the amount of the distribution that exceeds what could have been distributed without
violating this Act or the articles of incorporation.
(b) A director held liable for an unlawful distribution under subsection (a) is entitled to contribution:
(1) from every other director who voted for or assented to the distribution without complying with
the applicable standards of conduct described in section 8.30; and
(2) from each shareholder for the amount the shareholder accepted knowing the distribution was made
in violation of this Act or the articles of incorporation.
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SUBCHAPTER E. INDEMNIFICATION
§ 8.50 Subchapter Definitions
In this subhapter:
(1) "Corporation" includes any domestic or foreign predecessor entity of a corporation in a merger
or other transaction in which the predecessor's existence ceased upon consummation of the transaction.
(2) "Director" means an individual who is or was a director of a corporation or an individual who,
while a director of a corporation, is or was serving at the corporation's request as a director, officer,
partner, trustee, employee, or agent of another foreign or domestic corporation, partnership, joint ven-
ture, trust, employee benefit plan, or other enterprise. A director is considered to be serving an em-
ployee benefit plan at the corporation's request if his duties to the corporation also impose duties on,
or otherwise involve services by, him to the plan or to participants in or beneficiaries of the plan. "Direc-
tor" includes, unless the context requires otherwise, the estate or personal representative of a director.
(3) "Expenses" include counsel fees.
(4) "Liability" means the obligation to pay a judgment, settlement, penalty, fine (including an excise
tax assessed with respect to an employee benefit plan), or reasonable expenses incurred with respect
to a proceeding.
(5) "Official capacity" means: (i) when used with respect to a director, the office of director in a corpo-
ration; and (ii) when used with respect to an individual other than a director, as contemplated in section
8.56, the office in a corporation held by the employee or agent on behalf of the corporation. "Official
capacity" does not include service for any other foreign or domestic corporation or any partnership, joint
venture, trust, employee benefit plan, or other enterprise.
(6) "Party" includes an individual who was, is, or is threatened to be made a named defendant or respon-
dent in a proceeding.
(7) "Proceeding" means any threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether
civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative and whether formal or informal.
§ 8.51 Authority to Indemnify
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a corporation may indemnify an individual made a party to a proceed-
ing because he is or was a director against liability incurred in the proceeding if:
(1) he conducted himself in good faith; and
(2) he reasonably believed:
(i) in the case of conduct in his official capacity with the corporation, that his conduct was in
its best interests; and
(ii) in all other cases, that his conduct was at least not opposed to its best interests; and
(3) in the case of any criminal proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful.
(b) A director's conduct with respect to an employee benefit plan for a purpose he reasonably believed to
be in the interests of the participants in and beneficiaries of the plan is conduct that satisfies the requirement
of subsection (a)(2)(ii).
(c) The termination of a proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo con-
tendere or its equivalent is not, of itself, determinative that the director did not meet the standard of conduct
described in this section.
(d) A corporation may not indemnify a director under this section:
(1) in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the corporation in which the director was
adjudged liable to the corporation; or
(2) in connection with any other proceeding charging improper personal benefit to him, whether or
not involving action in his official capacity, in which he was adjudged liable on the basis that personal
benefit was improperly received by him.
(e) Indemnification permitted under this section in connection with a proceeding by or in the right of the
corporation is limited to reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding.
§ 8.52 Mandatory ndemnification
Unless limited by its articles of incorporation, a corporation shall indemnify a director who was wholly suc-
cessful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any proceeding to which he was a party because he is
or was a director of the corporation against reasonable expenses incurred by him in connection with the
proceeding.
1985] MISSISSIPPI BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW 79
§ 8.53 Advance for Expenses
(a) A corporation may pay for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party
to a proceeding in advance of final disposition of the proceeding if:
(1) the director furnishes the corporation a written affirmation of his good faith belief that he has met
the standard of conduct described in section 8.51;
(2) the director furnishes the corporation a written undertaking, executed personally or on his behalf,
to repay the advance if it is ultimately determined that he did not meet the standard of conduct; and
(3) a determination is made that the facts then known to those making the determination would not
preclude indemnification under this subchapter.
(b) The undertaking required by subsection (a)(2) must be an unlimited general obligation of the director
but need not be secured and may be accepted without reference to financial ability to make repayment.
(c) Determinations and authorizations of payments under this section shall be made in the manner specified
in section 8.55.
§ 8.54 Court-Ordered Indemnification
Unless a corporation's articles of incorporation provide otherwise, a director of the corporation who is a
party to a proceeding may apply for indemnification to the court conducting the proceeding or to another court
of competent jurisdiction. On receipt of an application, the court after giving any notice the court considers
necessary may order indemnification if it determines:
(1) the director is entitled to mandatory indemnification under section 8.52, in which case the court
shall also order the corporation to pay the director's reasonable expenses incurred to obtain court-ordered
indemnification; or
(2) the director is fWily anid resonably entitled to sssdtemicatiors is' view of all the relevant cirsni-
stances, whether or not he met the standard of conduct set forth in section 8.51 or was adjudged liable
as described in section 8.51 (d), but if he was adjudged so liable his indemnification is limited to reasona-
ble expenses incurred.
§ 8.55 Determination and Authorization of Indemnification
(a) A corporation may not indemnify a director under section 8.51 unless authorized in the specific case
after a determination has been made that indemnification of the director is permissible in the circumstances
because he has met the standard of conduct set forth in section 8.51.
(b) The determination shall be made:
(1) by the board of directors by majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors not at the time parties
to the proceeding;
(2) if a quorum cannot be obtained under subdivision (1), by majority vote of a committee duly desig-
nated by the board of directors (in which designation directors who are parties may participate), consist-
img solely of two or more directors not at the tune parties to the proceeding;
(3) by special legal counsel:
(i) selected by the board of directors or its committee in the manner prescribed in subdivision
(1) or (2); or
(ii) if a quorum of the board of directors cannot be obtained under subdivision (1) and a commit-
tee cannot be designated under subdivision (2), selected by majority vote of the full board of direc-
tors (in which selection directors who are parties may participate); or
(4) by the shareholders, but shares owned by or voted under the control of directors who are at the
time parties to the proceeding may not be voted on the determination.
(c) Authorization of indemnification and evaluation as to reasonableness of expenses shall be made in the
same manner as the determination that indemnification is permissible, except that if the determination is made
by special legal counsel, authorization of indemnification and evaluation as to reasonableness of expenses shall
be made by those entitled under subsection (b)(3) to select counsel.
§ 8.56 Indemnification of Officers, Employees, and Agents
Unless a corporation's articles of incorporation provide otherwise:
(1) an officer of the corporation who is not a director is entitled to mandatory indemnification under
section 8.52, and is entitled to apply for court-ordered indemnification under section 8.54, in each case
to the same extent as a director;
(2) the corporation may indemnify and advance expenses under this subchapter to an officer, employee,
or agent of the corporation who is not a director to the same extent as to a director; and
(3) A corporation may also indemnify and advance expenses to an officer, employee, or agent who
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is not a director to the extent, consistent with public policy, that may be provided by its articles of incor-
poration, bylaws, general or specific action of its board of directors or contract.
§ 8.57 Insurance
A corporation may purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of an individual who is or was a director,
officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, or who, while a director, officer, employee, or agent of the
corporation, is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, partner, trustee, em-
ployee, or agent of another foreign or domestic corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, employee benefit
plan, or other enterprise, against liability asserted against or incurred by him in that capacity or arising from
his status as a director, officer, employee, or agent, whether or not the corporation would have power to in-
demnify him against the same liability under section 8.51 or 8.52.
§ 8.58 Application of Subehapter
(a) A provision treating a corporation's indemnification of or advance for expenses to directors that is con-
tained in its articles of incorporation, bylaws, a resolution of its shareholders or board of directors, or in a
contract or otherwise, is valid only if and to the extent the provision is consistent with this subchapter. If arti-
cles of incorporation limit indemnification or advance for expenses, indemnification and advance for expenses
are valid only to the extent consistent with the articles.
(b) This subchapter does not limit a corporation's power to pay or reimburse expenses incurred by a director
in connection with his appearance as a witness in a proceeding at a time when he has not been made a named
defendant or respondent to the proceeding.
CHAPTER 11. MERGER AND SHARE EXCHANGE
g 11.03 Action on Plan
(a) After adopting a plan of merger or share exchange, the board of directors of each corporation party to
the merger, and the board of directors of the corporation whose shares will be acquired in the share exchange,
shall submit the plan of merger (except as provided in subsection (g), or share exchange for approval by its
shareholders.
(b) For a plan of merger or share exchange to be approved:
(1) the board of directors must recommend the plan of merger or share exchange to the shareholders,
unless the board of directors determines that because of conflict of interest or other special circumstances
it should make no recommendation and communicates the basis for its determination to the shareholders
with the plan; and
(2) the shareholders entitled to vote must approve the plan.
(c) The board of directors may condition its submission of the proposed merger or share exchange on any basis.
(d) The corporation shall notify each shareholder, whether or not entitled to vote, of the proposed share-
holders' meeting in accordance with section 7.05. The notice must also state that the purpose, or one of the
purposes, of the meeting is to consider the plan of merger or share exchange and contain or be accompanied
by a copy or summary of the plan.
(e) Unless this Act, the articles of incorporation, or the board of directors (acting pursuant to subsection
(c), require a greater vote or a vote by voting groups, the plan of merger or share exchange to be authorized
must be approved by each voting group entitled to vote separately on the plan by a majority of all the votes
entitled to be cast on the plan by that voting group.
(f) Separate voting by voting groups is required:
(1) on a plan of merger if the plan contains a provision that, if contained in a proposed amendment
to articles of incorporation, would require action by one or more separate voting groups on the proposed
amendment under section 10.04;
(2) on a plan of share exchange by each class or series of shares included in the exchange, with each
class or series constituting a separate voting group.
(g) Action by the shareholders of the surviving corporation on a plan of merger is not required if:
(1) the articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation will not differ, except for amendments
enumerated in section 10.02, from its articles before the merger;
(2) each shareholder of the surviving corporation whose shares were outstanding immediately before
the effective date of the merger will hold the same number of shares, with identical designations, prefer-
ences, limitations, and relative rights, immediately after;
(3) the number of voting shares outstanding immediately after the merger, plus the number of voting
shares issuable as a result of the merger (either by the conversion of securities issued pursuant to the
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merger or the exercise of rights and warrants issued pursuant to the merger), will not exceed by more
than 20 percent the total number of voting shares of the surviving corporation outstanding immediately
before the merger; and
(4) the number of participating shares outstanding immediately after the merger, plus the number of
participating shares issuable as a result of the merger (either by the conversion of securities issued pur-
suant to the merger or the exercise of rights and warrants issued pursuant to the merger), will not exceed
by more than 20 percent the total number of participating shares outstanding immediately before the merger.
(h) As used in subsection (g):
(1) "Participating" shares means shares that entitle their holders to participate without limitation in
distributions.
(2) "Voting shares" means shares that entitle their holders to vote unconditionally in elections of directors.
(i) After a merger or share exchange is authorized, and at any time before articles of merger
or share exchange are filed, the planned merger or share exchange may be abandoned (subject
to any contractual rights), without further shareholder action, in accordance with the procedure
set forth in the plan of merger or share exchange or, if none is set forth, in the manner determined
by the board of directors.
CHAPTER 12. SALE OF ASSETS
§ 12.02 Sale of Assets Other Than in Regular Course of Business
(a) A corporation may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of all, or substantially all, of its property
(with or without the good will), otherwise than in the usual and regular course of business, on the terms and
conditions and for the consideration determined by the corporation's board of directors, if the board of direc-
tors proposes and its shareholders approve the proposed transaction.
(b) For a transaction to be authorized:
(1) the board of directors must recommend the proposed transaction to the shareholders unless the
board of directors determines that because of conflict of interest or other special circumstances it should
make no recommendation and communicates the basis for its determination to the shareholders with the
submission of the proposed transaction; and
(2) the shareholders entitled to vote must approve the transaction.
(c) The board of directors may condition its submission of the proposed transaction on any basis.
(d) The corporation shall notify each shareholder, whether or not entitled to vote, of the proposed share-
holders' meeting in accordance with section 7.05. The notice must also state that the purpose, or one of the
purposes, of the meeting is to consider the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all, or substantially
all, the property of the corporation and contain or be accompanied by a description of the transaction.
(e) Unless the articles of incorporation or the board of directors (acting pursuant to subsection (c)) require
a greater vote or a vote by voting groups, the transaction to be authorized must be approved by a majority
of all the votes entitled to be cast on the transaction.
(f) After a sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of property is authorized, the transaction may be aban-
doned (subject to any contractual rights) without further shareholder action.
(g) A transaction that constitutes a distribution is governed by section 6.40 and not by this section.
CHAPTER 13. DISSENTERS' RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER A.
RIGHT TO DISSENT AND OBTAIN PAYMENT FOR SHARES
§ 13.01 Definitions
In this Chapter:
(1) " Corporation" means the issuer of the shares held by a dissenter before the corporate action, or
the surviving or acquiring corporation by merger or share exchange of that issuer.
(2) "Dissenter" means a shareholder who is entitled to dissent from corporate action under section 13.02
and who exercises that right when and in the manner required by sections 13.20 through 13.28.
(3) "Fair value," with respect to a dissenter's shares, means the value of the shares immediately before
the effectuation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion would be inequitable.
(4) "Interest" means interest from the effective date of the corporate action until the date of payment,
at the average rate currently paid by the corporation on its principal bank loans or, if none, at a rate
that is fair and equitable under all the circumstances.
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(5) "Record shareholder" means the person in whose name shares are registered in the records of a
corporation or the beneficial owner of shares to the extent of the rights granted by a nominee certificate
on file with a corporation.
(6) "Beneficial shareholder" means the person who is a beneficial owner of shares held by a nominee
as the record shareholder.
(7) "Shareholder" means the record shareholder or the beneficial shareholder.
§ 13.02 Right to Dissent
(a) A shareholder is entitled to dissent from, and obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event
of, any of the following corporate actions:
(1) consummation of a plan of merger to which the corporation is a par (ij if shareholder approval
is required for the merger by section 11.03 or the articles of incorporation and the shareholder is entitled
to vote on the merger or (ii) if the corporation is a subsidiary that is merged with its parent under section
11.04;
(2) consummation of a plan of share exchange to which the corporation is a party as the corporation
whose shares will be acquired, if the shareholder is entitled to vote on the plan;
(3) consummation of a sale or exchange of all, or substantially all, of the property of the corporation
other than in the usual and regular course of business, if the shareholder is entitled to vote on the sale
or exchange, including a sale in dissolution, but not including a sale pursuant to court order or a sale
for cash pursuant to a plan by which all or substantially all of the net proceeds of the sale will be dis-
tributed to the shareholders within one year after the date of sale;
(4) an amendment of the articles of incorporation that materially and adversely affects rights in respect
of a dissenter's shares because it:
(i) alters or abolishes a preferential right of the shares;
(ii) creates, alters, or abolishes a right in respect of redemption, including a provision respect-
ing a sinking fund for the redemption or repurchase, of the shares;
(iii) alters or abolishes a preemptive right of the holder of the shares to acquire shares or other
securities;
(iv) excludes or limits the right of the shares to vote on any matter, or to cumulate votes other
than a limitation by dilution through issuance of shares or other securities with similar voting rights;
or
(v) reduces the number of shares owned by the shareholder to a fraction of a share if the frac-
tional share so created is to be acquired for cash under section 6.04; or
(5) any corporate action taken pursuant to a shareholder vote to the extent the articles of incorporation,
bylaws, or a resolution of the board of directors provides that voting or nonvoting shareholders are enti-
tled to dissent and obtain payment for their shares.
(b) A shareholder entitled to dissent and obtain payment for his shares under this chapter may not challenge
the corporate action creating his entitlement unless the action is unlawful or fraudulent with respect to the share-
holder or the corporation.
§ 13.03 Dissent by Nominees and Beneficial Owners
(a) A record shareholder may assert dissenters' rights as to fewer than all the shares registered in his name
only if he dissents with respect to all shares beneficially owned by any one person and notifies the corporation
in writing of the name and address of each person on whose behalf he asserts dissenters' rights. The rights
of a partial dissenter under this subsection are determined as if the shares as to which he dissents and his other
shares were registered in the names of different shareholders.
(b) A beneficial shareholder may assert dissenters' rights as to shares held on his behalf only if:
(1) he submits to the corporation the record shareholder's written consent to the dissent not later than
the time the beneficial shareholder asserts dissenters' rights: and
(2) he does so with respect to all shares of which he is the beneficial shareholder or over which he
has power to direct the vote.
SUBCHAPTER B.
PROCEDURE FOR EXERCISE OF DISSENTERS' RIGHTS
§ 13.20 Notice of Dissenters' Rights
(a) If proposed corporate action creating dissenters' rights under section 13.02 is submitted to a vote at a
shareholders' meeting, the meeting notice must state that shareholders are or may be entitled to assert dissenters'
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rights under this chapter and be accompanied by a copy of this chapter.
(b) If corporate action creating dissenters' rights under section 13.02 is taken without a vote of shareholders,
the corporation shall notify in writing all shareholders entitled to assert dissenters' rights that the action was
taken and send them the dissenters' notice described in section 13.22.
§ 13.21 Notice of Intent to Demand Payment
(a) If proposed corporate action creating dissenters' rights under section 13.02 is submitted to a vote at a
shareholders' meeting, a shareholder who wishes to assert dissenters' rights (1) must deliver to the corporation
before the vote is taken written notice of his intent to demand payment for his shares if the proposed action
is effectuated and (2) must not vote his shares in favor of the proposed action.
(b) A shareholder who does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) is not entitled to payment for his
shares under this chapter.
§ 13.22 Dissenters' Notice
(a) If proposed corporate action creating dissenters' rights under section 13.02 is authorized at a shareholders'
meeting, the corporation shall deliver a written dissenters' notice to all shareholders who satisfied the require-
ments of section 13.21.
(b) The dissenters' notice must be sent no later than 10 days after the corporate action was taken, and must:
(1) state where the payment demand must be sent and where and when certificates for certified shares
must be deposited;
(2) inform holders of uncertificated shares to what extent transfer of the shares will be restricted after
the payment demand is received;
(3) supply a form for demanding payment that includes t date of the first anouncement to news
media or to shareholders of the terms of the proposed corporate action and requires that the person as-
serting dissenters' rights certify whether or not he acquired beneficial ownership of the shares before
that date;
(4) set a date by which the corporation must receive the payment demand, which date may not be
fewer than 30 nor more than 60 days after the date the subsection (a) notice is delivered; and
(5) be accompanied by a copy of this chapter.
§ 13.23 Duty to Demand Payment
(a) A shareholder sent a dissenters' notice described in section 13.22 must demand payment, certify whether
he acquired beneficial ownership of the shares before the date required to be set forth in the dissenter's notice
pursuant to section 13.22(b)(3), and deposit his certificates in accordance with the terms of the notice.
(b) The shareholder who demands payment and deposits his shares under section (a) retains all other rights
of a shareholder until these rights are cancelled or modified by the taking of the proposed corporate action.
(c) A shareholder who does not demand payment or deposit his share certificates where required, each by
the date set in the dissenters' notice, is not entitled to payment for his shares under this chapter.
§ 13.24 Share Restrictions
(a) The corporation may restrict the transfer of uncertificated shares from the date the demand for their pay-
ment is received until the proposed corporate action is taken or the restrictions released under section 13.26.
(b) The person for whom dissenters' rights are asserted as to uncertificated shares retains all other rights
of a shareholder until these rights are cancelled or modified by the taking of the proposed corporated action.
§ 13.25 Payment
(a) Except as provided in section 13.27, as soon as the proposed corporate action is taken, or upon receipt
of a payment demand, the corporation shall pay each dissenter who complied with section 13.23 the amount
the corporation estimates to be the fair value of his shares, plus accrued interest.
(b) The payment must be accompanied by:
(1) the corporation's balance sheet as of the end of a fiscal year ending not more than 16 months before
the date of payment, an income statement for that year, a statement of changes in shareholders' equity
for that year, and the latest available interim financial statements, if any;
(2) a statement of the corporation's estimate of the fair value of the shares;
(3) an explanation of how the interest was calculated;
(4) a statement of the dissenter's right to demand payment under section 13.28; and
(5) a copy of this chapter.
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§ 13.26 Failure to Take Action
(a) If the corporation does not take the proposed action within 60 days after the date set for demanding pay-
ment and depositing share certificates, the corporation shall return the deposited certificates and release the
transfer restrictions imposed on uncertificated shares.
(b) If after returning deposited certificates and releasing transfer restrictions, the corporation takes the pro-
posed action, it must send a new dissenters' notice under section 13.22 and repeat the payment demand procedure.
§ 13.27 After-Acquired Shares
(a) A corporation may elect to withhold payment required by section 13.25 from a dissenter unless he was
the beneficial owner of the shares before the date set forth in the dissenters' notice as the date of the first an-
nouncement to news media or to shareholders of the terms of the proposed corporate action.
(b) To the extent the corporation elects to withhold payment under subsection (a), after taking the proposed
corporate action, it shall estimate the fair value of the shares, plus accrued interest, and shall pay this amount
to each dissenter who agrees to accept it in full satisfaction of his demand. The corporation shall send with
its offer a statement of its estimate of the fair value of the shares, an explanation of how the interest was calcu-
lated, and a statement of the dissenter's right to demand payment under section 13.28.
§ 13.28 Procedure if Shareholder Dissatisfied With Payment or Offer
(a) A dissenter may notify the corporation in writing of his own estimate of the fair value of his shares and
amount of interest due, and demand payment of his estimate (less any payment under section 13.25), or reject
the corporation's offer under section 13.27 and demand payment of the fair value of his shares and interest due, if:
(1) the dissenter believes that the amount paid under section 13.25 or offered under section 13.27 is
less than the fair value of his shares or that the interest due is incorrectly calculated;
(2) the corporation fails to make payment under section 13.25 within 60 days after the date set for
demanding payment; or
(3) the corporation, having failed to take the proposed action, does not return the deposited certificates
or release the transfer restrictions imposed on uncertificated shares within 60 days after the date set for
demanding payment.
(b) A dissenter waives his right to demand payment under this section unless he notifies the corporation of
his demand in writing under subsection (a) within 30 days after the corporation made or offered payment for
his shares.
SUBCHAPTER C. JUDICIAL APPRAISAL OF SHARES
§ 13.30 Court Action
(a) If a demand for payment under section 13.28 remains unsettled, the corporation shall commence a proceed-
ing within 60 days after receiving the payment demand and petition the court to determine the fair value of
the shares and accrued interest. If the corporation does not commence the proceeding within the 60-day period,
it shall pay each dissenter whose demand remains unsettled the amount demoanded.
(b) The corporation shall commence the proceeding in the [name or describe] court of the county where
a corporation's principal office (or, if none in this state, its registered office) is located. If the corporation is
a foreign corporation without a registered office in this state, it shall commence the proceeding in the county
in this state where the registered office of the domestic corporation merged with or whose shares were acquired
by the foreign corporation was located.
(c) The corporation shall make all dissenters (whether or not residents of this state) whose demands remain
unsettled parties to the proceeding as in an action against their shares and all parties must be served with a
copy of the petition. Nonresidents may be served by registered or certified mail or by publication as provided
by law.
(d) The jurisdiction of the court in which the proceeding is commenced under subsection (b) is plenary and
exclusive. The court may appoint one or more persons as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend deci-
sion on the question of fair value. The appraisers have the powers described in the order appointing them,
or in any amendment to it. The dissenters are entitled to the same discovery rights as parties in other civil
proceedings.
(e) Each dissenter made a party to the proceeding is entitled to judgment (1) for the amount, if any, by which
the court finds the fair value of his shares, plus interest, exceeds the amount paid by the corporation or (2)
for the fair value, plus accrued interest, of his after-acquired shares for which the corporation elected to with-
hold payment under section 13.27.
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§ 13.31 Court Costs and Counsel Fees
(a) The court in an appraisal proceeding commenced under section 13.30 shall determine all costs of the
proceeding, including the reasonable compensation and expenses of appraisers appointed by the court. The
court shall assess the costs against the corporation, except that the court may assess costs against all or some
of the dissenters, in amounts the court finds equitable, to the extent the court finds the dissenters acted arbitrar-
ily, vexatiously, or not in good faith in demanding payment under section 13.28.
(b) The court may also assess the fees and expenses of counsel and experts for the respective parties, in
amounts the court finds equitable:
(1) against the corporation and in favor of any or all dissenters if the court finds the corporation did
not substantially comply with the requirements of sections 13.20 through 13.28; or
(2) against either the corporation or a dissenter, in favor of any other party, if the court finds that
the party against whom the fees and expenses are assessed acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good
faith with respect to the rights provided by this chapter.
(c) If the court finds that the services of counsel for any dissenter were of substantial benefit to other dis-
senters similarly situated, and that the fees for those services should not be assessed against the corporation,
the court may award to these counsel reasonable fees to be paid out of the amounts awarded the dissenters
who were benefited.
CHAPTER 14. DISSOLUTION
SUBCHAPTER A. VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION
§ 14.02 Dissolution by Board of Directors and Shareholders
(a) A corporation's board of directors may propose dissolution for submission to the shareholders.
(b) For a proposal to dissolve to be adopted:
(1) the board of directors must recommend dissolution to the shareholders unless the board of direc-
tors determines that because of conflict of interest or other special circumstances it should make no recom-
mendation and conmunicates the basis for its determination to the shareholders; and
(2) the shareholders entitled to vote must approve the proposal to dissolve as provided in subsection (e).
(c) The board of directors may condition its submission of the proposal for dissolution on any basis.
(d) The corporation shall notify each shareholder, whether or not entitled to vote, of the proposed share-
holders' meeting in accordance with section 7.05. The notice must also state that the purpose, or one of the
purposes, of the meeting is to consider dissolving the corporation.
(e) Unless the articles of incorporation or the board of directors (acting pursuant to subsection (c)) require
a greater vote or a vote by voting groups, the proposal to dissolve to be adopted must be approved by a majority
of all the votes entitled to be cast on that proposal.
§ 14.07 Untnwni Claims Against Dissolved Corporation
(a) A dissolved corporation may also publish notice of its dissolution and request that persons with claims
against the corporation present them in accordance with the notice.
(b) The notice must:
(1) be published one time in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the dissolved corpo-
ration's principal office (or, if none in this state, its registered office) is or was last located;
(2) describe the information that must be included in a claim and provide a mailing address where
the claim may be sent; and
(3) state that a claim against the corporation will be barred unless a proceeding to enforce the claim
is commenced within five years after the publication of the notice.
(c) If the dissolved corporation publishes a newspaper notice in accordance with subsection (b), the claim
of each of the following claimants is barred unless the claimant commences a proceeding to enforce the claim
against the dissolved corporation within five years after the publication date of the newspaper notice:
(1) a claimant who did not receive written notice under section 14.06;
(2) a claimant whose claim was timely sent to the dissolved corporation but not acted on;
(3) a claimant whose claim is contingent or based on an event occurring after the effective date of
dissolution.
(d) A claim may be enforced under this section:
(1) against the dissolved corporation, to the extent of its undistributed assets; or
(2) if the assets have been distributed in liquidation, against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation
to the extent of his pro rata share of the claim or the corporate assets distributed to him in liquidation,
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:1
whichever is less, but a shareholder's total liability for all claims under this section may not exceed the
total amount of assets distributed to him.
SUBCHAPTER B. ADMINISTRATIVE DISSOLUTION
§ 14.20 Grounds for Administrative Dissolution
The secretary of state may commence a proceeding under section 14.21 to administratively dissolve a corpo-
ration if:
(1) the corporation does not pay within 60 days after they are due any franchise taxes or penalties
imposed by this Act or other law;
(2) the corporation does not deliver its annual report to the secretary of state within 60 days after it is due;
(3) the corporation is without a registered agent or registered office in this state for 60 days or more;
(4) the corporation does not notify the secretary of state within 60 days that its registered agent or
registered office has been changed, that its registered agent has resigned, or that its registered office
has been discontinued; or
(5) the corporation's period of duration stated in its articles of incorporation expires.
§ 14.21 Procedure for and Effect of Administrative Dissolution
(a) If the secretary of state determines that one or more grounds exist under section 14.20 for dissolving
a corporation, he shall serve the corporation with written notice of his determination under section 5.04.
(b) If the corporation does not correct each ground for dissolution or demonstrate to the reasonable satisfac-
tion of the secretary of state that each ground determined by the secretary of state does not exist within 60
days after service of the notice is perfected under section 5.04, the secretary of state shall administratively
dissolve the corporation by signing a certificate of dissolution that recites the ground or grounds for dissolution
and its effective date. The secretary of state shalt file the original of the certificate and serve a copy on the
corporation under section 5.04.
(c) A corporation administratively dissolved continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any busi-
ness except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs under section 14.05 and notify claim-
ants under sections 14.06 and 14.07.
(d) The administrative dissolution of a corporation does not terminate the authority of its registered agent.
§ 14.22 Reinstatement Following Administrative Dissolution
(a) A corporation administratively dissolved under section 14.21 may apply to the secretary of state for rein-
statement within two years after the effective date of dissolution.
The application must:
(1) recite the name of the corporation and the effective date of its administrative dissolution;
(2) state that the ground or grounds for dissolution either did not exist or have been eliminated;
(3) state that the corporation's name satisfies the requirements of section 4.01; and
(4) contain a certificate from the [taxing authority] reciting that all taxes owed by the corporation have
been paid.
(b) If the secretary of state determines that the application contains the information required by subsection
(a) and that the information is correct, he shall cancel the certificate of dissolution and prepare a certificate
of reinstatement that recites his determination and the effective date of reinstatement, file the original of the
certificate, and serve a copy on the corporation under section 5.04.
(c) When the reinstatement is effective, it relates back to and takes effect as of the effective date of the ad-
ministrative dissolution and the corporation resumes carrying on its business as if the administrative dissolution
had never occurred.
CHAPTER 16. RECORDS AND REPORTS
SUBCHAPTER A. RECORDS
§ 16.02 Inspection of Records by Shareholders
(a) Subject to section 16.03(c), a shareholder of a corporation is entitled to inspect and copy, during regular
business hours at the corporation's principal office, any of the records of the corporation described in section
16.01(e) if he gives the corporation written notice of his demand at least five business days before the date
on which he wishes to inspect and copy.
(b) A shareholder of a corporation is entitled to inspect and copy, during regular business hours at a reasona-
ble location specified by the corporation, any of the following records of the corporation if the shareholder
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meets the requirements of subsection (c) and gives the corporation written notice of his demand at least five
business days before the date on which he wishes to inspect and copy:
(1) excerpts from minutes of any meeting of the board of directors, records of any action of a commit-
tee of the board of directors while acting in place of the board of directors on behalf of the corporation,
minutes of any meeting of the shareholders, and records of action taken by the shareholders or board
of directors without a meeting, to the extent not subject to inspection under section 16.02(a);
(2) accounting records of the corporation; and
(3) the record of shareholders.
(c) A shareholder may inspect and copy the records identified in subsection (b) only if:
(1) his demand is made in good faith and for a proper purpose;
(2) he describes with reasonable particularity his purpose and the records he desires to inspect; and
(3) the records are directly connected with his purpose.
(d) The right of inspection granted by this section may not be abolished or limited by a corporation's articles
of incorporation or bylaws.
(e) This section does not affect:
(1) the right of a shareholder to inspect records under section 7.20 or, if the shareholder is in litigation
with the corporation, to the same extent as any other litigant;
(2) the power of a court, independently of this Act, to compel the production of corporate records
for examination.

